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Debt and credit markets played a crucial role in recent economic history. This
thesis is composed of three chapters, each of which explores some drivers of private
and public debt accumulation throughout the past decade. The first two chap-
ters are directly linked, and study some behavioural determinants of household
debt accumulation in the United States in the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial
crisis. The third chapter takes a different perspective, and focuses on the political
economy of fiscal reforms.
In the first chapter, I study whether the growth in US household debt ahead of
the 2007-2008 financial crisis can be attributed to shifts in the distribution of
personal income across the US population. The underlying theoretical mechanism
is based on the idea that if individuals are concerned with status, rising income
inequality within a given social group might lead its relatively poorer members
to consume a larger proportion of their resources, due to a desire to emulate the
consumption levels of richer individuals (Duesenberry [1949]; Frank, Levine and
Dijk [2014]; Bertrand and Morse [2016]). I test this hypothesis by exploiting state-
level variation in top incomes over time, following the methodology proposed by
Bertrand and Morse [2016]. The results I present in this chapter challenge the
status-emulation theory of consumer behaviour during the 2000s credit boom.
I show that, between 1996 and 2007, only low and middle-income homeowners
increased their expenditure and debt-to-income ratios as a response to an increase
in income inequality in their state of residence. I also show that the growth in
income inequality was strongly correlated with house prices growth, across US
states and metropolitan areas. The positive correlation between inequality and
household debt in the pre-crisis US might therefore be simply explained by the
wealth and collateral effects experienced by low and middle-income homeowners
living in areas where inequality was growing at the fastest rates.
The lifting of credit constraints due to rising house prices have been a major driver
of household debt accumulation ahead of the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Mian
and Sufi [2011]). However, this effect might have been coupled with a generalized
optimistic belief that the growth in house prices was likely to continue in the
future (Case, Shiller and Thompson [2012]).
The second chapter therefore tests whether consumers hold realistic expectations
about the housing market, and whether this is a driver of their consumption and
saving decisions. Using the Michigan Survey of Consumers, I show that American
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households have heterogeneous expectations about the future of house prices,
which systematically depend upon household characteristics, as well as upon
the history of past house price realizations in the local area of residence. I also
analyze individual-level forecast errors to show that house price expectations are
biased and inefficient. Changes in individual forecast errors are predictable from
past house price realizations in the local area of residence: in particular, forecast
errors are positively correlated with recent price trends, and tend to become over-
optimistic in good times, and over-pessimistic in bad ones. The predictability
of forecast errors from public information available at the time the forecast was
made suggests a violation of full-information rational expectations theory. This
systematic bias in house price expectations matters because consumers make
financial decisions on the basis of their house price beliefs. By exploiting an
exogenous shift in housing sentiment, I show that when individuals expect the
value of their properties to rise, they borrow against the anticipated increase in
home equity.
The third and final chapter shifts the focus to the political drivers of public
debt and deficits. Public debt crises often call for the intervention of interna-
tional financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In
this chapter, I introduce a new panel dataset on planned fiscal policy prescrip-
tions included in all IMF loans between 2002 and 2012, and use it to study how
domestic politics of recipient countries influence the content of IMF lending agree-
ments. I show that IMF policy prescriptions depend strongly on domestic politics
and that fiscal conditions are shaped by a political force often neglected in public
choice literature: the threat of extra-parliamentary opposition, or civil unrest.
Extra-parliamentary opposition (measured as a populations’ propensity to riot
and demonstrate) significantly reduces the stringency of fiscal policy conditions
attached to IMF loans. It also reduces the number of reforms in the realms of
public employment and labor markets. These results suggest that fiscal policy has
a strong political component even during circumstances when domestic politics
are commonly assumed to cease to matter, as they do in IMF agreements. Also,
they suggest that voting is not the only mechanism through which politics enters
the technical realm of economic policy.
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Lay Summary
Debt and credit markets have been driving the dynamics of the real economy in
recent years. The 2007-2008 financial market crash led many developed economies
into the Great Recession. The year 2009 marked the onset of a sovereign debt
crisis at the periphery of the Eurozone, which threatened the very survival of the
currency union. To a large extent, these dynamics were triggered by private or
public debt accumulation, and from subsequent attempts at deleveraging. This
thesis is composed of three self-contained chapters, each of which discusses some
possible drivers of private and public debt accumulation throughout the past
decade. The first two chapters are directly linked, and study some determinants
of household debt accumulation in the United States in the run-up to the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. The third chapter takes a different perspective, and focuses
on public deficits and fiscal reforms.
In the first chapter, I test whether income inequality can be considered a main
driver of household debt accumulation in the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial
crisis. I challenge some results presented in previous literature, which suggest that
the rise in US household debt ahead of the recent financial crisis could be attrib-
uted to the increase in income inequality occurring across the US population in
the same years. According to this theory, inequality might have generated a desire
for higher consumption and debt levels in low and middle-income households, due
to the willingness to emulate the consumption levels of richer individuals. The
results I present in this paper challenge this particular understanding of consumer
behaviour during the 2000s credit boom. I show that the relationship between
inequality and household debt in the run-up to the 2007 financial crisis could be
simply explained by the role of house prices, which increased at higher rates in
high-inequality areas.
The increase in house prices lifted credit constraints, since homeowners were
allowed to borrow against the value of houses they already owned (Mian and Sufi
[2011]). The role of rising house prices on household debt accumulation might
however have been enhanced by a generalized optimistic belief that the growth
in house prices was likely to continue in the future (Case, Shiller and Thompson
[2012]).
In the second chapter I therefore examine how American households form house
price expectations. I find evidence that expectations about the future of the
housing market are heterogeneous across the population, and that they depend
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strongly upon past house price realizations in the local area of residence. I also
show that expectations are systematically incorrect: forecast errors are positively
correlated with recent price trends, and tend to become over-optimistic in good
times, and over-pessimistic in bad ones. The way people form house price expec-
tations matters because these expectations directly affect households’ financial
decisions. When consumers expect house prices to increase in the near future,
their mortgage leverage ratios expand accordingly. This implies that households
might be borrowing against an anticipated increase in home equity.
The third chapter shifts the focus on public sector debt, particularly on the
political drivers of fiscal reforms. I study how domestic politics influence a gov-
ernment’s decision about whether or not to undertake fiscal consolidation, in the
context of lending agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I
present a dataset including all fiscal conditions agreed between the IMF and var-
ious country representatives between 2002 and 2012. I show that macroeconomic
conditions are unable to explain all the variation in fiscal adjustment policies.
In fact, international and domestic politics have non-negligible effects on the
content of the lending agreements. In particular, I show that extra-parliamentary
opposition (measured as a populations’ propensity to riot, strike and demon-
strate) significantly reduces the stringency of fiscal policy conditions attached
to IMF loans. It also reduces the number of conditions in the realms of public
employment, privatizations, and labor market reforms. These results suggest that
economic policy, and in particular fiscal consolidation, has a strong political com-
ponent even during circumstances when domestic politics are commonly assumed
to cease to matter, as they do in IMF agreements. Moreover, they suggest that
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Introduction
Debt and credit markets played a crucial role in recent economic history. The
macroeconomic implications of the 2007-2008 financial crisis spread well beyond
the US, leading many developed economies into the Great Recession. More
recently, the onset of a sovereign debt crisis in the periphery of the Eurozone
in 2009 threatened the very survival of the European Union as a political entity.
To some extent, these events are still unfolding as I write.
The work I present in this thesis is motivated by such occurences. Much of the
policy debate, during the 2007-2008 crisis and its aftermath revolved around
macro-prudential policy, such as bank regulation mechanisms, optimal monetary
or fiscal regimes, and the combination of these aspects with international financial
flows. This thesis is an attempt to shed light on some micro-level drivers of the
macroeconomic events unfolding in the past decade, drivers that have been some-
what overlooked in the general narrative of these crises. The first two chapters
are directly connected, focusing on the drivers of household debt accumulation
in the United States in recent years, while the third chapter takes a different
perspective by analyzing the political economy of fiscal reforms. All three chapters
focus on the dynamics of debt accumulation, because they attempt to shed light
on the evolution of private and public debt levels over time.
This thesis also finds a coherent framework in its methodological approach. Tra-
ditionally, applied macroeconomic analysis has relied on time-series econometrics,
country-level panels and aggregate data as a standard methodological toolkit. I
follow instead a recent and quite innovative strand of literature, which exploits
microdata, fine-grained geographic variation and techniques typical of the applied
microeconomic literature to address macroeconomic questions. The reliance on
micro-level variation was crucial in identifying the precise mechanisms through
which housing, credit markets and household consumption were linked in turn of
the 2007-2008 crisis (Mian and Sufi [2010]). The use of microdata not only permits
to better isolate the channels through which macroeconomic outcomes may be
linked to each other but, by focusing on individual behaviour, it also allows
to disentangle these channels from aggregate macroeconomic shocks. Moreover,
agent-level heterogeneity is rapidly becoming the norm in structural macroeco-
nomic analysis. The applied analysis of the degree of heterogeneity in response to
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aggregate shocks is the natural complement to this evolution in economic theory.
In the first chapter of this thesis I exploit household-level heterogeneity in survey
data to study whether and to what extent changes in the distribution of personal
income across the US population have been a direct driver of the increase in
leverage ratio in the American economy ahead of the Great Recession. The under-
lying theoretical mechanism is based on the idea that if individuals are concerned
with status, rising income inequality within a given social group might lead its
relatively poorer members to consume a larger proportion of their resources,
due to a desire to emulate the consumption levels of richer individuals (Duesen-
berry [1949]; Frank, Levine and Dijk [2014], Bertrand and Morse [2016], Carr
and Jayadev [2014]). The within-state variation over time granted by the use
of household surveys allows me to assess whether a rise in top incomes at the
state/year level induces higher expenditure and debt levels in low and middle-
income households living in the same state at the same point in time.
In contrast with earlier literature (Bertrand and Morse [2016]), I show that there
is no evidence of a direct effect of top incomes on consumption or debt levels of
the American middle class, in the time frame under study. However, I identify
one social group that reacts more than other to increases in state-level inequality:
low and middle-income homeowners. Given an increase in top incomes relative
to median incomes, homeowners in the bottom 80th percentile of the income
distribution increase their consumption and debt-to-income ratios significantly
more than the comparable group of renters (for whom the effect of inequality is
actually negative). This effect is particularly strong for mortgage debt, and is not
explained by a change in the credit conditions at the national level, nor at the local
level, since the inclusion of interest rates charged on mortgages does not affect
the result. I show instead that rising income inequality is strongly correlated with
house price growth, within regions. The positive correlation between inequality
and household debt might therefore be more simply explained by the wealth effect
and collateral effects experienced by low and middle-income homeowners living
in areas where inequality was growing at the fastest rates.
The findings in this first chapter are relevant for the interpretation of the demand-
side mechanisms behind the 2000s credit boom. They suggests that household
debt accumulation prior to the financial crisis might not have been motivated by
a real or perceived income loss, or by a status-comparison behavioural mechanism.
Rather, the driver might have been the wealth and collateral effect associated
with higher home valuations (Mian and Sufi [2011]; DeFusco [2015]).
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The feedback mechanism between the lifting of credit constraints and the growth
in house prices has been an important driver of household debt accumulation
and household consumption, ahead of the Recession. However, this mechanism
might also have been amplified by a generalized optimistic belief that the growth
in house prices was likely to continue in the future (Case Shiller and Thompson
[2012]; Adelino, Schoar and Severino [2016]).
The second chapter therefore tests directly whether consumers hold realistic
expectations about the future of the housing market, and whether this is a driver
of their consumption and saving decisions. I use the microdata contained in
the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and exploit its variation along the lines of
geography and time, to analyse how American households form house price expec-
tations and how expectations depend upon the characteristics of their local area
of residence. I show that consumers hold heterogeneous beliefs about the future
of house prices, which largely depend on the history of past house price real-
izations in the local area of residence. Experiencing a state-level house price
increase over the previous year leads households to forecast a price increase sig-
nificantly higher, at the one-year horizon. Exploiting the panel component of
the Michigan Survey, I also estimate individual-level forecast errors, and present
evidence of a systematic extrapolative bias in consumers’ house price expec-
tations. Whenever house prices are increasing in their area of residence, individual
become over-optimistic about the future (and vice versa). The predictability
of forecast errors from past house price realizations indicates a violation of full-
information rational expectations theory. This systematic bias matters because
consumers seem to be making financial decisions on the basis of their house
price beliefs. By exploiting an instrumental variable technique based on an exoge-
nous shift in housing sentiment, I show that when individuals expect the value
of their properties to rise, the leverage ratios on their mortgages rises accordingly.
This result has relevant policy implications: in presence of a systematic bias in
consumer house price expectations, house prices and mortgage markets may be
subject to endogenous excess volatility (over-optimism in booms, and over-pes-
simism in busts). Then boom and bust cycles in the housing market may therefore
be recurrent (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer [2016]) and pose substantial risks
to macroeconomic and financial stability.
The third chapter shifts the focus to public debt and deficits, and their political
drivers. The 2007-2008 financial crisis affected the public balance sheets of many
developed economies. This was due in part to the direct cost of bank rescues,
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and in part to the cost of the fiscal stimuli which many governments initially
implemented in order to sustain aggregate demand in face of the credit crunch
and the recession. These events, coupled with some pre-existing fiscal imbalances,
triggered the onset of a public debt crisis in the periphery of the Eurozone, in
2009.
Public debt crises of this sort often call for the intervention of international
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The policy
advice provided by these institutions is generally presented as being motivated
by purely economic circumstances. In the third chapter, I introduce a new panel
dataset on fiscal policy prescriptions included in all IMF loans between 2002
and 2012, and use it to study to what extent the domestic politics of recipient
countries influence the content of these lending agreements. I show that macro-
economic conditions are unable to explain all the variation in fiscal adjustment
policies. In particular, fiscal conditions are shaped by a political force often
neglected in public choice literature: the threat of extra-parliamentary opposi-
tion, or civil unrest. I show that a population’s propensity to riot, demonstrate
and strike significantly reduces the extent of public budget reforms a country is
required to carry out as a part of the IMF agreements. All else held equal, two
additional episodes of civil unrest in each of the three years prior to the agreement
reduce fiscal consolidation targets and structural conditionality in the realms
of welfare state, labor markets and public employment reform by a significant
amount. The results are robust to controls for the economic circumstances of the
country; to political variables which previous literature has shown to be relevant
in determining IMF conditionality; and to some potential selection issues. This
evidence suggests that fiscal consolidation has a strong political component even
during circumstances when domestic politics are commonly assumed to cease to
matter, as in the case of IMF agreements. Moreover, it suggests that voting is not
the only mechanism through which politics enters the technical realm of economic
policy.
This thesis is an attempt to shed light over some recent historical events which left
behind many open questions for the field of macroeconomics. I see these chapters
as the beginning of a personal research agenda, as well as modest attempts to
reach a better understanding of the events unfolding in the past decade.
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CHAPTER 11
Income Inequality and Household Debt: the Role
of Home Ownership
1.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature suggests that rising income inequality was at the
root of the recent financial crisis (Van Treeck[2014]). This literature highlights
the correlation between two prominent trends affecting household balance sheets
over the past three decades: the growth of income inequality and the growth
of household debt levels (Figure 1.1). The saving rates of American low and
middle-income consumers, in particular, began declining as soon as inequality
started to soar, in the middle 1980s (Rajan [2010]). This has led some authors to
argue that poor and middle-income American consumers borrowed beyond their
own capacity to repay in order to sustain consumption levels despite stagnating
real incomes, generating fragility in the financial system (Rajan [2010]; Kumhof
Ranciere Winant [2015]).2
This chapter attempts to ascertain whether rising income inequality can be con-
sidered a direct driver of the consumption choices of low and middle-income
American consumers in the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. I focus in
particular on testing the relative income hypothesis (Duesenberry [1949]), which
received substantial attention in the public discourse as well as in academic circles
(Frank, Levine and Dijk [2014]; Bertrand and Morse [2016]; Carr and Jayadev
[2015]; De Giorgi Fredriksen and Pistaferri [2016]). This theory suggests that an
increase in income at the top of the distribution could directly drive consumption
choices at the bottom. If individuals are concerned with status, rising income
inequality within a given social group will lead its relatively poorer members
1. This chapter was previously circulated as a working paper with title : “Debt, Inequality and House
Prices: Explaining the Dynamics of Household Borrowing Prior to the Great Recession” Edinburgh
School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, n.259 (2015).
2. The decade before the crisis is the time frame in US history when, for the first time since before the Great
Depression, the top decile income share increased beyond 45% (Piketty Saez [2014]). During the same time
frame, US households accumulated almost half of the debt outstanding at the onset of the crisis (Figure 1.2).
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to consume a larger proportion of their resources, due to a desire to emulate
the consumption levels of richer individuals. Low and middle-income consumers
might therefore accumulate higher debt despite no real income change. Recent
empirical literature finds support for this hypothesis, suggesting that inequality
might have been a direct driver of household debt accumulation in the US prior to
the 2007 financial crisis (Bertrand and Morse [2016]; Carr and Jayadev [2015]).3
The results I present in this chapter challenge this particular understanding of
consumer behaviour during the 2000s credit boom. My results show that between
the mid-1990s and 2007 there is no significant empirical relationship between
the growth in income inequality and the growth in consumption or debt levels
of low and middle-income American households. On the other hand, exploiting
household-level heterogeneity in the data allows me to identify one particular
social group that reacted strongly to changes in income inequality within this time
frame: low and middle-income homeowners. Homeowners living in geographical
areas where inequality increased at the fastest rates displayed a positive growth
in consumption and debt levels, while renters living in the same state did not.
My results also show that the growth in within-region income inequality was
associated with a higher-than-average growth in house prices , in the same region.
Therefore, the empirical relationship between inequality and household debt in
the context of the pre-crisis US might be simply explained by the wealth and
collateral effects experienced by homeowners living in high inequality areas.
My empirical approach relies on the use of state-level variation in top incomes over
time to analyze how the consumption and debt levels of all households falling in
the bottom eight deciles of the income distribution respond to changes in income
levels of richer households living in the same state. In other words, I test whether
when relatively richer households become richer, relatively poorer households
residing in the same state tend to consume more out of their income. Using the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), I show that given a 10% increase in top
incomes relative to median incomes, homeowners in the bottom eight deciles of
the income distribution increase their consumption of non-durable goods (unre-
lated to housing expenditure) by 4.6 percent more than the comparable group of
renters. Since the net effect of top incomes on renters’ consumption is negative,
this estimation implies that a 10% increase in top incomes relative to median
incomes is correlated with an absolute increase in low and middle-income home-
3. For a complete survey of the recent literature on this topic see Van Treeck [2014].
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owners’ non-housing consumption worth 0.7 percent. Using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) I also show that inequality has a positive effect on
homeowners’ debt-to-income ratios. Given a 10% increase in top incomes, the
debt-to-income ratios of homeowners rise by 6.4 percent more than those of the
comparable group of renters, or 1.8 percent in absolute terms. This effect is
not explained by a change in credit conditions, as the interest rates charged on
mortgages were not significantly affected by changes in income at the top of the
distribution. This evidence might instead be explained by the fact that the within-
region growth in income inequality was positively correlated with the growth in
house prices. Using the PSID and the American Housing Survey (AHS), I show
that a 10% increase in top incomes relative to median incomes, between 1994 and
2007, was correlated with an average yearly increase in the self-reported value of
homes worth about 0.5% per year across US states and close to 0.9% per year
across the main metropolitan areas.
These findings are relevant for the interpretation of the demand-side mecha-
nisms behind the 2000s credit boom. Earlier research has shown that, during this
time frame, homeowners have exploited the collateral effects arising from housing
wealth (Aron et.al [2010]; DeFusco [2015]) and that home-equity loans were used
to finance consumption (Mian and Sufi [2009;2011]). While my results do not
necessarily discount the psychological driver at the heart of the relative income
hypothesis, they show that the empirical results in support of such a theory could
be substantially understating the role of a reduction in borrowing constraints
based on the increase in housing wealth. It should however be emphasized that
I do not attempt to address causality concerns. The within-state change in top
incomes is not exogenous to the consumption levels of poorer households living
in the same state or to the change in house prices: all can be simultaneously
determined by state-level time-varying unobserved factors (technological or fiscal
policy shocks, for example). Despite these concerns, my results clearly indicate
that owners responded to changes in state-level income inequality, while renters
did not; and that changes in inequality were highly correlated with changes in
house prices, within states an metro areas. For these results to be capturing unob-
served state-level variation (and thus for the OLS estimate to be upwardly biased)
it would be necessary that the unobserved shock were to change simultaneosly top
incomes and the consumption levels of poorer homeowners, leaving poorer renters
unaffected. In other words, housing wealth seem to have played a pivotal role in
explaining the link between inequality-debt cycle during the decade that preceded
the 2007 financial crisis. This evidence provides an alternative explanation for
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this empirical relationship, which insofar has been based on two major theories.
The first line of thought is that inequality has historically led towards an eas-
ening of the credit conditions applied to poor borrowers (Rajan [2010]). During
the decade preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the average interest rate on
household debt fell considerably (Figure 1.4). This is also the decade during
which income inequality in the US grew at the fastest rates since before the Great
Depression (Piketty and Saez [2014]). Inequality might be therefore associated
with particularly low interest rates. This theory is formally developed by Kumhof
et.al. [2015], in a DSGE model which establishes a link between inequality, pri-
vate debt, and financial crises. Assuming a decreasing marginal propensity to
consume over the income ladder, top earners might be induced to invest (or lend)
proportionally more of their resources, as their income increases. The influx of
savings in the market lowers the real interest rate, inducing higher borrowing on
the side of the most credit-constrained consumers and endogenously leading to
widespread defaults. Kumhof et.al. [2015] present results that are able to replicate
the long term dynamics of the US economy (both for the Great Depression and
the Great Recession). However, the empirical evidence in Coibion et al. [2014]
challenges this hypothesis; using microdata on bank credit originations, they find
that inequality actually reduced credit provision to poor applicants across the US.
They interpret their results as indicative that inequality functions as a screening
device for lenders, who choose to lend to richer applicants whenever possible. I
test whether the price of debt is driving my results, and find no evidence that
changing top incomes affect mortgage interest rates in any significant way.
The second line of thought is related to the relative income hypothesis, originally
developed by Duesenberry [1949] and most recently formalized by Frank, Levine
and Dijk [2014]. This chapter is mainly a contribution to this second strand
of literature. According to the theory of relative income, consumers compare
their standard of living with those of their reference group of peers. If inequality
increases within a reference group, individuals may consume more, given constant
real income, in order to keep up with the consumption levels of richer individuals.
The desire for positional goods might therefore explain why debt arises even in
absence of a real income change. This hypothesis has been tested empirically
mostly on aggregate data: Christen and Morgan [2005] find a strong effect of
inequality on debt levels in the US pre-2000. Bowles and Park [2005] find that
higher inequality is associated with longer working hours. More recently, Carr and
Jayadev [2015] and Bertrand and Morse [2016] use microdata on the American
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economy of the past two decades to test the relative income hypothesis, finding
evidence in its support. All else held equal, when low and middle-income Amer-
icans have been exposed to higher levels inequality, they have been saving less
and consuming more, especially on visible goods (Bertrand and Morse [2016]).
I borrow extensively from Bertrand and Morse’s [2016] methodology. I however
extend their analysis in several directions. First of all, I focus on disentangling the
role of income inequality from the role of house prices, by studying specifically the
decade preceding the 2007 financial crisis. Bertrand and Morse [2016] explicitly
address whether their results might be driven by an increase in house prices,
and they dismiss this potential confounding factor via two empirical tests. In
particular, they show that splitting the sample between homeowners and renters
does not indicate evidence of a statistically different effect of inequality between
the two groups. Also, they show that homeowners were reacting more strongly to
increases in inequality prior to the start of the housing boom (before 1995). The
discrepancy between my results and theirs is explained by the fact that Bertrand
and Morse [2016] do not explicitly address whether homeownership is driving
their results during the housing boom. However, this is the time frame when the
majority of US household debt was accumulated. Also, by using interaction terms
and by focusing on different expenditure categories (housing VS non-housing
consumption) I am able to show that in the decade preceding the crisis there
was a sizeable difference in the response to changes in income inequality between
homeowners and renters. Furthermore, I extend their analysis by analyzing the
effects of income inequality on household debt levels and leverage ratios (using the
PSID), which are not addressed in Bertrand and Morse’s paper. Finally, in the
second part of this chapter, I provide evidence of a strong empirical relationship
between the growth rates of income inequality and of house prices across US states
and metropolitan areas. Overall, the evidence I present in this chapter suggests
that inequality was not a direct driver of household debt accumulation ahead of
the 2007-2008 financial crisis (as suggested by Bertrand and Morse). Rather, the
channel through which income inequality affects consumption is likely to be via
the wealth and collateral effects originating from rising house prices, which are
highly correlated with growth in income inequality within geographical areas.
In order to identify the trends between inequality, consumption, debt and house
prices, I rely on three different household surveys. Section 1.2 describes each of
them in detail. Section 1.3 presents the first part of the empirical analysis, or
the relationship between inequality and consumption/debt accumulation. Section
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1.4 provides evidence of the empirical link between inequality and house prices.
Section 1.5 briefly summarizes the chapter.
1.2 Data description
The empirical analyses of this chapter require disaggregated data on consump-
tion, wealth, and income of a representative sample of American households over
a relatively long span of time. For this reason, I gather data from several pop-
ulation surveys: the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, and the American Housing Survey. These are well-known but complex
data sources and their usage requires some discretionary choices. This section
describes these choices in detail.
1.2.1 The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is the most comprehensive American
household survey on consumer behavior, and Bertrand and Morse [2016] use this
dataset in their estimations. Therefore, this is a natural starting point for my
analysis. The sample has a cross-sectional structure, is composed by about 6000
households per year and is nationally representative through sample weights. It
consists of two main questionnaires for each interview in any given year (each
household is required to respond to four interviews per year).
The first questionnaire is the Diary Survey: this collects data on weekly expendi-
tures of frequently purchased items such as food at home, food away from home,
alcoholic beverages, smoking supplies, personal care products and services, and
nonprescription drugs. The second questionnaire, the Interview Survey, collects
data on monthly expenditures for housing, apparel and services, transportation,
health care, entertainment, personal care, reading, education, food, tobacco, cash
contributions, personal insurance, and pensions. Both surveys therefore collect
data on non-durables expenditure.
I use the Interview Survey as it provides a wider range of information on house-
holds’ consumption behaviour, and it allows me to discriminate between housing
and non-housing expenditure. In order to be consistent with Bertrand and Morse
[2016], I exclude families who fail to respond to all four interviews and families
with zero total consumption. The exclusion of families that do not respond to all
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surveys takes a large toll on the sample size: I am left with about 1000 families
per given year. However, this is needed in order to construct a yearly measure
of expenditure, since the questionnaires are conducted on a quarterly basis, and
respondents are only required to give information on expenditure in the previous
quarter . Therefore, in order to provide a precise estimate of the yearly expen-
diture for any category of goods, it is necessary to sum the responses for the
entire set of (four) interviews. Yearly figures are necessary because the empirical
strategy relies on the allocation of households to certain deciles of the income
distribution, based on their annual income. Also, this facilitates comparison with
other survey variables used in this chapter, which are always expressed in annual
terms. Moreover, the exclusion of households who fail to respond to all four
interviews is a standard procedure when working with the CEX.4
Somewhat differently from Bertrand and Morse [2016], I rely on the aggregate
consumption categories reported in the summary expenditure variables of the
Interview questionnaire: total expenditure and housing expenditure. I do so for
simplicity, and to allow for an easier replication of my results. My CEX sample
is restricted to the interviews taking place from 1996 onwards, since these are the
only waves available from the Bureau of Labour Statistics Website.
1.2.2 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
I use the PSID because it provides information on households’ wealth and finan-
cial liabilities, unlike the CEX. While other American household surveys provide
this information (the Survey of Consumer Finances, for example), the PSID is
the only source that also grants access to information about the geographical
area of residence of respondents, a crucial part of my empirical methodology. The
PSID grew substantially over the years, and from an original sample of about
6000 households in 1968, it now stands at about 8500 American families being
continuously interviewed. My sample is restricted to 1996-2011. I only take into
account families reporting both a positive level of income and of consumption in a
given year, and I am left with a sample of about 14000 household heads observed
over time. The discrepancy between the panel of families in each cohort and of
household heads is due to family spin-offs and drop outs (the PSID is structured
to followed individuals, rather than families).
4. Also Blundell Pistaferri and Preston [2008] apply the same criteria and are left with about 8% of
the original CEX sample.
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1.2.3 The American Housing Survey
I will use the American Housing Survey as a source of information on house price
changes experienced by individual households in US metropolitan areas. The
main advantage of using the American Housing Survey (AHS) over other surveys
describing the US housing stock, is its combination of a panel structure with the
provision of a vast array of information on housing quality. Families are required
to provide detailed information about their homes, including square-foot size,
number of bedrooms/bathrooms, and recent renovations. This information allows
one to take into account changes in housing quality which might have affected its
value. The AHS surveys around sixty-thousand families per year, and alternates
the year when it samples National data with years when it samples a subset of
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). However, the lowest geographical level
identifiable in the National survey is the macro region (NE, NW, SE, SW), and
this impedes a direct comparison with the CEX and PSID.
The Metropolitan survey, on the other hand, captures more fine-grained geo-
graphical information. It cycles through a set of 21 metropolitan areas, surveying
each one about once every six years. Like the national survey, the metro survey
is longitudinal. However, metro survey samples have been redrawn more often
than the national samples, and this reduces the time spans where the longitu-
dinal dimension applies. During 1996-2008, the metro surveys were conducted
four times. This allows me to identify two sets of information on family-level
home value change. The first set is composed by MSAs surveyed in 1996 and
2004: Atlanta, Cleveland, Hartford, Indianapolis, Memphis, Oklahoma City, St.
Louis and Seattle.5 The second panel was collected in 1998 and 2007, and com-
prises Boston, Baltimore, Houston, Minneapolis, Tampa, and Washington DC.
My dataset is therefore composed of 14 MSAs and two panels: the two samples
interviewed in 1996-2004 and in 1998-2007.
The metro survey also samples about 60,000 individuals per year, but many
were excluded from the analysis according to the following criteria. About 45%
of the respondents are renters. I also exclude households that report negative or
zero income. Moreover, not all households respond to both waves of the survey,
and those who do not are naturally dropped from the analysis (as my main
5. The AHS sample also includes Sacramento (CA), but these observations are excluded from the
empirical analysis since I have no information on some of the covariates (for example, the elasticity of
housing supply) for this MSA.
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dependent variable is the change in value of their primary residence). I also
exclude households who changed residence between the two time periods and
those who changed the size of their houses through additions (measured as the
change in the number of rooms). This is because I am interested in measuring the
change in home value experienced by a given household on the same property,
throughout the years. Changes in residence would impede such comparison (since
in each interview households only report the current home value), and substantial
modifications of the structure of the house would have a similar effect (since the
change in home value would not only capture the change in price per se , but also
the change in size). Overall, I work on a sample of about 9000 households.
1.3 Consumption and debt
This section focuses on whether changes in the distribution of income between
the mid 1990s and the 2007 financial crisis were related to American households’
propensity to consume and borrow. I will use two data sources for this purpose:
the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
1.3.1 Methodology and descriptive statistics
Since the mid-1990s, the distribution of income became more unequal across the
US: in real terms the bottom 60% of American households experienced a real
income loss between 1999 and 2007 (Figure 1.3). Nevertheless, their propensity to
consume increased. In particular, the expenditure-to-income ratio of the bottom
four deciles of the income distribution grew by 15% over this time span, despite
the real income loss (Figure 1.3). Debt-to-income ratios also increased dispropor-
tionately at the bottom of the income distribution. The change in debt-to-income
ratios for the bottom quintile is close to 200% in eight years, while the second
quintile experienced a 100% increase. Surprisingly, this effect is not due to higher
access of lower-income households to home ownership: the home ownership rate
for the bottom four deciles of the income distribution decreased by an average
10% over this time span. This suggests that the rising aggregate debt-to income-
ratio reflects the intensive, rather than extensive, margin.
The trends described by Figure 1.3 imply that while inequality increased between
the mid 1990s and the late 2000s, consumption inequality has not followed suit
(as systematically documented by Krueger and Perri [2006], among others). All
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quintiles increased expenditure and debt levels, and poorer households even more
so.
In this section I study the relationship between the levels of low and middle-
income households’ debt and consumption and the levels of inequality in their
state of residence. This choice is rooted in the theory of relative income, which
predicts that people will try to keep up with the behaviour (consumption levels) of
their reference group. A reference group is defined as the people a given family is
more likely to know and/or interact with. Therefore, focusing on the geographical
area of residence has the purpose of identifying reference groups at the finest level
of detail which the publicly available data allows to reach.6
To study the empirical relationship between inequality and consumption, I will
follow closely the empirical methodology suggested by Bertrand and Morse [2015]
which is based on the following equation:
logYist= a+ β1XistI + β2log(80thPercentileIncome)st+ β3ZstI + χs + ψt + εist (1)
where logYist is household expenditure or outstanding debt for family i in state
s at year t.7 XistI is a vector of family specific characteristics, namely: total
family income; number of adults and children in household; age, race, gender and
educational attainment of household head; and home ownership status.8 ZstI is
a vector of controls for state-level time-varying characteristics which might be
correlated both with inequality and consumption or debt. The inequality measure
log(80thPercentileIncome)st is defined at the state/year level; following Bertrand
and Morse [2016] it is the average annual income of the top 20% of the state/year
income distribution as defined by the Current Population Survey (CPS).9
6. The publicly available CEX and PSID datasets do not report any level of geographic detail other
than the state of residence. One could, of course, think about other (and probably more relevant)
reference groups: for example along the lines of gender, occupation, educational attainment, or race.
Both the PSID as the CEX contain detailed information at the household level, and would allow for
a subdivision of households along these lines. However the CEX and the PSID are not designed to be
representative within states and state-level sample sizes can be rather small. The state-level measure
of inequality is therefore the finest level of detail I can reach while respecting the structure of the data
and its sampling design.
7. Income and expenditure variables are expressed in real terms. The CPI measure is local (state-level)
as computed by Carrillo, Early, Olsen (2014).
8. While Bertrand&Morse[2016] control for family income by including categories for income thresholds
every $2000, I instead control for the actual measure of family income (annual gross income before
taxes).
9. While I could compute income distribution based on the CEX or on the PSID, the CPS is more
reliable when it comes to income distribution analysis due to its much larger sample size (about 60,000
surveys per year). The CPS on the other hand does not collect data on assets, liabilities or consumption.
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Time trends, assumed to affect all states equally at the same point in time, are
taken into account by year fixed-effects; and so are the time-invariant character-
istics of each state due to the inclusion of state fixed-effect. The coefficient β2
therefore measures the effect of within-state change in top incomes over time on
the consumption levels of poorer households living in the same state.
Using the Current Population Survey to measure the deciles of the state/year
income distribution also allows one to identify the minimum income threshold
required for a CEX or PSID household to fall into the top two deciles of their
state/year cell. If the household falls into this category, it is dropped from the
sample. All remaining families (those below the 80th percentile of the state/year
cell) are defined as “non-rich” households, and are the sample upon which I run the
estimations. All models include sample weights, and the residuals are clustered
at the state level, to account for the presence of a common random effect within
states across families.10 The model in Equation (1) simply tries to answer the
following question: if average top incomes rise in a given state/year, do poorer
families in the same state/year spend more?
1.3.2 Consumption: baseline
Since the starting point of my analysis is Bertrand and Morse’s [2016] method-
ology, this section provides a comparison between my baseline results and theirs.
The main challenge associated with this exercise is the discrepancy in time frame:
while Bertrand and Morse’ dataset spans from 1980 to the late 2000s, mine only
spans 1996 onwards, since these are the only waves of data publicly available
from the Bureau of Labour Statistics.11 Moreover, Bertrand and Morse do not
provide regression estimates split over a subset of years. This prevents an exact
comparison of my results with theirs. Nevertheless, they run a model very similar
to Equation (1), where top incomes interact with dummy variables indicating
each decade in their sample (1980s, 1990s, 2000s).12 Therefore, Table 1.1 provides
a set of estimations based on Equation (1) only for the years after 1999, in order
to provide baseline coefficients that are as closely comparable as possible with
the coefficients estimated by Bertrand and Morse in their model with interaction
terms. The results are displayed in Column 1 of Table 1.1, showing that during
10. A discussion of the clusterization of standard errors in this context is provided in Appendix A1.2.
11. Also, the CEX is collected yearly; however, to facilitate comparison with the PSID, I only study
the years for which also the PSID sample is available, namely 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007,
2009, 2011.
12. Bertrand and Morse[2016], in Column 1, Internet Appendix A3.
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the 2000s inequality had no statistically significant effect on non-rich households’
consumption. The coefficient is positive (+0.19), but not statistically different
from zero. This might seem a susprising result: however this cofficient is almost
identical to the coefficient found by Bertrand and Morse (associated with the
interaction term between top incomes and the dummy for the 2000s).13 While
in general they find strong evidence of the relationship between inequality and
higher consumption in the bottom deciles of the distribution, they also find this
relationship to be weaker during the 2000s. The interaction term between this
decade and top incomes is positive (+0.21) but not significant.
Bertrand and Morse control for wealth effects on consumption by splitting the
sample between homeowners and renters.14 In columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.1, I
run the same test: in the subset of sample covering the years between 2000 and
2011, owners do not seem to react to increasing inequality more than renters.
In fact, splitting the sample between homeowners and renters seems to indicate
that renters respond more to changes in inequality, which is also consistent with
some of the baseline results presented by Bertrand and Morse [2016].15 However,
by allowing all coefficients (including time and state dummies) to differ across
the two models, one cannot easily test whether the difference in the coefficient
associated with top incomes between owners and renters is significant.
I run a more precise test of whether the two coefficients are statistically different
from each other, by including an interaction between the inequality measure with
a dummy variable indicating homeownership status (Column 4). This model
constrains all coefficients to be the same across the two groups, except for the
effect of homeownership. This test shows that the higher effect of inequality on
renters’ consumption levels, albeit positive (+0.209), is not statistically different
from zero.
Table 1.1 has the purpose of confirming that I can broadly replicate some of
Bertrand and Morse’s [2016] results on the time frame under study. However,
Table 1.1 also shows that a differential effect of inequality between owners and
renters could not have been inferred from a simple comparison of the coefficients
in Columns 2 and 3. Since the interactive model instead allows an evaluation of
the statistical significance of such difference, I will is use this model, rather than
a split of the sample, in the following estimations.
13. Bertrand and Morse[2016], in Column 1, Internet Appendix A3.
14. Bertrand and Morse [2016], Table 5, Panel A, Columns 1 and 2
15. Ibidem.
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1.3.3 Consumption: the role of home ownership
I study consumption as a function of income inequality using the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. The point of this exercise is to study the drivers of household
debt accumulation ahead of the 2007 financial crisis. This is the time frame
during which the US experienced the highest growth rates of household debt
in three decades.16 It is also the time frame when inequality grew at the fastest
rate since the decade preceding the Great Depression (Piketty and Saez [2014]).
Therefore the positive correlation between inequality and household debt growth
holds during this time frame. This section attempts to identify whether such
relationship is direct or mediated by other factors.
Therefore, Table 1.2 replicates the analysis presented in Table 1.1 focusing on
the pre-crisis years: the estimation includes the late 1990s and excludes the years
after 2008.
Column 1 shows that, for the overall population, the relationship between top
incomes and non-rich households’ consumption is positive but not significantly
different from zero. This is similar to the result found in Column 1 of Table
1.1, albeit with a different magnitude. This is the first interesting result of this
section, because it suggests that during the decade when the majority of US
household debt was accumulated, there is no evidence of a direct relationship
between regional growth in income inequality and changes in the consumption
behaviour of low and middle-income households.
In Column 2, I test whether household-level heterogeneity can shed some addi-
tional light on this result. I estimate the same model of Column 1 with the
addition of an interaction term between top incomes home-ownership status. The
interaction between inequality and home-ownership status is positive and strongly
significant (1% level). During this time frame, non-rich homeowners responded
to rising inequality with a much higher increase in consumption than renters
did. Specifically, the elasticity of response was +0.35; for every 10% increase
in the income of top earners in a given state/year, non-rich homeowners’ real
consumption increased by 3.5 percent more than renters .
A concern with this first specification is that the differential effect of inequality on
homeowners expenditure might mechanically reflect the increasing house prices
faced by new homebuyers over this time period. If an increase in inequality
16. See Figure 1.2.
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at the state level was correlated with the rise the value of residential housing
(perhaps because rising inequality reflects skilled migration and/or gentrification
dynamics) then the higher expenditure on the side of homeowners might simply
reflect the additional cost imposed on new home buyers by these social and
demographic changes occurring at the state level. Rental prices do not neces-
sarily follow purchasing prices, and this might alone explain the differential effect
between owners and renters. Since I have no way to isolate new homeowners
from existing homeowners (because the CEX is a repeated cross section in which
families are observed at most for one year and gives no indication of when a
household bought its current home), I eliminate housing expenditure from total
expenditure. The increase in consumption on the side of homeowners was not due
to higher expenditure in housing. In fact, Column 3 shows that expenditure for
shelter is not significantly affected by rising top incomes, and that in this respect
owners and renters do not differ from each other. This suggests that if inequality
was correlated with higher house prices, this affected both purchasing prices and
rental prices alike. On the other hand, Column 4 shows that the elasticity of non-
housing consumption to rising inequality is about 0.49 percent higher for non-
rich homeowners than for renters. This effect does not capture aggregate income
trends, as the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for median incomes at
the state level (Column 5). This latter result suggests that homeowners (and
homeowners only) were increasing non-housing consumption when inequality was
increasing in their state of residence.
However, this result might be biased by the fact that homeowners, on average, are
richer than renters, so they might be closer (socially/geographically) to the richest
people in their states of residence. Since I have no information on the precise geo-
graphic location of these families besides their state of residence, column 6 tries
to address this concern by exploiting their position in the income distribution.
I include a dummy for each different decile of the income distribution that non-
rich households fall into (ranging from decile 1 to decile 7, as the top two deciles
are excluded from the estimations). This barely affects the coefficient of the
interaction term and does not change its significance. Overall, Column 6 shows
that a 10% increase in inequality is associated with an increase in non-housing
consumption about 4.6 percent larger for homeowners than for renters. Since
the effect of inequality on renters’ consumption is negative (-3.9 percent), this
estimation implies that a 10% increase in top incomes relative to median incomes
is correlated with an increase in non-rich homeowners’ non-housing consumption
worth 0.7 percent. This effect is small, but positive and significant.
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1.3.4 Household debt
I study the relationship between top income and non-rich households’ debt accu-
mulation using the PSID because, unlike the CEX, it contains information about
households’ financial liabilities.
Column 1 of Table 1.3 shows that there is no significant relationship between non-
rich households’ debt levels and changes in top incomes during this time frame.
This is consistent with the results presented in Table 1.2. However, non-rich
homeowners strongly and significantly increased their debt-to-income ratios as
a result of the increase in inequality in their state of residence. The elasticity of
their response is about 0.64 percent higher than that of renters’ (Column 2). This
implies that for a 10% increase in top incomes relative to median incomes, non-
rich homeowners increase their debt-to-income ratios by 1.8 percent, on average.
This result is robust to controls for median incomes and for the average state-
level mortgage interest rate charged to families below the 80th percentile of the
income distribution.17 The differential effect of inequality on homeowners’ debt-
to-income ratios is mostly due to mortgage debt: Column 3 shows that inequality
has no significant differential effect on consumer debt levels, between the two
groups.
However, as suggested by Kumhof et.al. [2015], changes in inequality might gen-
erate an influx of savings on the market and therefore reduce the real interest
rate. These results might therefore be driven by the price of mortgage debt:
median interest rates on mortgages fell considerably in the US during the housing
boom (Figure 1.4). However that individual-level interest rates on first mortgages
are not significantly affected by changes in top incomes versus median incomes
(Column 4).18
Interestingly, leverage ratios (measured as outstanding mortgages to house value)
seem to be negatively affected by changes in top incomes (Column 5). A 10%
increase in top incomes is correlated with a reduction in non-rich homeowners’
leverage ratios worth 0.7 percent. This suggests that if mortgages were the main
component of the increase in the debt-income ratio of non-rich home owners,
they were more than offset by an increase in house prices.
17. The PSID includes information on the interest rate charged on first-mortgages at the family level.
In these regressions I include a control for the state-level interest rate, computed as a weighted average
of the interested rates reported by respondent families in the state/year cell.
18. Also, Figure 1.4 shows that the dispersion in mortgage interest rates across US states is relatively
low, suggesting that the lending market is mostly influenced by the FED rates, rather than by regional
characteristics.
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This section shows that the relationship between income inequality and consump-
tion/debt of low and middle-income households is likely to have been mediated
by homeownership status, prior to 2008. In particular, only non-rich homeowners
were responding to increases in inequality in their state of residence by increasing
their consumption and debt levels. An implication of this evidence is that rising
inequality might have been correlated with a wealth or collateral effect experi-
enced by non-rich homeowners, in the form of rising house prices.
1.4 Income inequality and house prices
In this section, I test to what extent inequality has been related to the change in
house prices across the US, in the decade preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
I analyse this effect by means of two different data sources: the PSID, at the level
of states, and the American Housing Survey, at the level of metropolitan areas.
1.4.1 Methodology and descriptive statistics
Between 1996 and 2008, the average American family reported an increase in
the value of their main residence between 5 and 10 percentage points every two
years (Figure 1.5). The wealth increase suddenly stopped after 2008. However,
this change in house prices was not homogenous across the US territory. Some of
the most striking differences can be seen, for example, across metropolitan areas.
As Figure 1.6 shows, the Washington DC metropolitan area experienced a real
increase in house prices worth about 60% between 1998 and 2007, almost double
the national average. The house price growth rate in Houston, Texas, during the
same years, was instead only around 10%.
In order to estimate the relationship between inequality and the increase in
housing wealth, I estimate the following model:
∆pigt= a+ β1XigtI + β2∆log(80thPercentileIncome)gt+ β3ZgtI + χg + ψt + εiigt , (2)
where ∆pigt is the change in the (self reported) value of housing assets of family i,
in geographical area g, between year t-n and year t . This model, unlike equation
(1), is expressed in first-differences, as both the PSID and the AHS data sources
have a panel structure (unlike the CEX) and the methodology does not rely on
interaction terms. My dependent variable is the change in home valuation at the
family-level between two time periods. Using a model in changes, rather than
levels, also prevents me from capturing spurious correlation between variables.
For consistency, all other regressors are also expressed in first-differences.
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Xigt
I is a vector of family-specific characteristics which include the log of levels of
family income; the change in income between t− n and t; age, race, educational
attainment, marriage status and gender of the household head; number of chil-
dren in the household. The inequality measure, ∆log(80thPercentileIncome)gt,
is the same as in other specifications (average income in the top two deciles of
the state/year income distribution, measured by the CPS), but is expressed in
changes (between t-n and t). I also run some robustness checks using a more
standard measure of inequality, using changes in Gini coefficients (also computed
from the March CPS).
Zgt
I is a vector of geographical area-specific characteristics which might affect
house prices, namely: changes in median incomes; changes in the elasticity of
housing supply, measured by Saiz [2010]; change in homeownership rates mea-
sured by the CPS; 10-year change in population size measured by the census;
average change in interest rate on mortgages reported by PSID respondents
between t−n and t. All geographical-area specific measures (including inequality)
are expressed at the state level in PSID estimations and at the metro area level
in the AHS estimations. Finally, geographic and year fixed effects are included
as usual. All regressions are weighted with the sample weights provided in the
surveys, and errors are clustered at the level of geographical areas (states in
Section 1.4.2 and metropolitan areas in Section 1.4.3).
I exclude households which changed ownership status between the two periods;
those who changed residence; and those who did not move but changed the size
of their house (measured as the number of rooms).19 This is because ∆pigt needs
to reflect the change in wealth experienced by homeowners on the same house
(which did not go though major improvements that might have substantially
affected its value).
1.4.2 Inequality and house prices: US states
Table 1.4 studies the relationship between changes in inequality and changes in
house values at the level of US states between 1999 and 2011 using the PSID.20
The dependent variable is the change in the value of the main residence for
19. The measure for the number of rooms is only available in the American Housing Survey, and not
in the PSID.
20. The panel starts in 1999 because I rely on the changes in house prices, rather than their levels.
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homeowners who did not change residence (or homeownership status) between
year t-2 and t .
At an aggregate level, a 10% increase in top incomes was correlated with an
average state-level house price increase of about 0.3% over two years (significant
at 1% level) between 1999 and 2011 (Column 1). When looking at this result
in the pre-crisis period, the correlation is higher (0.7% in two years Column
2). These aggregate effects are rather small, but Columns 3-6 provide evidence
that this effect is larger in the micro-level estimation that allows for household
heterogeneity.
Column 3 shows that between 1999 and 2007, a 10% increase in top incomes
relative to median incomes was associated with an increase in the value of a
family’s main residence worth about 1% over two years (significant at 5% level).
This implies a yearly average change of about 0.5% (all else held equal). Column 4
shows that this relationship is robust to the use of a more conventional measure of
inequality, the Gini coefficient: 10% change in the Gini coefficient correlates with
a change in house prices worth 2.3% over two years. Both regressions take into
account time-trends in income, by controlling for the change in median incomes
at the state level, as well as state and year fixed effects.
The American public was already perceiving the burst of the housing bubble in
2007, as reported by Case Shiller and Thompson [2012]. Expectations on future
house price growth were rapidly changing for the worse, and consequently house
price growth was already slowing down before the crisis erupted in late 2007
(Figure 1.4). Columns 5 and 6 provide a robustness check, by focusing on the
years between 1997 and 2005. The effect of inequality during this time span is
even stronger: a 10% increase in top incomes is related to a change in house prices
worth about 1.6 percentage points in two years, or an average of 0.77% per year
(Column 5). This effect is robust to the inclusion of family level fixed-effects, to
take into account household-specific time invariant characteristics (Column 6).
Here, too, the coefficient is very close to the weighted OLS regression (0.15).
The elasticity of housing supply, as expected, has a generally negative effect on
the change in house prices although this is not always significant. The change in
mortgage interest rates (average at the state level) displays the expected negative
coefficient, even if it is only significant at the aggregate level (Columns 1 and 2).
This is likely to reflect the fact similar households tend to be subjects to similar
credit conditions, across US states. Likewise, changes in the homeownership rates
are never significant in the micro-level estimations.
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1.4.3 Inequality and house prices: US metropolitan areas
Since the changes in top incomes are positively and significantly correlated
with housing appreciation across US states, I use the American Housing Survey
to test whether this correlations holds at the level of US metropolitan areas.
The American Housing survey rotates its panels across metropolitan areas every
8 years on average. Therefore each family during this time period reports a
change in house value at most once: between 1994 and 2006 for the first group of
metropolitan areas, and between 1998 and 2007 for the second group. Column
1 shows the macro-level effect for all MSAs: on average, the elasticity between a
1% increase in top incomes and an increase in house prices is 0.96. The elasticity
of housing supply has a negative coefficient, while positive changes in population
display an elasticity of 0.15 on house price increase. Higher median incomes (in
levels) are also positively correlated with house price increase (elasticity 0.3).
Columns 2-6 estimate the micro-level effects. The estimated effect of a 10%
increase in top income relative to median incomes is 7 percentage points in eight
years, or roughly 0.87% per year, on average (Column 2). Columns 3 and 4
split the sample between the two waves of MSAs; the first (households inter-
viewed in 1996 and in 2004) and the second (households interviewed in 1998
and in 2007). The estimated effect of inequality on house prices differs sub-
stantially between the two columns. The first wave of MSAs (Column 3) displays
an elasticity of 2.4, implying that a change in top incomes relative to median
incomes had a more than proportional effect on house prices during this time
frame: a 10% increase in top incomes was associated with an overall increase
in house prices worth 24 percentage points in eight years, or an average yearly
increase in prices worth about 3%.
However, the estimated coefficient on top income for the second wave of MSAs
(Column 4) is only 0.8% per 10% increase in top incomes (roughly 0.1% per
year, on average). The positive effect of changes in inequality on house price
increase is confirmed when using Gini coefficients at the MSA level (Columns
5 and 6). Again, the difference between the two waves is substantial: a 10%
increase in Gini coefficients was associated with a house price increase of about
8% for the first group of MSAs, and only 1.2% for the second group. The
differential in coefficients between these two waves of MSAs may cause some
concern. However, the samples are composed of different metropolitan areas. In
particular, the second group has an outlier in Houston (TX), which experienced
house price increases well below the US average in this time frame, and is widely
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regarded to have been a peculiar case among US metro areas during the boom.21
Moreover, this second wave of interviews was conducted when the price slowdown
had already started (at the end of 2007).
Overall these results indicate that in the pre-crisis US, a regional growth in income
inequality was strongly correlated with an higher than average growth in house
prices.
1.5 Conclusions
The relative income hypothesis states that income inequality should be negatively
correlated with the saving rates of low and middle-income households (Frank
Levine and Dijk [2014]). This is because income inequality might shift the pref-
erences of “non-rich” consumers, who will attempt to emulate the consumption
levels of richer individuals and accumulate more debts in the process. Recent
literature provides empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis, suggesting
that income inequality might have been a direct driver of US household debt
accumulation ahead of the 2007 financial crisis (Bertrand and Morse [2016]; Carr
and Jayadev [2015]).
I test this theory on the years when the majority of US household debt was accu-
mulated, between the mid 1990s and 2007. I find that the relationship between
inequality and consumption holds only for a particular category of consumers:
poor and middle-income homeowners. This group exhibited a positive expendi-
ture reaction to increases in income inequality within their states of residence,
especially with respect to non-housing expenditure. Non-rich homeowners also
accumulated more mortgage debt, in response to increasing top incomes. How-
ever, their leverage ratios (mortgage to house value) did not increase, nor did the
interest rates they paid on their debt.
This evidence points to a relationship between income concentration and house
price growth across the US. I find empirical support in favour of this hypothesis.
Exploiting both geographical and time variation across US states and metro-
politan areas, I present evidence of a positive within-region correlation between
inequality and the increase in house prices in the decade preceding the financial
crisis of 2007-2008.
21. Houston, due to its large supply of land and permissive regulations, reacted to demand growth
through higher construction, not price increase, largely avoiding the boom and bust dynamic which
other cities experienced (FED, 2008). Excluding Houston from the regression for this set of MSAs
yields a coefficients on top incomes of 0.95, significant at 1% level.
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These results shed some light on the demand-side mechanism driving the 2000s
credit boom. The relative income mechanism seems empirically indistinguishable
from a more canonical wealth effect, against which households might have decided
to borrow (Mian and Sufi [2009;2011]). An alternative and complementary inter-
pretation is that households were subject to an increase in collateral availability,
as suggested by Aron et.al [2010] and DeFusco [2015].
This analysis could be extended by studying why income inequality is correlated
with rising house prices. The link between inequality and house prices has so
far received little attention in the literature.22 While a large part of the housing
boom taking place ahead of 2007 should probably be attributed to credit market
liberalization (Mian and Sufi [2009]; Favara and Imbs [2015]; Jordà et.al [2015a]),
the correlations I present here suggest that demand-side factors may have played
an independent role in the dynamics of the real estate market during the boom
years.
Overall my results suggest that the effect of inequality on consumer credit in
the decade preceding the 2007 crisis was mediated by the role of house prices.
In other words, what has largely been considered imprudent behaviour on the
side of the weakest American consumers (borrowing beyond their own capacity
to repay) might as well have been the result of a widespread illusion: the belief
that the value of real estate would keep on growing (or at least hold its value
indefinitely).23
This changes the narrative, shifting the blame for the post-2008 recession
from “poor” consumers to poor regulators. It suggests that if house prices were
not to reach unsustainable levels, as a result of better urban planning and more
regulated credit markets, it might have been possibile to mitigate the effects
of the Recession which followed the housing boom.
22. Matlack &Vigdor (2008) provide an analysis of rental prices in the US between 1970 and 2000, using
census microdata. They find that in markets with low vacancy rates, increases in top incomes relative
to the median imply a significant increase in the rental price per room paid by families at the bottom
of the distribution. Maattanen and Tervio(2014) in a partial equilibrium model find negative effects
of inequality on house prices, except in a segment of housing very close to the top of the distribution.
However, their model is based on matching approach: each household holds one house, and there is no
migration/foreign investment/speculation on the housing market. Zhang et.al [2016] find that income
inequality correlates with an increase in the price-to-income ratios across Chinese cities.
23. On the role of beliefs in the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis see, for example, Piazzesi and
Schneider [2009] Case Shiller and Thompson [2012] or Adelino Schoar and Severino [2016].
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Figures
Figure 1.1:Correlation between country/year growth rates of income inequality and country/year
growth rates of household debt-to-GDP ratios. OECD countries, 1978-2011. Sources: Piketty




















Top 1% Income Share (%change)
Yearly % change. OECD countries : 1978 - 2011
Household debt and inequality





















Figure 1.3: Percentage change in selected indicators by quintile of the income distribution.
United States 1999 to 2007. Source: PSID.
Figure 1.4. Evolution of average interest rates on first mortgages reported by PSID respondents
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Figure 1.6. Average reported change in home value VS previous interview. Selected US metro-
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Tables
Table 1.1. Top income levels and bottom 80th percentile’s consumption:2001-2011
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





     
Top 20% Income 0.194 -0.035 0.674* 0.209 
 (0.170) (0.178) (0.339) (0.224) 
Owner 0.195***   0.449 












































Constant 3.671* 6.624*** -2.389 3.502 
 (1.998) (2.057) (4.035) (2.652) 
     
Observations 4,471 3,056 1,415 4,471 
R-squared 0.337 0.308 0.351 0.337 
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2001 to 2011. OLS regression. The sample is 
restricted to households below the 80th percentile of the state/year cell. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of yearly total expenditure at the family level. All variables are in real 
terms, with CPI scaled at the State level (1996=1). Top 20% Income is the average income 
of families falling in the top 20% of the income distribution in a given state/year, computed 
from the March CPS.  Family controls include a logarithm of income; age of head and its 
squared; sex, marital status, race and educational attainment of head; number of children in 
HH.  Sample weights from the CEX are included. Errors are clustered at the State level.  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 1.2. Top income levels and bottom 80th percentile’s consumption: 1997 to
2007.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











       
Top 20 Income 0.074 -0.185 -0.139 -0.203 -0.290 -0.387* 
 (0.170) (0.181) (0.232) (0.198) (0.201) (0.222) 
Top20*owner  0.359*** 0.099 0.492*** 0.497*** 0.459*** 
  (0.119) (0.125) (0.121) (0.120) (0.133) 



































































       
Observations 5,528 5,528 5,528 5,528 5,528 5,528 
R-squared 0.329 0.330 0.239 0.353 0.353 0.369 
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1996 to 2007. OLS regression. The sample is 
restricted to households below the 80th percentile of the state/year cell. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of yearly total expenditure at the family level in columns 1-2; the log 
of housing expenditure in column 3; the log of non-housing expenditure (calculated as a 
residual) in cols 4-6. All variables are expressed in real terms (state-level CPI, 1996=1). The 
variable “owner” is centered in columns 2-6.  Top 20% Income is the average income of 
families falling in the top 20% of the income distribution in a given state/year, computed 
from the March CPS.  Family controls include a logarithm of income; age of head and its 
squared; sex, marital status, race and educational attainment of head; number of children in 
HH.  Sample weights from the CEX are included. Errors are clustered at the state level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.3. Top income levels and bottom 80th percentile’s financial liabilities.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 























Top20*Owner  0.646*** 0.771   
  (0.215) (0.852)   
Owner 0.596*** -7.007*** -10.277   
 (0.039) (2.513) (10.008)   
Median Income 0.045 0.030 -0.620 0.030 -0.123*** 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.578) (0.064) (0.040) 
Average Interest  0.001 0.003 -0.019   
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.436)   

































      
Observations 41,742 41,742 41,743 15,678 24,878 
R-squared 0.276 0.277 0.113 0.333 0.383 
      
Source: Panel study of Income Dynamics, 1996-2007. OLS regression. The sample is 
restricted to households below the 80th percentile of the state/year cell. The dependent 
variable in columns 1-2 is outstanding debt to income ratio; in column 3 is non-mortgage 
debt; in column 4 is interest rate charged on the main mortgage; in column 5 is leverage 
(mortgage outstanding/house value). All variables are expressed in logs and are in real terms, 
with CPI scaled at the State level. Top 20% Income is the average income of families falling 
in the top 20% of the income distribution in a given state/year, computed from the March 
CPS.  Family controls include age of head and its squared; sex, marital status, race and 
educational attainment of head; number of children in HH. Sample weights are included in 
all columns. Errors are clustered at the state level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4 Top income levels and house prices: US states.
Source: PSID, 1999 to 2011. OLS regression. The sample is restricted to households below 
the 80th percentile of the State/year cell. House Price levels are in real terms, with CPI 
expressed at the State area level. Delta house price is the year-on-year change in the value of 
house. Top incomes and median incomes and Gini coefficients (in changes) are calculated 
from the March CPS. Elasticity is the measure of elasticity of housing supply available from 
Saiz (2010).  The change in mortgage interest rates is calculated at the state/year level from 
the PSID. Ownership rates for families falling in the bottom 80th percentile of the income 
distributions are also calculated from the PSID. Family level controls include age, education, 
race, sex, marriage status of the household head; also log of income and number of children 
at the family level. Sample weights from the PSID included in columns 3-5, col 6 includes 
family fixed-effects. The dependent variable in col. 1-2 is the average change in house prices 
at the State level; in columns 3-5 is the family-level change in house prices. Errors are 
clustered at the state level .*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Average  
Delta Price 























       
∆ Top Income 0.030*** 0.069*** 0.107**  0.161*** 0.152*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.052)  (0.051) (0.045) 
∆ Median Inc 0.135*** 0.031*** 0.121 0.211** 0.141 0.088 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.079) (0.087) (0.099) (0.100) 
Elasticity -0.004 0.002 -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.006** 0.105 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.173) 
∆ Interest rate -0.093*** -0.078*** -0.069 -0.070 -0.043 -0.040 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.070) (0.072) (0.079) (0.086) 
∆ Ownership 0.022*** -0.039*** -0.103 -0.098 -0.099 -0.067 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.099) (0.097) (0.101) (0.132) 


































Observations 52,067 37,428 13,273 13,273 10,876 11,038 
R-squared 0.565 0.427 0.045 0.045 0.053 0.022 
Number of 
familyID 
     4,223 
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Table 1.5 Top income levels and house prices: US metro areas
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





















       
∆ Top Income 0.961*** 0.703* 2.432*** 0.084*   
 (0.012) (0.388) (0.075) (0.038)   
∆ Median Income 0.647*** 0.751*** -1.696*** -2.316*** 1.078*** -2.253*** 
 (0.013) (0.208) (0.131) (0.057) (0.136) (0.034) 
Elasticity -0.036*** -0.098 0.253*** -0.905*** -0.076*** -0.905*** 
 (0.002) (0.062) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
∆ Population 0.150*** 0.219** 0.059*** 0.546*** 0.100*** 0.551*** 
 (0.003) (0.076) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Log Median Inc. 0.300*** -0.118     
 (0.019) (0.382)     
∆ Gini     0.808*** 0.126* 
     (0.025) (0.057) 
 
























Observations 17,601 6,657 4,929 1,728 4,929 1,728 
R-squared 0.925 0.133 0.019 0.109 0.019 0.109 
Source: American Housing Survey, 1996 to 2007. WLS regression. The sample is restricted to 
households below the 80th percentile of the MSA/year cell. House Price levels are in real terms, 
with CPI expressed at the Metro area level. Delta house price is the change in the value per room 
reported by a panel of families interviewed between 1996-2004 and 1998-2007 in 14 metro areas. 
Top incomes and median incomes and Gini coefficients (in changes) are calculated from the 
March CPS. Elasticity is the measure of elasticity of housing supply available from Saiz(2010). 
Family level controls include age, education, race, sex, marriage status of the household head; 
also log of income and number of children at the family level. The variation in population is 
calculated as the 10 year average from Census. Area Fixed effects include a dummy for macro 
geographical areas: northeast (Baltimore, Boston, Hartford, Washington DC); South (Atlanta, 
Memphis, Oklahoma City, Tampa, Houston TX); Midwest (Cleveland, Indianapolis, 
Minneapolis, St.Louis). The dependent variable in column 1 is the average change in house prices 
at the MSA level; in columns 2-6 is the family-level change in house prices. Column 1 and 2 take 
into account both waves (change between 1996-2004 and 1998-2007) and all SMSAs. Columns 3 
and 5 only restrict the analysis to the change occurring between 1996 and 2004 for the first wave 
of MSAs: Atlanta, Cleveland, Hartford, Indianapolis, Memphis, Oklahoma City, Seattle, 
St.Louis. Columns 4 and 6 restrict the analysis to the second wave, between 1998 and 2007: 
Baltimore, Boston, Houston, Minneapolis, Tampa and Washington DC. Each observation is 
weighted using the sample weights included in the AHS survey. Errors are clustered at the MSA 




Appendix A1.1: Regional clusters and standard errors
In Equation (1) I define a model of the type:24
(A1) Yist= γs + λt + βXst+ ϵist
Since the error term in (A1) reflects the idiosyncratic variation in outcomes across
people, states, and time, some of this variation is likely to be common to all indi-
viduals residing in the same state at the same time (due to unobserved state/time
shocks). The model (A1) can be written more precisely as:
(A2) Yist= γs + λt + βXst+ vst+ ηist
Where vst are state-year time shocks. With only two states and two time periods,
there would be no way to distinguish the effect of Xst from these state/year
shocks. The models presented in this chapter rely on 51 states or 16 metropolitan
areas and therefore it is reasonable to assume that vst will average out to zero as
the number of groups (regions/years) increases (Angrist and Pischke [2008]).
However in (A2) the problem is not just cross-sectional, but has also a time
dimension: vst and vs̄ (the average of vst) are likely to be serially correlated (as
regional shocks extend their influence over time).
The simplest method adopted to take this problem into account is to cluster errors
at the state level, rather than at the state/year level, as would be appropriate if
the problem related only to cross-sectional dependence (Bertrand et.al [2004]).
Clustering at the state, rather than the state/year level, allows for residual cor-
relation within clusters, including the time series correlation vst - vs̄. Angrist
and Pischke [2008] suggest that to assume that the correlation between vs̄ and
vst can be estimated reasonably well there needs to be a minimum number of
clusters (they cite 42). Most of the estimations proposed here have 51 clusters
(states); an exception are those in Table 1.6, that have 14 clusters. It is not clear
how to correct for the problem in this context, however. Angrist and Pischke
[2008] suggest that at the minimum, one would want to show that the conclusions
are consistent with the inferences that arise from group-level averages since this
is a conservative approach. This is what I present in Column (1) of Table 1.6.
The results of these group-level estimations are consistent with the micro-level
estimates.
24. This section draws heavily from Angrist and Pischke [2008], pp.236-240
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CHAPTER 2
Waves of Optimism: House Price Expectations and
Credit Cycles
2.1 Introduction
The expectations of households and firms play a central role in macroeconomics.
Ahead of the 2007 financial crisis American consumers channelled their savings
into the real estate market largely because of the expectation of significantly
positive returns on investment (Piazzesi and Schneider [2009], Case Shiller and
Thompson [2012]). There is evidence that this optimistic attitude was shared
by mortgage lenders: sophisticated investors appeared to be for the most part
oblivious to the risk of a substantial downturn in the housing market (Coval et.al
[2009], Foote et al. [2012]; Cheng et al. [2014], Chenenko et al. [2015]). The 2007-
2008 crisis proved these expectations to be largely misguided.
Some models attempt to reconcile the burst of financial bubbles with rational
expectations theory by framing them as the investors’ reaction to rare events
(Martin and Ventura [2011]; Caballero and Simsek [2013]).25 This view is however
hard to reconcile with the evidence that financial crises, and housing market
crashes in particular, occur relatively frequently. Developed economies have expe-
rienced at least twenty housing market crashes in the post-World War II period.26
Regional housing bubbles also have a long tradition: in the US, for example, they
25. In other words, during boom phases agents are not blind to the possibility of a market downturn,
but given the probability distribution of outcomes, it may be rational to invest in a given asset despite
acknowledging its overvaluation. The burst of the bubble, on the other hand, occurs due to stochastic
and exogenous processes, to which agents attach an extremely low probability ex-ante because they
are rare events. Some classes of these models rely on frictions, others on asymetric information: see
Brunnermeier and Oehmke [2013] for a comprehensive review of the literature on rational bubbles.
26. The IMF [2003] counts 20 of these episodes between 1970 and 2002, while Jordà et.al [2015] count
25 housing market crashes (for a similar cross-section of economies) between 1945 and 2013, all of which
were followed by a recession.
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date back all the way to the frontier land boom of the late 18th century (Glaeser
[2013]).
The generalized underestimation of risk which occurred in the run-up to the
2007 financial crisis might therefore stem from some form of cognitive limitation:
investors could be applying simple heuristics to predict price changes in the future
(Glaeser [2013]). In particular, the excessive weight given to recent events when
forming expectations might lead investors to highly discount the probability of a
market downturn in good times, and vice versa (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny
[2015]; Bordalo Gennaioli and Shleifer [2016]). In this case, a form of “irrational
exuberance” may have been a main driver of housing market dynamics in the pre-
crisis period (Shiller [2015]).
This chapter studies how consumers form house price expectations, and whether
expectations matter for their financial decisions. I provide three main contribu-
tions. First, I use the microdata contained in the Michigan Survey of Consumers
and exploit its variation along the lines of geography and time to analyse how
American households formed house price expectations between 2007 and 2014. I
show that households have heterogeneous beliefs about the future of the housing
market, which systematically depend upon household characteristics and upon
the history of past house price realizations in the state of residence. Experiencing
a state-level house price increase worth 1 percentage point (on average over four
quarters) leads households to forecast a price increase of 0.6 percentage points,
at the one-year horizon (10% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable).
This coefficient falls in the range of the estimations provided by Case Shiller and
Thompson [2012] and Kuchler and Zafar [2015] for a similar exercise, albeit they
use different data.
Second, I show that extrapolation from recent house price changes induces a
systematic bias in beliefs. I construct individual-level house price forecast errors
and show that such errors are predictable from information publicly available at
the time the forecast was made, in particular from recent house price growth in the
state of residence. The estimated elasticity between recent state-level house price
growth and changes in individual-level house price forecast errors (at the one-year
horizon) is 0.67. In other words, if individuals experienced a state-level house
price increase (decrease) in the past year worth 1 percentage point, their forecast
errors about the future of the housing market tend to become 0.67 percentage
points more optimistic (pessimistic). House price expectations seem therefore to
follow a representativeness heuristic, as defined by Gennaioli Shleifer and Vishny
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[2015], where agents overweight information they recently acquired when making
predictions about the future.27 The predictability of forecast errors from recent
house price realizations is inconsistent with full information rational expectations
theory, because in this framework expectations should be fully efficient at least
with respect to past values of the variable being forecast (Muth [1961]; Lovell
[1986]).
Considering the empirical relationship between leveraged housing bubbles and
financial instability (Jordà et.al [2015a,b]) it is particularly interesting to study
whether house price expectations directly affect mortgage leverage choices. There-
fore, as a third contribution, I provide evidence that house price expectations help
predict the mortgage credit cycle. I use the geographical information included in
the Freddie Mac’s Single Family Loan-Level Dataset, merged with state/quarter
averages of house price expectations measured by the Michigan Survey, to test
whether an increase in house price expectations leads to an increase in household
leverage ratios.
The identification of a causal relationship between house price expectations and
mortgage leverage is challenging, due to concerns over simultaneity and omitted
variables. Therefore, in order to identify the effect of an exogenous shift in housing
sentiment on the American mortgage market I exploit an instrumental variable
strategy. Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015] use the interaction of constituent
ideology prior to presidential elections with election timing to show that more
progressive (conservative) counties experience a positive shift of feelings about
the government whenever the Democrats (Republicans) win the White House.
In a similar fashion, I use the interaction of constituent ideology prior to the
2008 presidential election with election timing to show that more progressive
states experienced a more positive housing sentiment shift around the time of
the election, after controlling for pre-electoral trends. I show that this change in
house price expectations can be considered exogenous to changes in fundamentals
and to post-electoral policy changes that might affect the housing or mortgage
markets directly. Most importantly, the shift in housing sentiment appears to be
unaffected by changes in other sentiment variables, including feelings about the
government as measured by Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015].28
27. Their definition follows Kahneman and Tversy [1972].
28. I borrow from Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou’s [2015] methodology with the aim to answer a different
question from them. They study how households’ consumption responds to changes in feelings about
the government; on the other this chapter is an analysis of how shifts in house price expectations affect
the mortgage credit cycle.
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I exploit this methodology to show that one standard deviation increase in state-
level house price expectations (1.7 percentage points between 2007 and 2014)
generates an increase in individual-level loan-to-value ratios worth 1 percentage
point, or 6% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable. This result holds
to controls for loan and borrower characteristics, aggregate time trends, state-
level fixed effects and state-level house price growth. To my knowledge, this is
the first contribution providing empirical evidence that house price expectations
directly affect mortgage leverage ratios.
This chapter draws inspiration from several strands of literature. In particular,
my work is closely related to the empirical efforts analysing the expectation
formation process, which generally shows that expectations are heterogeneous
among agents (Carroll [2003]; Branch [2004]; Souleles [2004]). Recent evidence
strongly points in the direction of an extrapolative bias affecting different
types of expectations (Malmendier and Nagel [2016]; Madeira and Zafar [2015];
Greenwood and Shleifer [2014]).29 There are not many studies of house price
expectations, however. Case Shiller and Thompson [2012] describe house price
forecasts using proprietary data on four US metropolitan areas before the crisis,
and find evidence of unrealistic five-year expectations. Bover [2015] focuses on
the Spanish case, and shows how expectations are heterogeneous and depend
upon household-specific characteristics. Kuchler and Zafar [2015] provide evi-
dence that house price expectations depend on past housing returns.
I extend this literature by describing how house price expectations are formed
using a publicly available data source which is representative of the American
population. Moreover, by focusing on individual-level forecast errors, this chapter
is to my knowledge the first to provide evidence of a systematic bias within
house price expectations formed by American consumers.30 This bias has been the
object of speculation before (Case Shiller and Thompson [2012]; Shiller [2015]),
but was never formally quantified.
My work is also related to the literature evaluating whether sentiment has any
real effects on consumer and investor behaviour. Using the Michigan Survey
of Consumers, Souleles [2004] shows that people’s expectations are biased and
29. Malmendier and Nagel [2011;2016] show that expectations and financial choices depend more
strongly on lifetime experiences than on other publicly available data. Madeira and Zafar [2015] confirm
this finding with respect to short-term inflation expectations and find that publicly available infor-
mation matters more for longer horizons. However, evidence of an extrapolative bias is not confined
only to inflation expectations. Greenwood and Shleifer [2014] show expected stock market returns are
extrapolative in nature, and as such incompatible with rational expectations models of returns.
30. The only other contributions testing the rationality of house price expectations is, to my knowledge,
Zhang[2016], who focuses on professional forecasters. Zhang[2016] finds evidence of systematic over-
optimistic forecasts, but not of inefficiency.
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inefficient, and nevertheless sentiment helps forecasting consumption growth. De
Nardi et al. [2011] find that in the context of a permanent income model, the
fall in income and wealth expectations after the 2007 financial crisis can explain
the post-recession consumption drop in its entirety. Several other studies have
linked experiences, beliefs, and financial market decisions (Chernenko Hanson
and Sunderam [2015] ; Giannetti and Wang [2014]; Malmendier and Nagel [2011;
2016]; Gennaioli Ma and Shleifer [2015]).31
However, empirical work on the macroeconomic effects of house price expectations
is recent, mainly due to data limitations (as the collection of these surveys only
began with the financial crisis).32A recent applied literature analyses the feedback
effects of house price expectations, or their capacity to be self-fulfilling prophecies.
Lambertini et al. [2013] use a VAR approach to show that during housing booms,
expectations about future house price growth account for a large fraction of
macroeconomic fluctuations. Ling et.al [2015] show that changing sentiment from
homebuyers, home builders, and lenders predicts house price appreciation in the
following quarters. They also show that this feedback mechanism between senti-
ment and house prices can explain the persistence in house price movements along
the boom and bust cycle. Soo [2013] develops an original measure of house price
sentiment based on local area newspaper articles and finds that sentiment can
predict a substantial fraction of the subsequent variation in house price growth.
On a similar note, Wang [2014] finds that in states where homeowners overes-
timate the current market value of their home (a proxy for over-confidence),
housing returns in the following year are higher. Overall, the evidence seems to
point towards a strong feedback effect of house price sentiment on housing market
equilibria. However, this paper is the first contribution to show that house price
expectations have a direct effect also on the mortgage markets.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the expectations data, and
presents the results related to how house price expectations depend on individual-
level characteristics. It also describes how I use the survey to analyse house price
forecast errors. Sections 2.3 presents the mortgage-level data, the identification
31. Chernenko Hanson and Sunderam [2015] link personal investor experience to attitudes about
investing in non-prime mortgages during the 2003-2007 credit boom. This evidence confirms the findings
of Malmendier and Nagel [2016], who show that lifetime inflation experiences matter for the choice
of mortgage products. Gennaioli Ma and Shleifer [2015] also show that past profitability is strongly
correlated with CFOs’ expectations about future profitability, and that that optimism in expectations
affects their actual investment decisions. Giannetti and Wang [2014] find that experiencing corporate
scandals reduces future individual participation in the stock market.
32. With the exception of Case Shiller and Thompson [2012] who focus on a few metropolitan areas
using a proprietary dataset.
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strategy, and the results on the effect of housing sentiment on mortgage leverage
decisions. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Empirical analysis of house price expectations
This section describes the Michigan Survey of Consumers, the data source used to
analyse individual-level expectations. It also provides some descriptive analyses of
the determinants of individual-level expectations and shows how the data can be
used to test the rational expectations hypothesis. Finally, it presents the results
of these tests.
2.2.1 Data: expectations in the Michigan Survey
Data on expectations comes from the University of Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers, the source used to produce the Consumer Sentiment Index. This survey
is nationally representative and has been conducted every month since 1978 on
a rotating panel of about 6000 US households (500 per month).
The interviews are conducted with one individual per household and include
household-level demographics such as income, educational attainment, and family
composition, as well as a vast array of sentiment and expectations indicators.
In particular, respondents are required to indicate their forecast of the one-
year-ahead percentage change in inflation, personal income, and local area house
prices.
These questions are phrased as:
“By about what percent do you expect prices of homes like yours in your commu-
nity to go (up/down), on the average, over the next 12 months?”
Similar questions are asked about the development of personal income and infla-
tion.33 The descriptive statistics for this sample are provided in panel A of Table
2.1.
To analyse how individuals’ experiences and characteristics influence the expec-
tation-formation process, I estimate the following equation:
Expectationist= a+ β1ΓistI + β2ΘstI + β3φs + β4χt + εist (3)
33. House price forecasts are only available since 2007 and only for homeowners. For consistency, I
therefore drop non-homeowners from the sample altogether. This exclusion is feasible because home-
owners are the majority of the survey sample (they constitute 78% of surveyed households).
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Where the outcome variable is the individual-level expectation about the change
in income, inflation, and house prices in 12 months for individual i living in
state s during quarter t . ΓI is a vector of individual characteristics, such as
income, a variety of demographics, and recent experiences. ΘstI measures aggre-
gate dynamics at the state level in a given quarter t , such as recent house price
changes, or unemployment rates.34 Quarter fixed-effects have the purpose of con-
trolling for aggregate shocks affecting all states at the same time, and state fixed
effects control for time-invariant factors that might affect all families living in the
same state across time.
2.2.2 Results: determinants of individual expectations
Aggregate expectations on the growth rates of income, house prices, and inflation
display a strong correlation with the US business cycle (Figure 2.1). All three
indicators of consumer confidence drop in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 finan-
cial crisis. Income growth expectations drop from 3% per year in 2007 to about
1%, and start recovering only in 2013. House price growth expectations follow
a similar pattern: they become negative in 2008 and stay negative until 2012.
Throughout this time, American consumers were consistently expecting a wealth
loss. Expectations about inflation rates, by comparison, have been remarkably
stable throughout this time frame, slightly falling in 2009/2010 only to recover
swiftly around 2011 and they have been averaging around a yearly 4% ever since.
Table 2.2 sheds some light on how household-level demographics are correlated
with different measures of expectations. Richer and older couples have on average
lower income expectations than their younger, poorer, and single individuals
(Column 1). This probably reflects the lifecycle of earnings. On the other hand,
men and people with a college degree expect their earnings to grow more than
other demographic groups. People who report experiencing negative income shock
in the previous year (measured as job loss or reduced wages/working hours)
expect their income to grow 2.5 percentage points less than others. This is
coherent with recent evidence showing that negative shocks at the personal level
cast a shadow of pessimism on agents’ beliefs about the future. For example, indi-
viduals who experienced a negative stock market shock are more risk-averse and
less likely to predict high returns on investment (Malmendier and Nagel [2011]).
34. Details of the state-level control variables can be found in Appendix A2.1 and the relative descriptive
statistics in Panel C of Table 2.1.
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The effect of unemployment rates confirms this intuition: one standard deviation
increase in state-level unemployment rates (2%) reduces individual income expec-
tations by 8 percentage points (57% of a standard deviation in the dependent
variable). This can be considered evidence corroborating the findings of Kuchler
and Zafar [2015], who find that experiencing unemployment systematically makes
people more pessimistic about the future of the labour market.
Inflation expectations display different correlations with household demographics
(Column 2). Richer and more educated males expect future inflation to be lower
than poorer and less educated women, or older people. This is consistent with
the results presented by Madeira and Zafar [2015], who find that women, ethnic
minorities, less educated and lower-income people predict higher inflation, on
average. They also find that these social groups are slower in updating their
expectations, and make more prediction errors. Madeira and Zafar [2015] inter-
pret their results as indicative of differentials in the ability to collect and process
public information across different types of agents.
My results also indicate that stock owners expect lower levels of future inflation,
which may be consistent with a theory of the heterogeneity in expectations being
based on information. Stock market exposure may induce people to follow the
financial news more closely, and this may in turn develop their ability to better
assess market conditions. On the other hand, people who are more financially
literate probably also self-select in stock ownership. Access to information, as well
as information processing ability (financial literacy) may therefore play a crucial
role in explaining heterogeneity in inflation expectations, as suggested by Burke
and Manz [2014]. People who recently experienced a negative income shock, on
the other hand, forecast future inflation to be higher, giving further credit to the
idea that personal experiences matter for relative optimism/pessimism about the
future.
Column 3 of Table 2.2 analyses how house price expectation depend upon house-
hold demographics and past experiences. Richer households, men, and college
graduates expect house prices to grow more, as do people who own stocks. This
might in part be due to unobserved within-state heterogeneity: these households
may be more likely to reside in metropolitan geographical areas, where house
prices are likely to grow more than the state average, all else held equal.35 On the
other hand, it may also be that these households are actually better informed, and
correctly anticipated a more rapid house price growth in the post-crisis period.
35. I observe the state of residence for any given household, but not the county or ZIP code.
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Less informed households may be more prone to cognitive biases and may be
slower in updating expectations, as suggested by Madeira and Zafar [2015]. They
may therefore have projected the housing market shock to continue well beyond
the crisis of 2007-2011.36 Once again, people who recently experienced a negative
income shock are less optimistic about the future, in housing markets as well as
income and inflation.
An interesting result of this specification is that the average yearly house price
growth in the state of residence (measured in the quarter preceding the interview)
is a strong predictor of expectations about future house price growth. A house-
hold experiencing a 1 percentage point increase in state-level house prices in the
previous four quarters predicts the one-year-ahead increase in local house prices
to be 0.5 percentage points higher, or about 10% of a standard deviation in the
dependent variable (significant at the 1% level). This result lies in between the
elasticity of 0.23 estimated by Case Shiller and Thompson [2012] and that of 0.9
estimated by Kuchler and Zafar [2015].37
This evidence suggests an extrapolative pattern in house price expectations: if
individuals experience house price growth in their state of residence, they expect
the trend to continue in the near future. These results are consistent with other
recent empirical studies focusing on different kinds of expectations and provide
evidence for an extrapolative component of investors’ beliefs about the future that
largely depends on recent experiences (Malmendier and Nagel [2016]; Madeira
and Zafar [2015]; Greenwood and Shleifer [2015]; Kuchler and Zafar [2015]).
Overall, this section shows that expectations are highly heterogeneous across
households. Different demographic groups display systematic differences in the
way they think about the future. This seems to contradict the tenet that private
information plays no role in the expectation formation process, and that therefore
all expectations can be approximated by those of a representative agent (Muth
[1961]). On the other hand, it does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis that
expectations are formed efficiently overall, since from the point of view of the
individual it may be optimal to choose different forecasting methods depending
on personal circumstances, or different individuals might have differential access
to information (Pesaran and Weale [2006]).
36. In other words, they could have behaved according to the representativeness heuristic, described by
Gennaioli Shleifer and Vishny [2015]. In this framework, Bayesian agents biased by representativeness
only react to a series of good/bad news and overweight recent trends (as opposed to considering all
historical information) when making predictions about the future.
37. Kuchler and Zafar [2015] use a different dataset, study a different time frame (2012 onwards),
and measure house prices at the local (ZIP) code area rather than at the state level. Case Shiller and
Thompson [2012] focus on the pre-crisis period and on four metropolitan areas.
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2.2.3 Testing the rationality of expectations: methodology
Table 2.2 shows that people form expectations about the future based on the
information available to them at the time they make the forecast. Economic
theory adds to this tenet the notion of optimality in the use of publicly available
information: that is to say, individuals might make mistakes in their predictions,
but the economic system in the aggregate does not waste information. In this
sense, expectations are assumed to be rational, or consistent with the predictions
of the relevant economic theory (Muth [1961]).
Muth’s [1961] original theory postulates that private information plays no role in
the formation of macroeconomic expectations. Moreover, expectations should be
fully efficient with respect to publicly available information. Given a variable Y ,
its value at time t (Yt) should be perfectly predicted by the ex-ante expectations
of the representative agent, defined as Et−n(Yt). Any vector of public information
available to the agent at time t-n (Xt−n) should have no additional explanatory
power towards Yt. Formally:
Yt=α+β1Et-n(Yt)+β2Xt-n+εt (4)
with α = β2 =0; β1 = 1;E(εt) = 0.
Forecasts may diverge from realisations, but the errors will average out to zero
over time, and they won’t be systematic. This, in turn, implies orthogonality
between ex-post forecast errors (FEt) and all public information available to the
agent at the time the forecast Et−n(Yt) was made:
FEt=Yt-Et-n(Yt)=α+β2Xt-n+εt (5)
with α = β2 =0; E(εt) = 0.
In other words, under rational expectations forecast errors should be unpre-
dictable given the set of public information available to the agent at the time
the prediction was made (Muth [1961]; Lovell [1986]).
In order to test whether house price expectations are formed in a way that is
consistent with the full-information rational expectations model, I construct indi-
vidual-level house price forecast errors , defined as follows:
FE ist=Eist-4(HPIs t)-HPIst (6)
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Where Eist-4(HPIs t) is the expectation that individual i living in state s at
quarter t-4 has about house price growth in state s at time t (percentage house
price growth in one year). This forecast is compared with the actual annual-
ized change in house prices recorded in quarter t for state s , as measured by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) quarterly repeated sales house price
index (HPIst).38 FEist therefore represents individual-level forecast errors : unlike
in equation (5), a larger value implies over-optimism.
Note that equation (6) introduces individual-level heterogeneity in the defin-
ition of forecast errors, which was absent from equation (5). The presence of
individual-level heterogeneity in expectations, described in the previous section
of this chapter, suggests that also the forecast errors (FEist) are unlikely to be
orthogonal to the private information set, defined by individual characteristics.
It is not clear yet how to test for rationality in the presence of individual-level
heterogeneity (Pesaran and Weale [2006]). Heterogeneous individuals may have
different information processing costs, and it may be optimal for them to choose
different forecasting methods (Pesaran and Weale [2006]). Moreover, agents may
have differential access to information. The definition of rational expectations
in the context of heterogeneous information and information processing capacity
constitutes a very interesting avenue of research. However, it is beyond the scope
of this chapter to analyse this matter in great detail. Instead, I will focus on
whether public information (specifically past house price growth in the area of
residence) is processed efficiently on average. I therefore exploit the panel compo-
nent of the survey, which provides two observations per individual, to study how
public information translates into changes in individual-level forecast errors.39 To
do so, I use a model in first-differences:
∆FEist=a+β1∆X Iist+β2∆ΘIst-n+γt+ϕs+υist (7)
Where ∆FEist =FEist−FEist-2={[Eist-4(HPIs t)-HPIst]-[Eist-6(HPIs t-2)-HPIst-2} is the dif-
ference between individual i ’s forecast errors between the first and the second
interview (which are two quarters apart from each other) and s and t indicate
state and quarter, respectively. ∆XIist is a vector of changes in family-specific
controls between the first interview and the second one, such as household income,
38. Information about the house price index, together with other aggregate controls, can be found in
Appendix A2.1.
39. An alternative would be to estimate a model with state-level averages. The results are very similar
in nature, magnitude and significance, with respect to this model in changes. I therefore prefer to
mantain micro-level variation and use a model in changes at the individual level instead.
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plus the same household-level demographics used in Equation (3) measured at the
time of the latest interview. ∆ΘIst-n defines changes in state/quarter variables,
such as the average yearly growth in house price (measured in the quarter prior
to each interview).
By first-differencing the outcome variable, the model controls for all time
invariant household-level characteristics related to idiosyncratic perceptions of
the housing market.40 First-differencing should also control for all individual level
heterogeneity that can be reasonably assumed to be constant for a given indi-
vidual within six months, such as information processing capacity and financial
literacy.
The model in Equation (7) allows for the identification of systematic components
in consumers’ forecast errors. Significant coefficients on any variable within the
information set available to the agent at the time they produce the forecast (any
β1orβ2=/ 0), imply a departure from a strong form of rational expectations (Lovell
[1986]). On the other hand, for even a weak form of rational expectations to hold,
the prediction errors must at least be independent from historical information
on prior realisations of the variable being forecast: formally, β2 must be equal to
zero, whenever Θst-n measures past house price realisations (Lovell [1986]).41
2.2.4 Results: house price forecast errors
Figure 2.2 shows that individual-level forecast errors do not cancel each other out
in the aggregate, since they are significantly different from zero in each quarter.
Also, they display a strong time component in this sample: they are systematically
positive, implying excessive optimism during the crisis and the recession (2007q1
until 2010q4) and consistently negative afterwards, indicating that American con-
sumers have on average underestimated the recent recovery of the US housing
market.
40. For example, individuals might be forecasting house price growth for their local area of residence
(ZIP code or city) rather than for their state. Since I construct individual-level forecast errors as a
the difference between the individual-level expectation and the state-level realization, the dependent
variable might contain measurement error (the difference between local and state-level house price
growth). As long as this difference is constant over six months, the model in changes should take into
account this unobserved variation. However, even if the difference between state and local area house
price growth were to change over time, this difference will appear as measurement error in the dependent
variable. As long as the measurement error in the dependent variable is uncorrelated with the right-
hand side of Equation (7), the estimation will be consistent.
41. This version of the rational expectations hypothesis is weak in that it only requires the agent to
efficiently process the information related to the historical realizations of the variable s/he is forecasting
rather than all available public information.
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The first two columns of Table 2.3 analyses how forecast errors depend on house-
hold characteristics. Column (1) describes forecast precision: the dependent
variable is the absolute value of forecast errors. The closer this value is to zero,
the higher the precision of the forecast. A larger value therefore implies higher
inaccuracy. Richer households, men, and households who invest in the stock
market have more accurate estimates about the future of the housing market.
The effect of owning stocks is small, but strongly significant: stock owners make
predictions that are on average 0.3 percentage points more accurate than non-
stock owners (or 5.7% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable). This is
also true of more educated families: the effect of having a college degree improves
the accuracy of the house price forecast by 0.14 percentage points, or 2.6% of
a standard deviation in the dependent variable. This seems consistent with what
Madeira and Zafar [2015] find about household-level heterogeneity in inflation
expectations: women, less educated people, and poorer households tend to have
more imprecise forecasts. This result provides further support for the hypoth-
esis that access to information, or the ability to process it, might play a crucial
role in the expectation formation process. People who recently experienced neg-
ative income shocks also tend to have less precise forecasts.
However, forecast errors can also be analysed with respect to their relative degree
of optimism and pessimism, rather than in absolute values. Column (2) shows the
results of a model with the forecast error defined as in Equation (6): a positive
value in the dependent variable now implies excessive optimism about the future
of local house prices. Richer households, men, and college graduates tend to have
more positive forecast errors: in other words they are wrong less often (as shown
in Column 1), but when they are, their mistakes are on the optimistic side. A
negative income shock, on the other hand, makes people excessively pessimistic
about housing market returns (Column 2): a family declaring a negative income
shock in the previous year predicts a house price growth at the on-year horizon
0.74 percentage points lower than the actual realization (about 10% of a standard
deviation in the dependent variable).
The predictability of forecast errors from household-level demographics should
however not necessarily be interpreted as evidence against the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis. It might be that different individuals have differential access to
information; or that private information plays a role in determining house price
expectations; or, again, that the same public information is optimally processed
in different ways by different individuals. So far, consensus has not emerged yet
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on how to distinguish betwee these alternative hypotheses (Pesaran and Weale
[2006]).
Column 3 therefore estimates a model in first-differences in order to control
for time-invariant individual-level heterogeneity, in an attempt to mitigate any
differences due to private information and household-specific characteristics.
This specification attempts to evaluate whether the economy in the aggregate
processes public information efficiently, by analysing whether forecast errors are
efficient with respect to past information about local area house price growth.
Column (3) shows that a recent history of housing appreciation (average house
price growth in the previous four quarters) is indeed a strong predictor of the
change in individual-level house price forecast errors.42 An increase in state-level
house prices worth 1 percentage point in the year before the forecast was ini-
tially made is correlated with an increase in individual forecast errors worth 0.67
percentage points. In other words, if individuals experienced a state-level house
price increase (decrease) in the past year worth 1 percentage point, their forecast
errors about the future of the housing market tend to become 0.67 percentage
points more optimistic (pessimistic). A similar increase in personal income affects
forecast errors by 0.4 percentage points. These results hold when controlling
for time trends and state-specific characteristics, and individual-household fixed
effects. The inclusion of quarter fixed effects should also rule out the possibility
that the forecast errors may be due to unexpected macroeconomic shocks, since
all aggregate time trends are taken into account. It is still possible that these
results reflect unobserved state/quarter shocks, but considering that these are
short-term expectations, the possibility that a repeated series of unanticipated
shocks at the state/quarter level is driving the result seems unlikely.
The latter result suggests that households may not be efficiently processing public
information about house price growth. People’s forecast errors have a tendency to
become over-optimistic when they experience house price growth, and vice versa.
In other words, they attach too much weight to recent house price movements.
This is only a baseline result, however it could be extended in several directions
by exploiting both time and geographic heterogeneity in forecasts. For example, it
would be interesting to evaluate whether the bias appears to be stronger around
the financial crisis, or whether people extrapolate from losses as much as from
gains. Another dimension of heterogeneity could be geography, since the extrap-
42. To avoid simultaneity, past housing appreciation is measured as the average yearly house price
growth measured in the quarter ahead of the interview.
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olative bias could depend upon certain characteristics of a state: for example the
extent to which the state has been subject to major housing market crashes in
the past, or its history of house prices volatility. Finally, it would be interesting
to study how individual characteristics interact with the generalized tendency
towards an extrapolative bias.
However, at the very least, the result in Column 3 suggests that consumers’ house
price expectations are not formed efficiently and are subject to some form of
cognitive limitation. In particular, house price expectations seem to violate even
a weak form of the rational expectations hypothesis, since they are not efficient
with respect to past realizations of the variable being forecast. People expect
recent price movements to continue the future, leading to systematic errors. This
result, combined with the evidence of heterogeneity in expectations and forecast
errors, casts a shadow of doubt on the applicability of full-information rational
expectations theory to housing markets. Taken literally, this result instead sup-
ports the hypothesis that this asset market may be subject to purely belief-driven
boom and bust cycles, in which prices can be largely detached from fundamentals
and be subject to excessive volatility (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny [2015]).
2.3 House price expectations and the credit cycle
The expectation formation process matters because beliefs might affect the busi-
ness cycle. Souleles [2004] provides an analysis of how income and inflation
expectations in the Michigan Survey translate into households’ propensity to
consume. However, given the link between housing collateral and mortgage debt
(Mian and Sufi [2011]), it might be particularly interesting to study whether
house price expectations affect mortgage choices. In this section, I first describe
the problem of identifying a causal relationship between house price expecta-
tions and credit markets, and present the empirical strategy I will use to address
this problem. I then describe the mortgage data, which is derived from a pub-
licly available, lender-side source. Finally, I present evidence of the empirical
relationship between house price expectations and mortgage borrowing.
2.3.1 The identification problem: IV strategy
Mortgage leverage played a prominent role ahead of the financial crisis and its
aftermath: it increased the likelihood of default on mortgages (Mian and Sufi
[2009]) and was one of the main drivers of the recession (Mian and Sufi [2011]).
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House price expectations display a strong positive correlation over time with
average mortgage leverage recorded among American households (Figure 2.3).
If individuals expect the value of their properties to rise, they might borrow
against the expected increase in home equity, because a part of the loan will be
automatically repaid by the price increase. At the same time banks might be
willing to lend larger sums, because of the expectations of higher collateral in the
near future.
The Michigan Survey of Consumers does not provide data on financial liabil-
ities, but information on mortgage leverage at the household level is available
from a variety of public sources. This mortgage-level data can be merged with
state/quarter averages of house price expectations observed in the Michigan
Survey of Consumer to estimate a model of the type:
LTVist=a+β1Expst+β2ΛistI +β3XstI+ϕs+χt+υist (8)
Where LTVist is the individual mortgage loan-to-value ratio, a measure of
leverage, for family i residing in state s in quarter t . Expst defines the weighted
average of expectations in state s at quarter t recorded by the Michigan Survey
of Consumers. ΛistI is a vector of household-level controls, which includes the
credit score of the borrower, interest rate, length and purpose of the loan. XstI
defines control variables recorded at the state/quarter cell, which might con-
temporaneously affect expectations and the dependent variable (such as recent
state-level house price growth).
Year fixed effects allow to control for economy-wide shocks, for example federal
policy changes affecting all states at the same time. Geographical area fixed-
effects instead control for time-invariant state-specific characteristics, which could
be correlated with both sentiment and mortgage markets. So the coefficient β1
measures the effect of a within-state change in expectations over time, washed
out all variation due to unobserved state-specific characteristics common to all
households living in state s and all aggregate shocks occurring in the economy at
time t .
However, Equation (8) is subject to several endogeneity concerns. First of all,
there is a reverse causality problem: a higher availability of credit is likely to
trigger a change in aggregate expectations about the future of house prices. Fur-
thermore, expectations and outcomes are likely to be simultaneously affected
by unobserved fundamentals. In order to identify the effect of a shift in house
price expectations, I therefore rely on an instrumental variable strategy. Mian,
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Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015] show that that the ideological predisposition of res-
idents in a county (Republican VS Democrats) is a strong predictor of within-
county changes in sentiments regarding government policy, anytime there is a
change of government in the White House. In particular, Republican-leaning
counties become more pessimistic about government policy when Democrats win
the presidential elections, and vice versa. However there is evidence that large-
scale electoral events shift all measures of consumer sentiment, and not just views
of the government. Gerbert and Huber [2009; 2010] exploit an unanticipated
change in political power (the Democrat takeover of Congress occurring in 2006)
to show that pre-electoral political leanings have a strong effect on the changes
in economic opinions after the election. Immediately after the event, Democrats
become more optimistic about the general economy than they were the month
before, and Republicans’ sentiment shifts in the opposite direction.
This suggests that housing expectations might also be subject to changes around
election time. The housing market could be particularly affected by elections
due to the role of pre-electoral uncertainty. Pre-electoral uncertainty may reduce
investments that are costly to reverse: Canes-Wrone and Park [2014] find evidence
of this effect across the US at the turn of the 2008 Presidential election. The
extent of the reversal of this uncertainty after the election may depend upon the
ex-ante political views of a certain electorate and interact with the party change
at the White House. I exploit this idea to evaluate how the change in house price
expectations following the 2008 presidential election affects mortgage leverage
ratios.
My empirical strategy is formally expressed by equations (9) and (10).43 The first
stage relationship measures the within-state change in expectations occurring
after the presidential election and takes the form:
Est=β1Zst+β2XstI +β3ΛistI +β4φs+β5χt+εst (9)
Where Est are state-level expectations about one-year change in house prices,
measured as a weighted average of the individual level forecasts provided by the
Michigan Survey in a given state s and quarter t . Zst= Ds ∗δt is the interaction
term between the vote share for the Democratic Party in a given presidential elec-
tion (Ds) and the post electoral period δt (the quarter of the election is excluded
from the analysis). State fixed effects, φs, capture time-invariant state charac-
43. I apply a very similar methodology to Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015], although I rely on state-
level measures of sentiment and political leanings, rather than on county-level data. Also, my time series
is shorter, because the Michigan Survey only began collecting information on house price expectations
in 2007.
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teristics (including the voting share for the Democratic party in 2008, Ds) while
quarter fixed effects, χt, control for economy-wide time trends such as the US-
wide shift in housing sentiment occurring in 2007 (and take into account the
time varying term δt). If Zst is significant and positive, progressive states get
more optimistic about the housing market than conservative states, and this shift
occurs after the electoral period. It is important to stress that the vote shares
for the Democratic party are not assumed exogenous in this model: partisan
leanings can be strongly correlated with long-term housing price dynamics, such
as the willingness to issue new building permits (Kahn [2011]). The validity of
the instrumental variable strategy relies on the exogeneity of the interaction
between partisanship and electoral timing.The vector XstI is a set of variables
that proxy for changes in fundamentals which could impact states exactly at
the time of the elections (for example changes in house prices). The vector ΛistI
includes individual-level characteristics of borrowers in each state: income, age,
credit score of the borrower, and some characteristics of the loan (length in years,
interest rate, type and purpose of the mortgage, use of the property).44 The
inclusion of these variables has the purpose of building further credibility to the
orthogonality condition: the exclusion restriction is valid after partialling out for
these shocks in fundamentals.
I will run a series of robustness tests on the first stage relationship to show
that the switch in housing sentiment can be considered exogenous to a set of
macroeconomic fundamentals. I also show that the switch cannot be attributed
to changes in state-level housing policy taking place after the elections and that
it is robust to shifts in other expectations and sentiment variables occurring at
the same time, including views of the government (as measured by Mian, Sufi
and Khoshkhou [2015]).
The second stage relationship exploits mortgage-level data to measure how house
price expectations affect borrowing/lending. This relationship is defined as fol-
lows:
LTVist=a+β1Est+β2ΛistI +β3XstI+β4ϕs+β5χt+υist (10)
Where LTVist is loan-to-value ratio for household i , in state s , at time t . The
dependent variable is regressed upon the same set of controls in (9), with the
housing sentiment variable at time t (Est) instrumented by Zst. The second stage
of this instrumental variable strategy deserves however some further discussion.
44. The inclusion of this vector in the first-stage relationship is necessary for the consistency of the IV
estimator.
64
Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015] use the change in presidency to evaluate how
sentiment towards the government affects household consumption. This might
undermine the credibility of my empirical results, because the exclusion restric-
tion in Equation (10) might be violated. In particular, the concern might be that
views of government are driving the second stage results, rather than house price
expectations.
While I recognize the limitations associated with this particular instrument, it
is hard to isolate an alternative variable that only affects sentiment and does
not impact the mortgage and housing markets directly. Moreover, I believe this
particular concern about the validity of the instrument to be of second-order rele-
vance for two main reasons. The first is that other sentiment variables, including
views about the government, display a much lower correlation with household
loan-to-value ratios than housing sentiment does. The second (and perhaps more
convincing) reason is the fact that Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015] show that
shifts in government sentiment after the election have no significant effect on
household consumption over the same time period. If views of the government do
not shift short-term consumption habits, there is no reason to believe that they
will influence long-term saving decisions such as mortgage borrowing, and drive
my second-stage results.
2.3.2 Mortgage-level data
The Michigan Survey does not include individual-level data on households’ bal-
ance sheets. Therefore, in order to identify whether house price expectations
matter for mortgage leverage choices I have to rely on a different data source.
The data on individual-level mortgage transactions comes from the Single Family
Loan-Level Dataset, provided by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac). While some surveys collect information about American house-
holds’ financial liabilities, using mortgage information provided by the lender
provides several advantages. The first is coverage: Freddie Mac’s database collects
information about over 20 million residential mortgages securitized across the
United States between 1999 and 2015. Freddie Mac’s share of mortgage-backed
securities currently corresponds to roughly a third of the American market in
terms of number of loans, and 14% in terms of volume.45 The second advantage of
this dataset is its precision and quality. As this is lender-level data, it is much less
45. http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf; Federal Reserve Board
Data, Mortgage Debt Outstanding, March 2016.
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likely to contain measurement error. It also provides information unavailable in
most surveys, such as credit score of the borrower or the length of the mortgage
in years.
Freddie Mac provides a sample of about fifty-thousand observations per year
which are randomly drawn from the overall population. I rely on this sample
because it makes the estimations less computationally intensive while matching
the moments of the distribution of the overall population very closely.46
After the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, the Agencies
(as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are commonly referred to) were put under federal
administration and are now running under the conservatorship of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Since the federal government is ultimately
responsible for the Agencies’ solvency, both have strict rules about the char-
acteristics of the mortgages that fall under their umbrella. Loan values cannot
exceed certain nominal limits, which are determined annually by the FHFA,
depending on the geographical area where the house is located. The Agencies
are also required to back only “prime” mortgages, and jumbo loans are excluded
from their portfolios. This dataset in particular is composed only of 30-year fixed-
rate single-family mortgages, which nevertheless constitute the most common
type of mortgage on the American market, making up on average 83% of the
stock of loans originated in a given year (Fuster and Vickery [2015]). In this
sense, this dataset represents the most conservative side of the American mort-
gage market, both in terms of lending risk and overall leverage.
The descriptive statistics for this sample can be found in panel B of Table (2.1).
The outcome variable I will consider is the individual mortgage loan-to-value
ratio. This is the ratio of the loan to the value of the property as appraised by
the lender (or the original property value at the time of purchase, if the owner
can prove that the value of the property has not declined since then). Clearly,
this is an equilibrium variable, because it jointly reflects credit supply and credit
demand. The average mortgage securitized by Freddie Mac in this time frame
is worth 69% of the property value and its length is 26 years. About 47% of the
families have not been homeowners in the past three years and as such are labelled
in the database as first-time home buyers. The vast majority of borrowers live
in the property, since investment loans are only 6% of the total. On the other
hand, a large fraction of the loans have the purpose of refinancing since purchase
mortgages are the minority (37%).
46. All relevant comparisons between the sample and the population are included in the material
provided by Freddie Mac together with the dataset.
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2.3.3 First stage: housing sentiment and elections
Column 1 of Table 2.4 estimates Equation (9), the first-stage relationship. The
relationship between house price expectations, partisan leanings and electoral
outcomes is strong: the interaction between ex-ante state-level voting share for
the Democratic Party, and a dummy indicating the post 2008q4 period, displays
an elasticity of +0.10 (significant at 1 percent level) after controlling for pre-
electoral trends.
Column 2 controls for whether this shock was due to changes in fundamentals.
For example, if Democratic states experienced an income shock at the time of
the elections, or a stronger house price growth, Column 1 would be capturing a
spurious correlation between the electoral outcomes and the sentiment variable.
As in Table 2.2, price expectations are strongly correlated with past house price
growth, but other controls, such as changes in aggregate income, unemployment
rates are not significant. The coefficient on electoral outcomes is still positive and
significant at the 1% level, even if its magnitude is smaller than the one estimated
in Column 1 (+0.7). Time trends are taken into account, not only by a dummy
indicating the post electoral period (after the third quarter of 2008) but also by
quarter fixed-effects. State fixed-effects are included in order to control for time-
invariant characteristics of a state, such as geographical constraints that might
limit housing supply elasticity (Saiz [2010]).
Given that the shift in presidency in 2008 affects house price expectations, if house
price expectations affect mortgages a relationship between the potential instru-
ment and loan-to-value ratios should emerge. Column 3 provides the estimation
of this reduced-form equation. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive
and significant (+0.05) at 5% level. The Democratic vote share in a given state is
positively associated with an increase in the individual-level loan-to-value ratios,
in the post-electoral period. In the remaining part of this section, I run a series
of robustness tests aimed at verifying the validity of this instrument and testing
the credibility of the exclusion restriction.
Post-electoral policy changes
A cause of concern with the first stage estimation presented in Table 2.4 is that
local political leanings might directly affect housing markets in the post-electoral
period, for example by changing the local housing policy. Local housing policy
might lead people to act differently with respect to the housing market, regard-
less of house price expectations. In this case the exclusion restriction would be
violated.
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Table 2.5 runs some robustness checks, testing whether Democratic-leaning states
experience relevant policy changes in the housing sector in the post-electoral
period. Columns 1 and 2 estimate whether more progressive states experienced
a change in federal or local public transfers devoted to housing after 2008. For
example, if Democratic states changed the provision of housing benefits after the
2008 election, a fraction of poorer citizens might have been pushed into the private
residential market, changing the overall leverage ratios. The evidence in Column
1, however, suggests that Democratic states did not change housing benefits in
the post-electoral period. The percentage of citizens relying on public housing is
not significantly affected by political leanings (Column 1), nor is the number of
people relying on rent subsidies (Column 2).
A different kind of concern relates to Democratic states receiving a more favor-
able treatment in the post electoral period from the Federal government, for
example in terms of real estate taxation. If Democratic constituencies experi-
enced a decrease in property taxes after the election, this might increase people’s
willingness to buy a house, and possibly increase average loan-to-value ratios.
Column 3 shows that this is not the case: the coefficient of the interaction term
on average property taxes (in logs) is positive and not significant.
Finally, political views might change the housing supply dynamic after elections
such as a change in the regulatory framework. Column 4 shows that the housing
regulatory framework, proxied by the number of building permits issued in a
given state/year, is not significantly affected by the interaction between Democ-
ratic vote shares and the post-electoral period. Ex-ante political leaning doesn’t
seem to change housing supply dynamics also when looking at construction costs
(Column 5): the average wages in the construction sector, which are the compo-
nent of building costs more likely to differ across states, are also unaffected by
partisanship and election timing.
Overall, there is no clear relationship between ex-ante political views and policy
changes in the post-electoral period which might impact the housing or mortgage
markets directly.
Other sentiment variables
Table 2.4 controls for some of the fundamentals which might affect the regional
economies at the time of the elections. However, the change in party at the White
House might affect other sentiment variables, which could also have an impact
on borrowing and saving decisions. It is important to understand if the post-
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electoral shift in housing sentiment is not actually concealing a more general
optimism about the economy. In particular, Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015]
show that the percentage of the population expressing a positive opinion about
the government shifts dramatically after the US presidential elections. Other
expectations about macroeconomic policy, such as inflation rates and interest
rates, might also change substantially with a shift in government. Therefore, it
is necessary to clarify the role of other expectations in the first-stage relationship.
Table 2.6 addresses this issue by studying the state-quarter average of other
sentiment variables measured by the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Column
1 shows that the interaction between ex-ante political views and electoral out-
comes has no significant effect on personal income expectations. The coefficient is
positive, but not significant. However, more progressive states view the election
of a Democratic president as beneficial for their income in real terms, as they
expect the inflation rate to be lower in the subsequent 12 months (Column 2).
Interestingly, there is no expectation of a change in interest rates following the
election: Column 3 shows that the coefficient associated with the interaction term
is not significant. This is reassuring, as interest rate expectations may be a main
driver of credit market dynamics. Consistently with Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou
[2015], I find that the proportion of individuals reporting a positive view of the
government increases substantially after 2008, depending on the share of votes
that the Democratic party received in the election (Column 4).
In sum, partisan leanings are a strong predictor of changes in inflation expecta-
tions and views of the government, after the 2008 presidential election. However,
the first-stage relationship between elections and housing sentiment holds after
controlling for these factors: Column 5 of Table 2.6 shows that the effect of the
interaction term on house price expectations is still positive (+0.04) and strongly
statistically significant (1% level) after controlling for other sentiment variables
and for views about government policy.
Placebo test
In order for the instrument to be valid is is necessary to provide a convincing case
that this observed shift in house price expectations is due to a pure sentiment
shift, rather than a change in other variables. To this purpose, table 2.7 provides
some placebo tests, checking whether the voting share for the Democratic party
predicts sentiment shifts in times other than the 2008 election. Column 1 presents
the baseline result (the within-state change in housing sentiment occurring after
the 2008 presidential election as a function of the voting shares for the Democratic
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party in the same state). The coefficient is positive (+0.07) and statistically
significant at the 1% level. To test whether Democratic-leaning states experienced
other sentiment shifts in the years after the 2008 election, I regress the within-
state change in house price expectations on the interaction between voting shares
for the Democratic party in 2008 and dummy variables indicating the years post
2009 and post 2010, respectively. In other words, while Column 1 observes the
within-state change comparing the quarters before 2008 with all the quarters
after, Columns 2 and 3 only compare the change occurring between 2009-2014
and 2010-2014, respectively. Democratic leaning states experienced a within-
state sentiment shift (with respect to pre-2009 trends) also in late 2009, but its
magnitude (+0.02) is less than a third of what they experienced in late 2008,
and the estimate is quite imprecise. Also, Democratic states do not experience
any significant sentiment shift in late 2010, with respect to pre-2010 trends. This
implies that the change in house price expectations occurring in Democratic states
in the post-electoral period was taking place mostly around the 2008 election.
Column 4 provides an additional robustness test, using the 2012 presidential
election. As Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015] point out, the within-region change
in sentiment should be driven by a change in party in the White House. If the
first-stage equation really reflects a shift in sentiment, rather than a change in
unobservables, I should not register a significant shift in house price expectations
after the victory of an incumbent President in 2012. In Column 4 of Table 2.7 I
therefore estimate Equation (9) again, to check whether there is a change in house
price expectations around the 2012 presidential election. The coefficient on the
interaction term is positive but not statistically significant. Also, its magnitude is
three times smaller than the comparable estimate in Column 1 of Table 2.7, which
instead presents the result of the same model for the 2008 presidential election.
The results of this section suggest that there was a shift in housing market sen-
timent occurring at the time when the Democrats won the White House in 2008.
This shift was positively correlated with the ex-ante political views of a state’s
population: Democratic-leaning states became more optimistic than Republican-
leaning states. This shift does not seem to be due to changes in housing or federal
policies, or due to a generalized optimistic view about the economy. Rather,
the results suggest that this is likely to be a pure shift in optimism affecting
particularly the housing market. Therefore, conditional on a set of covariates, the
interaction between partisanship and electoral timing appears to be a relevant and
valid instrument to analyze the effects of a change in house price expectations on
mortgage borrowing.
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2.3.4 Second stage: expectations and mortgage leverage
Table 2.8 presents the analysis of the effects of housing sentiment on mortgage
leverage ratios. Column 1 displays the simple OLS regression framework defined
in Equation (8). Individual mortgages’ loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) are regressed
on a set of covariates, including different measures of sentiment in the same
quarter/state cell.
House price expectations are positively correlated with mortgage borrowing (the
estimated elasticity is +0.11, significant at the 5% level). Interest rate expec-
tations are also positively and significantly correlated with LTVs, albeit the
estimation is quite imprecise. This sign is coherent with what could be expected,
since the Freddie Mac Single Family Loan Level Dataset includes only fixed-
rate mortgages, and therefore an expected rise in interest rates should lead con-
sumers to buy/refinance when rates are more favorable. On the other hand, expec-
tations about inflation, personal income or opinions about government policy
display no significant correlation with the dependent variable. This is an impor-
tant result, because my measure of opinions about government policy is the same
as the one used by Mian, Sufi and Khoshkhou [2015] in their analysis. Perceptions
of the government have no effect on household consumption decisions (Mian, Sufi
and Khoshkhou [2015]); similarly, I find no correlation between this measure and
mortgage leverage. This should at least partially confirm the validity of the instru-
mental variable strategy proposed here. The 2008 presidential election might have
shifted both government and housing sentiment however the former seems to have
no direct implications on household consumption decisions. Therefore, it might
be possible to assume that any significant effect estimated in the second stage rela-
tionship reflects a shift in housing, rather than a shift in government sentiment.
Column 2 runs a similar model to Column 1, only excluding other sentiment
variables and including some aggregate controls for state-level time varying vari-
ables which might be correlated with both expectations growth and changes in
mortgage leverage.47 The coefficient associated with house price expectations is
slightly smaller, but still positive and significant at the 10% level.
Finally, Column 3 shows the results of the IV estimation. I instrument the state-
level change in house price expectations with the interaction between state-level
political leanings and election timing (as described by equations 9 and 10). These
47. These are: the state level GDP (logs); unemployment rate; average change in house prices over the
past year; average property taxes (logs); population growth; number of building permits (logs); average
wages in the construction sector (logs).
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results are directly comparable to the OLS estimation presented in Column 2,
since both include the same set of controls and the sample size is identical.48 I
can reject the null at the 1% level (with an estimated elasticity of +0.6). The
loan-level characteristics have the expected signs: longer mortgages have higher
LTVs and homeowners with higher credit scores are generally less heavily in
debt. Interest rates are positively correlated with loan-to-value ratios, which is
probably explained by the credit risk associated to lending a larger proportion
of a property’s appraisal value. First-time homebuyers, on average, receive less
lending on similar properties (probably reflecting a shorter credit history). Loans
on investment properties are also about 2.5 percentage points lower than loans
on owner-occupied properties.
This result indicates that one standard deviation increase in state-level house
price expectations (1.7 percentage points) generates an increase in individual-
level loan-to-value ratios worth 1 percentage point, or 6% of a standard deviation
in the dependent variable.
2.3.5 Different types of mortgages
The mortgages included in Freddie Mac’s portfolio serve different purposes.
About 37% are loans to buy a property and the remaining 63% of the loans
are refinancing mortgages. This type of loans are meant to extract equity from
already occupied properties. Among refinancing mortgages, a further distinction
needs to be made between “cash-out” loans and “non-cash-out” loans. The former
type is free from any specific purpose, however the latter is a mortgage that
has the intent to pay off existing mortgage and house-related debt.49 The three
types of loans are roughly equally represented in Freddie Mac’s portfolio between
2007 and 2014: purchase mortgages constitute 37% of the total, cash out mort-
gages 28%, and non-cash-out ones about 34%.
However, these three types of mortgages might be affected by house price expec-
tations in different ways. Borrowing with the expectation of house price increases
makes sense if households are liquidity constrained, desire higher consumption
(whether housing-related or not), and bet on home appreciation to pay off a
part of their debts in the near future. This type of logic is less likely to apply to
48. Column 2 also excludes observations recorded in the election quarter (q4 2008).
49. The loan is limited to being used to: pay off the first mortgage, regardless of its age; pay off any
junior liens secured by the mortgaged property, that were used in their entirety to acquire the subject
property; pay related closing costs, financing costs and prepaid items; disburse cash out to the borrower
(or any other payee) not to exceed 2% of the new refinance mortgage loan or $2,000, whichever is less.
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households who are opening a second mortgage in order to pay off existing debts.
In this latter case, the decision to refinance is most likely due to the desire to
change the mortgage conditions (length, or structure of the interest rates) due to
changes in policy or to unforeseen circumstances, such as the loss of employment.
Table 2.9 explores the effect of house price expectations on these three different
types of mortgages. House price expectations display an elasticity of +0.62 on
purchase mortgages (Column 1, significant at the 5% level), but the effect is
almost double on cash-out refinancing mortgages (+1.21, Column 2, significant at
1% level). On the other hand, the coefficient associated with house price expec-
tations on non-cash-out refinancing mortgages is substantially smaller (+0.34,
Column 3) and statistically insignificant. Aggregate level controls support the
idea that non-cash out refinancing mortgage borrowing is driven mainly by neg-
ative circumstances, rather than by speculation about the future of the housing
market. One standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate is correlated
with an increase in non-cash-out refinancing borrowing worth 0.46 percentage
points (2.7% of a standard deviation, Column 3). Average wages in the construc-
tion sector (a proxy for the average level of wages in a state) also negatively
correlate with loan-to-value ratios.
Finally, I address the concern of unobserved fundamental shock that could be
correlated with state ideology and emerges after the election. As a robustness
check, in Table 2.10 I estimate Equation (10) again, including only the second
and third quarter of 2008, and the first two quarters of 2009 (2008q4, or the
election quarter, is excluded). Analyzing the effect of expectations in a temporal
span so close to the election helps to further reduce the concern that my results
could be driven by unobservable shocks affecting more progressive states in the
post-electoral period.
Column 1 shows that between 2008q2 and 2009q1, leverage on purchased prop-
erties was not significantly affected by changes in house price expectations. The
coefficient (+0.08) is positive, but not statistically significant. The same is true
of mortgage refinancing to pay off existing debt (Column 3). On the other hand,
the estimated elasticity on cash-out refinancing mortgages (+1.76) is statistically
significant at the 5% level (Column 2). The magnitude of this effect implies that
an increase one standard deviation increase in short term house price expectations
between 2008q2 and 2009q2 (excluding the quarter of the election) generated an
increase in cash-out refinancing mortgage leverage ratios worth 2.9 percentage
points, or 18% of a standard deviation in the dependent variable.
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Overall, the effects of a shift in housing sentiment on mortgage leverage are
significantly positive and robust to different specifications. If consumers on
average expect house prices to rise in the near future, the individual leverage
ratio increases, and as a consequence so does the leverage ratio of the aggre-
gate economy.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I document the pattern of house price expectations formed by
American consumers in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. I show that
expectations are heterogeneous across the population and that they contain a
component of systematic extrapolative bias which is inconsistent with full-infor-
mation rational expectations theory. Finally, motivated by the role that mortgage
leverage had in the 2007-2008 financial crisis, I study whether house price expec-
tations might be considered a fundamental driver of mortgage borrowing and
lending behaviour. By exploiting an exogenous shift in housing sentiment that
occurred after the 2008 presidential election, I show that a change in house price
expectations has substantial effects on mortgage leverage, which increases when-
ever there is an expected increase in home equity.
These results have interesting implications. In the presence of cognitive biases
like the representativeness heuristic, the asset markets may be subject to endoge-
nous excess volatility (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny [2015]; Bordalo Gennaioli
and Shliefer [2016]). Since houses are also effectively used as collateral for loans
(DeFusco [2015]; Mian and Sufi[2011]), the dynamic relationship between asset
prices and mortgage leverage may exhacerbate the cycle even further and pose
substantial risks to financial and macroeconomic stability (Jordà et.al [2015a,b];
Jordà et.al [2016]). The extrapolative heuristic in house price expectations, com-
bined with the role that such expectations have on mortgage leverage decisions,
may therefore help explain the relationship between the housing cycle and the
consumption cycle, and perhaps even the slow recovery after the Great Recession
(De Nardi [2014]).
A theme that connects recent empirical research on expectations is the role of
personal experiences, as opposed to public information, in shaping individuals’
beliefs about the future. For example, cross-sectional “contagion” among peers
affects the average consumer’s decisions about investing in the housing market
more than objective economic data (Bayer, Mangum and Roberts [2016]; Bailey
et.al.[2016]).50 The evidence on heterogeneity in expectations presented in this
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chapter may indeed arise from private information, but also from differential
access to public information or even from different forecasting models: my work
can be improved by distinguishing between these alternative channels. Analysing
the drivers of expectations’ heterogeneity may constitute the empirical basis
upon which to develop a new theory of how consumers are likely to react to
news, a theory that does not rely on the assumption that all agents are per-
fectly informed and efficient in their forecasting methods. Indeed, this chapter
shows that full-information rational expectations theory may not be entirely cap-
turing the dynamics of the housing market.
Developing a more realistic model of how beliefs are formed seems particularly
important because expectations are more than just noise: the evidence I present
here suggests that they directly affect the credit cycle. To further refine my results
it would be interesting to disentangle whether house price expectations affect
primarily lending standards or mortgage applications. Nevertheless, the analysis
of consumers’ expectations appears to be a useful tool in the identification of
emerging asset and credit bubbles.
50. Kuchler and Zafar [2015] show that personal experiences also strongly guide the individual’s per-
ception of the labor market. Such perceptions might affect not only job search efforts, but also labor
demand and investment, if employers form expectations similarly to their employees, suggesting the
possible existence of unemployment cycles (Eeckhout and Lindenlaub [2015]).
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Figures
Figure 2.1. Expectations on income, inflation and house price growth rates at the 1-year horizon.

















Figure 2.2. House prices forecast errors, percentage points. US average by quarter. Sources:
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Figure 2.3. Correlation between average mortgage loan-to-value ratios and average expec-
tations about 1-year ahead house price growth. Percentage points; US averages by quarter.
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Tables
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics

Variable Units Obs Mean  Std.Dv Min Max
Panel A 
HH Income Yearly, US $ 48896 84074.71 73331.61 2400.00 500000.00
Age Years 52304 55.17 56.59 18.00 97.00
Male Dummy 52548 0.46 16.59 0.00 1.00
Married Dummy 52548 0.67 0.46 0.00 1.00
Adults # 52548 1.90 0.70 1.00 5.00
Children # 52521 0.61 1.03 0.00 5.00
College Educ. Dummy 52548 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Stock Owner Dummy 52548 0.70 0.45 0.00 1.00
Exp. Hprice 1 Y % growth 36404 0.34 5.30 -25.00 25.00
Exp. Income 1Y % growth 50371 1.77 14.09 -50.00 95.00
Exp. Inflation 1Y % growth 47047 3.84 4.15 -10.00 20.00
Forecast Error Hprice % 35137 0.85 7.04 -30.85 25.00
Absoulute Value For.Err. % 36313 5.12 4.85 0.00 30.85
Panel B
Loan to Value % 399296 69.48 17.36 6.00 100.00
Length Mortgage Years 399304 26.12 6.60 5.00 43.00
Credit Score Points 399239 753.69 46.71 333.00 844.00
Interest Rate % 399304 4.76 1.06 2.25 9.13
First Time Buyer Dummy 399304 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Investment Property Dummy 399304 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Purchase Dummy 399304 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Panel C
Change House Price t-1 Percentage points 395324 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.06
Unemployment Rate Percentage points 395324 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.12
Population Growth Percentage points 390182 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05
Building Permits # per year 390182 33796.58 34736.81 536.00 176992.00
Wage Construction Sector Monthly, US $ 389732 4312.46 637.01 2724.00 6756.00
Property Tax Yearly, US $ 397938 2011.87 836.06 462.01 5346.01
Public Housing Percentage/ pop. 397938 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08
Rent Subsidies Percentage/ pop. 397938 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
State-Level Controls
Freddie Mac Single-Family Loan Level Dataset
         Summary Statistics, 2007-2014
Michigan Survey of  Consumers
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Table 2.2. Determinants of individual-level expectations





House Price t+1 
    
HH Income (log) -1.654*** -0.527*** 0.211*** 
 (0.190) (0.048) (0.072) 
Age -0.310*** 0.049*** -0.037** 
 (0.052) (0.010) (0.014) 
Male 0.812*** -0.503*** 0.200** 
 (0.166) (0.072) (0.077) 
College Degree 1.613*** -0.348*** 0.287*** 
 (0.236) (0.061) (0.070) 
Married -0.555** 0.200*** 0.078 
 (0.267) (0.067) (0.069) 
#Children 0.232* -0.038 -0.100** 
 (0.134) (0.030) (0.038) 
Stock Owner 0.171 -0.294*** 0.246*** 
 (0.241) (0.065) (0.083) 
Negative Income Shock -2.466*** 0.856*** -0.855*** 
 (0.175) (0.052) (0.067) 
Change HPrice Lag(State) -3.464 0.497 52.841*** 
 (11.395) (2.353) (3.863) 
Income Change (State) 0.121 1.575** 0.478 
 (1.824) (0.587) (0.799) 
Gini Coeff.(State) 17.562* -7.288** 4.540 
 (9.400) (2.987) (4.881) 
Unemployment Rate(State) -41.759*** 1.093 7.344 
 (12.617) (3.514) 
 
(6.786) 
Constant 28.046*** 12.140*** -3.096 














Observations 33,976 32,020 33,892 
R-squared 0.049 0.072 0.063 
This table shows how individual-level expectations depend on individual-level characteristics 
and aggregate dynamics. The source is the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers , 
2007 to 2014, only homeowners are included. The dependent variable in column 1 is the 
expected % personal income change in one year; in column 2 is the expected inflation 
change in one year; in column 3 is expected house price growth in 12 months.   Errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.3. Determinants of individual-level house price forecast errors
This table analyzes individual level forecast errors on house prices from the panel 
component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, 2007 to 2014. The dependent variable in 
Column 1 is the absolute value of the house price forecast error: the further away from zero, 
the higher the inaccuracy of the forecast. In Column 2 the dependent variable is the forecast 
error, defined as in Equation (6): a higher value implies excessive optimism with respect to 
future house price realizations. In Column 3 the dependent variable is the change in forecast 
errors between the two interviews (quarter t +2 and quarter t). A higher value implies an 
increase in over-optimism.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at 
the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Inaccuracy 
Forecast 




    
Delta Personal Income   0.404** 
   (0.158) 
Delta House Price lag   0.677*** 
   (0.100) 
Age 0.018* -0.041** 0.035 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.021) 
Male -0.265*** 0.246*** 0.156 
 (0.049) (0.086) (0.108) 
College -0.144** 0.321*** 0.131 
 (0.059) (0.094) (0.154) 
Married -0.081 0.069 -0.215 
 (0.088) (0.068) (0.154) 
#Children -0.044 -0.127*** -0.016 
 (0.030) (0.042) (0.066) 
Stock Owner -0.300*** 0.199 -0.020 
 (0.077) (0.127) (0.065) 
Negative Income shock 0.259*** -0.743*** 0.101 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.155) 
Delta Unemployment   0.033 
   (0.123) 















       Yes 
Yes 
 
Constant 6.805*** 0.733 3.998** 
 (0.699) (1.065) (1.916) 
    
Observations 32,844 32,844 11,809 
R-squared 0.262 0.317 0.098 
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Table 2.4. First-stage: house price expectations and political outcomes
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Exp. H. Price t+1 
OLS 
First Stage 
Exp. H. Price t+1 
OLS 
First Stage 
Loan To Value Ratio 
OLS 
Reduced Form 
    
DemShare(08)*PostElection(08) 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.051** 
 (0.028) (0.014) (0.020) 
Dem.Share(08) -0.057** 0.001 -0.322*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.041) 
Post Election(08) -5.977*** -4.117*** 5.791*** 
 (1.265) (0.774) (1.001) 
Aggregate Income  1.201 -1.496 
  (1.250) (1.380) 
Unemployment_rate  -2.501 11.342 
  (5.883) (8.270) 
Delta HPrice Lagged  49.485*** 10.541*** 
  (2.983) (3.693) 
Income Borrower -0.013** -0.023*** 3.261*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.244) 
Loan Length -0.003 -0.002 0.394*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Credit Score -0.000* -0.000 -0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Interest Rate 0.082 0.046 3.081*** 
 (0.066) (0.047) (0.210) 
First Time Buyer -0.016 -0.012 -1.501*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.179) 
Investment Property -0.041** -0.035* -1.714*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.173) 





















Constant 3.661*** -30.713 98.129** 
 (0.969) (34.354) (38.492) 
    
Observations 380,389 380,389 380,612 
R-squared 0.399 0.492 0.269 
This table shows first-stage and reduced form relationships between electoral outcomes, 
house price expectations and loan-to-value ratios. The dependent variable in Columns(1)-(2) 
is the quarter/state average of one-year house price expectations. In Column.(3) the 
dependent variable is the individual-level mortgage loan-to-value ratio. All models include 
both state and year fixed-effects; standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5: First-stage robustness: post-electoral policy change?
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 























      
Dem Share (08)*PostElection (08) -0.000 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (6.576) (114.537) (3.005) 
 


















Observations 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,370 1,369 
R-squared 0.012 0.035 0.361 0.368 0.805 
Number of fips 48 48 48 47 47 
This table shows the relationship between electoral outcomes and state-level housing policy 
at t+N. The dependent variables are averages at the state level, and they originate from the 
March CPS, the Bureau of Labour Statistics and the Census Bureau, which are: Percentage 
of citizens living in public housing (Column 1); Percentage of renters who receive rent 
subsidies (Column 2); Average property taxes on residential housing (Column 3); Yearly 
building permits issued by the local authorities (Col.4); Average Wages in the construction 
Sector (Column 5). Time fixed-effects are also included.  Errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6: Robustness: other expectations?













      
Dem Share(08)*Post 
Election(08) 
0.022 -0.039*** -0.003 0.008*** 0.044*** 
 (0.027) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.016) 
 
Positive View of 
Government 
     
 
1.453** 
     (0.767) 
Expect. Int Rate 1     -0.256 
     (0.301) 
Expect. Income 1     0.045*** 
     (0.014) 
Expect Inflation 1     -0.055 
     (0.046) 
 
Aggregate Controls 

















Observations 1,458 1,457 1,458 1,458 1,451 
R-squared 0.060 0.288 0.334 0.294 0.254 
Number of fips 49 49 49 49 47 
This table looks at the relationship between electoral outcomes and sentiment measures  
different from house prices. The dependent variables are compiled from the Michigan 
Survey of Consumer Sentiment (2007-2014) as state/quarter averages: Expectations about 
personal income percentage growth in one year (1); about inflation rates growth in one year 
(2); about whether interest rates will go up/down in one year (3); about whether the 
respondent has a positive view of the government’s policy(4). Col.(5) regresses house price 
expectations on all other sentiment measures and the interaction term between post electoral 
quarters and democratic vote shares in 2008q4. All columns include quarter fixed effects.  
Aggregate controls include the sum of log income; unemployment rates; average house price 
growth in the previous three quarters; average wages in the construction sector; number of 
building permits; population growth (year on year). Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and are clustered at the state level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Robustness: placebo tests
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ExpHPrice1 ExpHPrice1 ExpHPrice1 ExpHPrice1 
     
DemShare(08)*PostElection(08) 0.072***    
 (0.015)    
DemShare(08)*2010 onwards  0.028*   
  (0.016)   
DemShare(08)*2011 onwards   -0.044  
   (0.029)  




















Constant 2.322*** -2.056*** 0.117 2.316*** 
 (0.256) (0.391) (0.245) (0.250) 
     
Observations 1,451 1,076 888 1,451 
R-squared 0.237 0.230 0.188 0.231 
Number of fips 47 47 47 47 
The dependent variable is the state/quarter averages of house price expectations recorded by 
the Michigan Survey. Column 1 shows the response of house price expectations to the 
instrument (the democratic voting share in the 2008 election interacted with a dummy 
indicating the post-electoral period). Columns 2  and 3 display whether the voting share for 
the Democratic party in the 2008 elections shifted  house price expectations also in 
subsequent years. Column 4 shows the response of house price expectations to an alternative 
instrumental variable (the interaction between the voting share for the Democratic Party in 
the 2012 election with a dummy indicating the post-2012 electoral period). Errors are 
clustered at the state level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.8. Second-stage: aggregate sentiment and individual-level loan-to-value ratios
This table displays the  effects of a change in house price expectations on individual-level 
mortgage loan-to-value ratios  (measured by the micro data included in Freddie Mac’s single 
Family Loan-Level dataset). Column 1 shows the results of an OLS estimation which 
includes controls for other expectations (income, inflation, interest rates and perception of 
the government). Column 2 displays an OLS estimation which excludes q3 2008 and 
expectations other than house price forecasts, but includes state-level controls such as: state-
level GDP;  unemployment rates; change in house prices in the previous four quarters;  
population growth; property taxes (average); average wages in the construction sector; 
number of issued building permits. Column 3 shows the results of the 2SLS estimation. 
Errors are clustered at the state level. ***p<0.001, p<0.05,*p<0.1. 







    
Exp HPrice1 0.119** 0.079* 0.604*** 
 (0.056) (0.047) (0.231) 
Exp inflation 1 -0.007   
 (0.027)   
View Govt. 0.061   
 (0.488)   
Exp Income 1 -0.008   
 (0.011)   
Exp.Int Rate 1 0.581**   
 (0.232)   
Length Mtg. 0.406*** 0.317*** 0.317*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Credit Score -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Interest Rate 3.723*** 4.972*** 4.971*** 
 (0.278) (0.258) (0.249) 
First Time Buyer -1.336*** -1.416*** -1.399*** 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.173) 





















Constant 63.360*** 147.098*** 154.051*** 
 (1.824) (32.547) (32.740) 
 
First stage F stat.   20.21 
Observations 394,958 372,755 372,755 
R-squared 0.257 0.273 0.272 
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Table 2.9: Different mortgages
This table analyses the relationship between house price expectations and loan-to-value 
ratios for different types of mortgages. Column 1 limits the analysis to mortgages which have 
the purpose of acquiring a property; Column 2 instead looks at cash-out refinancing 
mortgages only, where the borrower draws equity out of a property they already possess, and 
the loan has no specific purpose; Column 3 looks at refinancing non-cash-out mortgages. 
The model is a 2SLS estimation, identical to the one in Table 2.8, and includes the same set 
of controls. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state 
level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 (1) (2) (3) 








Loan To Value 
2SLS 
Refinancing 
Not Cash Out 
    
Exp. HPrice 1 0.632** 1.213*** 0.343 
 (0.311) (0.325) (0.432) 
Aggr. Income (log) -2.395 -2.060 -1.114 
 (2.003) (1.821) (2.122) 
Unemployment Rate 10.724 -6.490 23.445*** 
 (10.373) (13.663) (9.007) 
Change HPrice Lag -55.538*** -35.804* 16.592 
 (17.806) (20.591) (24.406) 
Pop. Growth 31.898** 36.239*** -15.938 
 (16.071) (13.750) (14.136) 
Property taxes (log) -0.147 0.024 1.661** 
 (0.674) (0.802) (0.653) 
Wages Construction (log) -1.196 -9.124*** -9.118*** 
 (2.646) (2.180) (2.719) 
Building Permits (log) 0.122 -1.112* 0.442 
 (0.471) (0.641) (0.785) 
Dem Share (08) 0.005 -0.045 -0.128* 
 (0.047) (0.068) (0.071) 
Post Election (08) 19.651*** 15.200*** 16.353*** 






















Constant 127.606** 200.218*** 172.070*** 
 (60.042) (50.841) (64.591) 
    
Observations 138,789 105,009 131,199 
R-squared 0.129 0.112 0.155 
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Table 2.10. Robustness: sentiment change around the election
 (1) (2) (3) 












Not Cash Out 
    
Exp. HPrice 1 0.084 1.768** 0.067 
 (0.898) (0.725) (0.475) 
Dem Share (08) 0.015 -0.214*** -0.079*** 
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.022) 
Post Election (08) 6.668*** 2.967*** 1.792** 






















Constant 58.372*** 64.981*** 96.137*** 
 (3.168) (4.026) (3.955) 
    
Observations 15,214 15,234 18,912 
R-squared 0.105 0.092 0.133 
This table analyses the relationship between house price expectations and loan-to-value 
ratios for different types of mortgages between quarter 2008q2 and 2009q2, excluding the 
quarter when the election took place. Column 1 limits the analysis to mortgages which have 
the purpose of acquiring a property; Column 2 is limited to cash-out refinancing mortgages 
only; Column 3 looks to refinancing non-cash-out mortgages. The models include all 
controls included in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the state level.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A2.1: Control variables
Aggregate, state-level variables control for the characteristics of the housing
market and the general economy in a given state and quarter. In both sets of
estimations (on expectations and on mortgage leverage) I include past house
price growth, measured at the state level, defined as the growth rate in the
previous four quarters (Federal Housing Finance Agency repeated sales index).
Some models control for time-varying fundamental shock (income growth, unem-
ployment rates, homeownership rates (from the March CPS) and for changes
in local housing policy (average property taxes, percentage of residents living
in public housing, percentage of residents paying lower rent due to government
subsides). These variables are derived from the March CPS.
Both expectations and mortgage markets are likely to be affected by changes in
regulation or other factors restricting housing supply, such as higher building
costs. I proxy for production costs using average wages in the construction sector
(Bureau or Labour Statistics, NAICS 23). The changes in the restrictiveness of
regulation are proxied by the yearly number of building permits issued in a given
state, which are here used as a measure of housing supply elasticity, as in Kahn
[2011].51
Population growth and migration can also have important implications for the
housing market equilibrium. I therefore also control for (yearly) changes in the
number of residents using data from the US Census. Data on both 2008 and 2012
electoral results by state comes from the Federal Election Commission dataset.
Panel C of Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics relative to these state-level
variables.
51. Saiz [2010] provides a more precise measure of housing supply elasticity. This is however only
available for certain metropolitan areas, rather than states.
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CHAPTER 3
Fiscal Adjustment and Social Unrest
in IMF-Supported Programs
3.1 Introduction
This chapter shifts the focus to public debt and deficits. The 2007-2008 financial
crisis affected the public balance sheets of many developed economies. This was
due in part to the direct cost of bank rescues, and in part to the cost of the
fiscal stimuli which many governments initially implemented in order to sustain
aggregate demand in face of the credit crunch and the recession. These events,
coupled with pre-existing fiscal imbalances, triggered the onset of a public debt
crisis in the periphery of the Eurozone in 2009.
The Eurozone crisis sparked a widespread debate on the determinants and the
consequences of fiscal consolidation. Technical arguments regarding the magni-
tude and direction of fiscal multipliers dominated a part of the academic literature
(Alesina and Ardagna [2010], Eggerston and Krugman [2012]) while another side
of the debate was concerned with the potential social costs of public budget cuts
(Woo et al.[2013]; Kentikelenis et.al [2011, 2014]). However, a common denom-
inator of this literature is to describe fiscal policy design in times of crises as a
purely technical matter, which is largely independent from the social and political
circumstances of a given country. This chapter studies instead the design of fiscal
consolidation programs and provides evidence that fiscal policy choices in times of
crises might be strongly driven by political, rather than economic, considerations.
Public debt crises often trigger the intervention of international financial insti-
tutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF agreements are a
typical example of situations in which domestic political constraints are assumed
to cease to matter, because the Fund is not accountable to a country’s electorate.
In this chapter, I present a new panel dataset on fiscal conditionality attached to
all International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending agreements taking place between
2002 and 2012. This dataset provides a novel source information on planned fiscal
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policy efforts, spanning 91 countries and ten years.52 I use this dataset to analyse
whether the domestic politics of borrowing countries affect fiscal reforms included
as conditions in IMF agreements. My results indicate that IMF conditionality is
susceptible to domestic political constraints of recipient countries. In particular,
fiscal conditionality is subject to a political force often neglected by public choice
theory: extra-parliamentary opposition, or the threat of social unrest.
Models in political economics traditionally explain fiscal discipline, or its absence,
as a consequence of a country’s formal political institutions, such as electoral
or fiscal rules.53 However, recent literature suggests that governments might be
delaying or avoiding public budget consolidation because they might fear the
welfare loss that ensues from demonstrations, riots, and strikes that typically
follow public budget cuts (Ponticelli and Voth [2011]; Tabellini and Passarelli
[2013]). IMF arrangements, however, need not be subject to the same constraints,
as the IMF enjoys a large degree of bargaining power and could, in principle,
impose policies on borrowing countries in exchange for lending.
To explain how domestic conflict restricts policy choices in the context of IMF
arrangements, I situate my results within the bargaining framework proposed
by Putnam [1988], known as the theory of two-level games. This theory predicts
that international negotiations can be shaped by the relative preferences of each
negotiator’s domestic constituency. Facing binding domestic constraints can con-
stitute a bargaining advantage if ex-post defection from the agreement is costly for
both parties. In this framework countries with stronger domestic opposition may
use this constraint as a bargaining tool to obtain more lenient fiscal conditionality
within IMF programs, all else held equal.
Building on this theoretical framework, this chapter’s main contribution is to
show that the threat of social unrest is indeed a political force capable of
restricting fiscal policy choices in the context of IMF arrangements. My results
indicate that two additional episodes of civil unrest, in each of the three years
prior to the negotiations, reduce the planned fiscal consolidation efforts by 1.2
percentage points of GDP, or 21% of a standard deviation in the dependent
52. To my knowledge, the only other data source collecting a cross-country panel of fiscal reforms is
Devries at al. [2011], who focus only on OECD economies. However, their dataset is unsuitable to
study the political determinants of fiscal policy decisions . This is because Devries at al. [2011] measure
fiscal adjustment as the actual, ex-post , budget balance change. Hence, there is no obvious way to
discriminate between a governments’ intentions and the program’s implementation. Instead, I collect
data on planned fiscal consolidation, rather than on the actual fiscal consolidation outcomes .
53. The seminal model by Alesina and Drazen [1991] focuses on the war of attrition between conflicting
interests groups in society. For a thorough review of the literature on the topic see Alesina and Perotti
[1995] and Alesina and Passalacqua [2015].
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variable. This is robust to controls for the economic circumstances of the country;
to political variables which previous literature has shown to be relevant in deter-
mining IMF conditionality; and to some potential selection issues.
I also study how social unrest relates to qualitative targets in the realms of public
wages, welfare expenditure, or labor market reforms. These reforms are also very
likely to trigger public opposition, as suggested by Tabellini and Passarelli [2013].
Countries facing a stronger history of social unrest also receive fewer qualitative
conditions in these policy realms. Two additional episodes of civil unrest, in each
of the three years prior to the negotiations, reduce the number of these conditions
by 0.25 (a fourth of a condition), or 11% of a standard deviation in the dependent
variable. The threat of social unrest, however, has no negative effect on reforms
that are less likely to trigger public protests, such as trade and financial sector
reforms.
This chapter draws inspiration from two main strands of literature. The first
relates to the political economy of IMF conditionality, particularly recent work
focusing on how the domestic institutional settings of borrowing countries can
explain the variation in IMF’s programs and conditions.54 Stone [2008] is one of
the first proponents of this view, showing that the scope of IMF conditionality is
less broad in democracies, and particularly under coalition governments. Stone
[2008] interprets this result as evidence that under these political setups govern-
ments face more domestic opposition to reform and use this as a bargaining tool
against the IMF to obtain less intrusive policy prescriptions. Stone’s [2008] results
are in line with the work of Caraway, Rickard and Anner [2012], who find that
countries with stronger labour movements (measured by the relevance of trade
unions) receive fewer conditions related to labour markets. They also find that
this effect is particularly strong in democracies. Woo [2013] shows that conditions
related to the public sector are influenced by domestic political constraints much
more than financial sector conditions, which instead respond to supranational
interests.
I contribute to the literature on the domestic political determinants of IMF con-
ditionality by focusing on a particular a set of conditions (quantitative fiscal
targets) that, to my knowledge, has not been previously studied. My results chal-
lenge a view, dominant in earlier literature, which predicts that if a government
54. This is defined by Stone [2008] as the “structuralist” view of IMF conditionality. This approach is
complemented by the “realist” view, which focuses more on the geopolitical pressures conditioning the
IMF (Copelovitch [2010], Gould [2003; 2006]) and by the “bureaucratic” view, which focuses on the
internal power struggle among IMF staff (Dreher [2004]).
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is more constrained domestically, it should use the IMF to enforce costly reforms
on its citizens, blaming the responsibility on the Fund’s officials (Vaubel [1986],
Przeworski and Vreeland [2000], Vreeland [2003]). Instead, I show that the poten-
tial for extra-parliamentary opposition reduces the extent of conditionality within
IMF programs, consistently with the results Caraway Rickard and Anner [2012]
present regarding the negative relationship between labour market conditionality
and relevance of trade unions.
My results also fit in the broad literature relating the political economy of fiscal
policy. Recent contributions, in particular, point to the relationship between
fiscal adjustment and extra-parliamentary opposition. Ponticelli and Voth [2011]
show how fiscal austerity programs are very likely to cause a large extra-par-
liamentary opposition in the form of riots, protests, and strikes. Tabellini and Pas-
sarelli [2013] claim that the fear of social unrest, rather than electoral outcomes,
might be what prevents governments from engaging in fiscal consolidation. This
is particularly plausible as governments seem not to be punished by voters after
implementing austerity programs (Alesina, Carloni Lecce [2012]). I contribute
to this literature by providing empirical evidence that the threat of social unrest
can indeed be a powerful force in explaining fiscal consolidation, or its absence.
Furthermore, I show that the electoral cycle enhances this result; democracies
are more responsive than autocracies to the threat of unrest, and governments
facing imminent elections even more so.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of Putnam’s
theory of two-level games, which constitutes the theoretical basis to understand
how social unrest can influence fiscal policy in the context of IMF agreements.
Section 3.3 presents the dataset and the empirical methodology, Section 3.4
presents results on fiscal conditionality, and Section 3.5 presents results on struc-
tural reforms. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical framework: conditionality as a two-level
game
Putnam’s [1988] theory of international negotiations features two “chief negotia-
tors” engaging in a bargaining process set in two stages, or “levels”. Level I is
international: each chief negotiator tries to reach an agreement with their foreign
counterpart. Level II is domestic: each level I agreement has to be ratified from
the respective domestic constituencies.
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In order to model the interaction between the two levels, Putnam uses the concept
of “win sets”. A negotiators’ win set is the set of all feasible level I agreements
that would win the approval of domestic constituencies at level II. Hence, the
absolute size of both win sets defines the first of Putnam’s hypotheses: larger win
sets should make agreements more likely, as the win sets overlap more easily. This
hypothesis cannot be tested in my data, however, since I observe the population of
agreed IMF conditions. On the other hand, the outcome of the negotiating process
depends crucially on the relative size of win sets. In particular, Putnam’s theory
states that a relatively smaller win set can constitute a bargaining advantage,
and tilt the balance of the negotiations in favor of the party facing the highest
degree of domestic constraints.
When applying this framework to the bargaining process between countries and
the IMF over conditionality it is necessary to assume that the IMF and the
country’s representatives have different preferences over economic policy. To
simplify, I assume that the government will try to minimize conditionality and
maximize lending, and that the Fund will have the opposite strategy. The Fund
might prefer more conditionality for a given amount of lending, as it views policy
prescriptions as a form of collateral: conditions are meant to safeguard IMF
resources by ensuring that the country’s balance of payments will be strong
enough to permit it to repay the loan.55 The Fund might also be maximizing
conditionality in order to expand its influence on the international stage, and
therefore its staff’s power and prestige (Vaubel [1986], Vaubel Dreher and Soylu
[2007]). Major stakeholders and other lenders involved in the negotiation process
might also affect the Fund’s preferences over conditionality: this can sometimes
soften the Fund’s stance in exchange for political positions that are favorable
to powerful countries (Stone [2008]; Dreher and Jensen [2007]; Dreher Sturm
and Vreeland [2009a,b]). However, external stakeholders might also desire more
conditionality in exchange for lending (Gould [2003, 2006]). Holding these influ-
ences constant, it seems reasonable to assume that the Fund has a taste for
more stringent conditionality, mainly because it could assure the swift payback
of the loan tranches.
On the other hand, a government might try to minimize conditionality for a given
amount of lending. This is because agreeing to fewer conditions may imply higher
flexibility in the path to economic recovery and the government might value this
55. IMF [2016] factsheet on conditionality.
93
flexibility (Kahler [1993]). Also, the government might be concerned about the
welfare loss associated with riots and protests that may result from proposing
ambitious reforms to the citizens.56
Given a budget constraint upon which both subjects agree, and assuming that the
IMF’s and the governments’ priorities diverge, the set of feasible agreements can
be represented by the segment F ∗G∗ in Figure 3.1. The segment F ∗G∗ depicts all
the possible agreements satisfying both win sets and the budget constraint (which
is defined as the combination of lending and conditionality which is capable of
solving the country’s macroeconomic imbalance). F* is the preferred outcome
for the Fund, as it minimizes lending and maximizes conditionality; G* is the
preferred outcome for the government, for the opposite reason.
Ilida [1993] formalizes the relationship between the size of the respective win
sets and the distribution of the negotiation outcomes. In Ilida’s model there are
infinite periods. In each period the players, G and F , take turns proposing an
agreement over the contract curve F ∗G∗ (Figure 3.1), which is a proposal over
a given amount of lending (l) and a set of policy prescriptions (c). Assuming
that citizens have to decide whether or not protest against the proposed reforms
(lc), and that each citizen has a status quo payoff (s i). Each citizen is indifferent
between the status quo and the payoff from the negotiations if and only if s i=lc.
If lc!si citizen i decides not to protest. The key to the agreement is then going
to be the median citizens’ evaluation of the status quo (sm).57 To simplify the
analysis, this model assumes that both the government and the Fund have perfect
knowledge of the level of domestic constraints in the borrowing country. Also, it
assumes that the governments’ interests align with that of its constituency, and
that the constituency is homogeneous in its demands (there are no conflicting
interest groups lobbying the government about conditionality).58
56. This assumption is in contrast with the setup proposed by Vaubel [1986] or Vreeland [2003], where
governments use the IMF as a scapegoat, to weaken domestic opposition and enforce reforms on the
population. If this were to be the case, we should observe more conditionality the higher the degree
of domestic constraints; and more so in democracies than in autocracies. However this chapter as well
as the work of Stone [2008], Caraway Rickard Anner [2012] and Woo [2013] contradict this earlier
hypothesis.
57. Of course, the decision to participate in riots may be endogenous to other people’s decisions. A
more realistic model of the costly decision to participate in a riot as a consequence of economic policy
is proposed by Tabellini and Passarelli [2013].
58. Regarding the common knowledge assumption, Ilida [1993] models the possibility of international
asymmetric information, with one country having full knowledge of its constraints but not the other
party. He finds that in most situations the bargaining power of the domestically constrained negotiator
is still enhanced for the most part. On the other hand, Mo [1994] expands the analysis to a situation
where the negotiators’ interest are in conflict with at least some of the interests in her constituency and
finds that domestic constraints can still be a bargaining advantage for the negotiator even in this setting.
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Assuming common knowledge, then both negotiators know the real value of sm,
and they know that no agreement in which lc<sm can ever be ratified in the
country. This is because in order for agreement (lc, 1-lc) to be ratified, the
median citizen needs to support it. Crucially, both the government and the Fund
have positive discount rates, capturing the idea that not finding an agreement is
costly for both parties. The country’s motives are clear, as a delay in reaching
an agreement might lead to greater costs associated with its macroeconomic
imbalances. The Fund has a different set of incentives in finding an agreement
as soon as possible. The internal dynamics of appointment strongly incentivize
IMF negotiators to return from country missions with an agreed set of reforms
(Kahler [1993]). Moreover, the delay might put pressure on the internal coalition
brought together to support a given lending program, or negotiating position.
To avoid unsettling internal dynamics, the IMF management might be willing to
concede to some of the country’s demands in order to reach an agreement as soon
as possible (Kahler [1993]). Also, the threat of economic collapse may lead rich
countries, who are the Fund’s major stakeholder, to the rescue of their geopolitical
allies. Finally, the Fund might be worried about the potential regional spillovers
of a country’s macroeconomic crisis. So it is reasonable to assume that both the
government and the Fund will have an incentive to propose a solution which
satisfies the other party as soon as possible.
Given this setup, the citizen’s decision to riot affects the outcome of the negoti-
ations through the welfare loss potentially associated with the protests. Anedoc-
tical evidence suggests that citizen protests have strong-armed governments into
revoking reforms in Italy, Portugal, and Greece, during the European debt crisis
(Tabellini and Passarelli [2013]). Developing countries are not immune from this
mechanism, as the case study of Jamaica displays (Kahler [1993]). If the cit-
izens riot against a proposed reform, the government can be forced to repeal
the agreement. This is costly for both the government and the IMF.
With such a mechanism at play, a higher degree of social unrest can change the
equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game in favour of less fiscal adjustment,
given the same amount of lending. In other words, as long as the Fund’s discount
rates are positive, a higher degree of domestic constraints constitutes a bargaining
advantage for the government. Graphically, this can be represented by a change
in the equilibrium outcome on the contract curve F ∗G∗ in Figure 3.1. If the
government becomes more constrained domestically, its win set will shift from
[sm1, G *] to [sm2, G *].
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This result, formalized by Ilida [1993], relies on the assumption of a constant win-
set on the side of the Fund. This is equivalent to assuming that the IMF always
faces the same set of domestic constraints when dealing with a specific country.
In reality, the Fund’s win set towards a specific borrower might shift, especially in
response to changing geopolitical pressures. However, a shrinking win set on the
side of the Fund will shift the outcome in its favor, but does not fundamentally
change the intuition of the model.
The logic of two-level games provides a theoretical framework to investigate how
domestic constituencies can influence international negotiations with the Fund,
as Putnam originally suggested:
“[...] if labor unions in a debtor country withhold necessary coopera-
tion from an austerity program that the government has negotiated
with the IMF, level II ratification of the agreement may be said
to have failed; ex ante expectations about that prospect will surely
influence the level I negotiations between the government and the
IMF ”.59
3.3 Data and methodology
This section describes the construction of the dataset and the definition of the two
main dependent variables. It also discusses the construction of the main measure
for social unrest and the methodological framework.
3.3.1 Data on IMF conditionality
The source of conditionality data is the Monitoring of Fund Arrangements
(MONA) database, which was disclosed by the IMF to the public in 2009, per-
mitting retroactive access to a large part of the lending agreements. The IMF
disburses its loans to countries in subsequent tranches, over the course of an
agreement that might span over several years. Most IMF programs are clas-
sified as conditional lending, in which the country is supposed to fulfil a set
of policy prescriptions (conditions) before receiving the subsequent tranche of
the loan. IMF representatives visit the borrowing country multiple times over
the course of a program in order to discuss compliance with conditions that
59. Putnam [1988], p.436
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have been agreed in the past and to define new policies for the future. While
the IMF might enjoy a large degree of bargaining power during these negoti-
ations, the conditions are nevertheless an object of a bargaining process between
the Fund’s and the country’s representative. The MONA database collects data
on the outcome of this bargaining process, represented by the set of conditions
agreed in each program review.
I focus only on programs taking place between 2002 and 2012. The MONA data-
base provides information about the vast majority of agreements taking place
in this time frame, while older agreements are available in the MONA archive
(from 1993 to 2003). Due to their structure, the two datasets are not easily
comparable. Choosing this particular time frame might be problematic because
in the year 2000 the IMF launched an initiative to reduce the scope and extent of
conditionality. Despite this, the number of structural conditions included in the
average program had not changed substantially up to 2004 (Independent Eval-
uation Office [2008]). This suggests that the streamlining initiative was mainly
interpreted by the Fund’s staff as an invitation to change the composition of
conditionality and to focus more on the IMF’s area of core expertise (Independent
Evaluation Office [2008]). This chapter focuses on rather homogeneous groups of
conditions. Therefore, the choice of this specific time frame should not substan-
tially condition the results.
Overall, I construct a dataset composed of 91 countries, 171 unique agreements,
and 486 program/years. Figure 3.2 shows the geographical distribution of IMF
agreements during this time frame. On average, countries in this dataset are
part of an IMF agreement for 3.3 consecutive years, with the maximum number
recorded for Tanzania, which has been under four consecutive IMF programs
between 2002 and 2012. Table 3.1 contains the descriptive statistics for this
sample. I construct a panel dataset, where each country is observed for a number
of consecutive years. Since I only observe conditionality when a country is under-
going an IMF agreement, this is an unbalanced dataset from the point of view of
the dependent variables (not each country/year cell is also a program/year cell).
3.3.2 Costruction of conditionality variables
IMF conditions can be categorized along two dimensions. The first is their nature:
conditions can be quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative conditions include
Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPCs) and Indicative Targets (ITs). For
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example, these can be quantitative targets on government budget balance or tar-
gets on the required level of international reserves. Qualitative conditions include
Structural Performance Criteria (SPCs) and Structural Benchmarks (SBs), such
as measures to improve the public or financial sector operations. Prior Actions
(PAs) can belong to either category.
Conditions also differ in their degree of compulsoriness, as some are considered
mandatory in order to pass a review, and as such they require a waiver from the
Executive Board in case they are not met. Compulsory conditions include Prior
Actions (PAs), which need to be met in order for the first tranche of the loan
to be disbursed. Other mandatory conditions are Quantitative and Structural
Performance Criteria (QPCs and SPCs). Indicative Targets (ITs) and Structural
Benchmarks, while important, are intended as general markers to assess program
performance, and compliance with them is not considered necessary in order to
pass a review.60
I compute two measures of conditionality from the MONA database. The first
is the degree of fiscal consolidation required in a given country at the end of any
program year.61 The MONA database provides data on the level of fiscal deficit
required of country c at the end of year t expressed in billions (or millions) of
National Currency. These are all defined as Quantitative Performance Criteria,
and are therefore compulsory in order to pass a review. I collect this variable
for all country/years for which it is available, and scale its nominal value the
consolidated value of GDP recorded for country c in year t .62 The first of my
dependent variables is therefore constructed as follows:
Consolidationct=Targetct-Fiscal Deficitct-1 (11)
where Targetct is the expected deficit-to-GDP ratio included as an IMF condition
at the end of year t and Fiscal Deficitct-1 is the deficit-to-GDP ratio at the end
of year t-1 .63
60. This information is publicly available on the IMF website, under “conditionality factsheets”.
61. For a given country/year, there are multiple deficit targets, as the IMF runs multiple reviews
per program/year. I decide to consider only the end-year target (the last one reported in the MONA
database for each given country/year). This is for consistency with the macroeconomic explanatory
variables, which are normally consolidated to reflect end-year values.
62. Some country/years are not program/years, and some program/years do not include a fiscal deficit
condition. These are treated as missing values.
63. Fiscal deficit at t-1 is defined as the difference between the consolidated figures of government
revenues and government expenditures at the end of year t-1 , as included in the World Economic
Outlook, April 2015.
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Figure 3.3 plots the distribution of the Consolidation measure in my dataset.
About 55% of the program/year cells include a condition on fiscal policy (Table
3.1). A positive number implies fiscal consolidation; a negative number fiscal
expansion. The average for my dataset is +1.14% of GDP, implying an equiv-
alent fiscal consolidation target (Table 3.1). However many programs actually
require countries to undertake some degree of fiscal expansion with respect to the
previous fiscal year. While this evidence might contradict popular understanding
of IMF policies, there is evidence that spending might be increased during IMF
programs, particularly social spending in developing countries (Nooruddin and
Simmons [2006]; Independent Evaluation Office [2003]; Clements et.al [2013]).
Also, governments might temporarily need to expand their fiscal capacity in times
of crisis to prevent a collapse of economic activity (IEO [2003]).
My second measure of conditionality regards structural, or qualitative, conditions.
This data also comes from the MONA database. I collect conditions in the realms
of:
(a) Public employment, wages, and civil sector reform;64
(b) Welfare system reform: social policy, pension, health, education, and social
welfare reforms, including privatizations;65
(c) Labor market reforms, excluding reforms to the public sector, which are
already included under category (a).66
These are the types of conditions that are more likely to affect ordinary citi-
zens’ lives, and may face a stronger non-partisan opposition as a consequence.67
According to the theoretical framework presented in Section 3.2, a relevant history
of social unrest should weaken conditionality also in the qualitative policy areas
defined by (a), (b) and (c). Labor market reforms, in particular, are negatively
related to the relative strength of a country’s labor unions (Caraway, Rickard and
Anner [2012]).
My measure of structural conditionality is simple: I construct it as the yearly sum
of the number conditions included in (a) (b) and (c) above:
SocialPolicyReformct=act+bct+cct (12)
64. MONA database, economic codes 7.4; 7.5; 7.6; 22
65. MONA database, economic codes 8; 8.1; 8.2;8.3;8.4;23;23.1;23.2
66. MONA database, economic codes 12 and 28.
67. Ponticelli and Voth [2011]; Tabellini and Passarelli[2013].
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The average country undergoing an IMF program receives 1.5 conditions in
SocialPolicyReform (Table 1); Circa 38% of the programs contain at least one
condition in SocialPolicyReform (Figure 3.4) Measures of qualitative condition-
ality on international trade, or financial sector reforms are constructed in a similar
way.68 Conditions on international trade were included in 31% of the agree-
ments, and conditions on financial sector reform were included in 22% of them
(Figure 3.4).
Measuring structural conditionality is not a straightforward problem: the number
of conditions counts, but scope and depth of the conditions also matter. A mea-
sure of conditionality based on the sum of the number of conditions is however
a tradition in the literature on IMF conditionality: recent examples are Dreher
and Jensen [2007], Woo [2013], or Gould [2003], who uses a three-year weighted
average of the number of financial system reforms to evaluate the influence of
private creditors. Stone [2008] uses a similar approach to evaluate the scope of
IMF conditionality counting the number of policy domains covered by at least
one condition.
Other authors have been trying to account for the relative stringency of con-
ditionality. Caraway, Rickard and Anner [2012] assign different weights to a
condition depending on whether this falls in the category of Prior Action, Struc-
tural Performance Criteria, or Structural Benchmark. This weighting procedure
measures the relative importance of the condition from the point of view of the
IMF (or how much the Fund cares about the condition being fulfilled), but it
hardly provides a clear indication of the relative weight of the condition from a
social or economic point of view. I therefore prefer a simple count variable, as this
increases the transparency and interpretability of the results. However I also run
some models using the weighting procedure proposed by Caraway, Rickard and
Anner [2012] and show that my results are robust their measurement of structural
conditionality.
3.3.3 Methodology and explanatory variables
To study the relationship between fiscal conditionality and social unrest, I rely
on a panel data regression model of the type:
Yct=a+Xct-1+AverageUnrest(t-1,t-2,t-3)+φc+εct (13)
68. As the sum of economic codes 1; 2; 26; 27 and 25; 25.1; 10; 10.1; 10.2; 10.3; 21.1; 21.2 respectively.
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where Yct is the measure of conditionality (whether Consolidation or SocialPoli-
cyReform) defined in Section 3.1. Xct-1 is a vector of country-year controls which
include macroeconomic variables affecting fiscal consolidation, and several polit-
ical and institutional factors which might affects fiscal conditionality, measured
at t-1 , in order to avoid a simultaneity bias. Country fixed effects (φc) aim at
capturing time-invariant country-specific characteristics which might affect the
degree of conditionality.
AerageUnrest(t-1,t-2,t-3) is the main effect of interest, which captures the short-
term potential for social unrest in a given country. Following Ponticelli and Voth
[2011], I construct this measure as a count variable of the episodes recorded in
the Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS).69 The measure for social
unrest (AverageUnrest) is computed as the three-year moving average of the
number of episodes of social unrest occurring in country c prior to year t : this
is, again, to avoid potential endogeneity arising from simultaneity and reverse
causality. This is the dependent variable which I will use throughout the chapter
to test the hypothesis that social unrest reduces the strength of conditionality in
certain policy areas.70
The CNTS dataset collects data on a broad range of social unrest episodes, taken
from media reports of the incidents. These include general strikes, riots, anti
government demonstrations, attempts to assassinate political figures, government
crises, guerrilla warfare, revolutions and purges. However, AverageUnrest only
includes general strikes, riots and anti-government demonstrations. These vari-
ables potentially reflect different institutional structures, but all express forms
of collective protest organized by the citizens/voters against the political estab-
lishment which might be triggered by undesired changes in economic policy.
They also occur with relative frequency across the sample, while revolutions,
for example, are extremely rare in this time period. Moreover, revolutions might
easily be carried out by political forces other than citizens, such as the armed
forces or opposition parties. As such, they don’t necessarily reflect the citizens’
capability and willingness to organize protests. A similar reasoning applies to
guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, attempts to assassinate political figures
may be the expressions of individual, rather than collective, aggrievance. Gov-
69. Banks [2013].
70. The average over three years is admittedly an arbitrary choice. This is however the same time span
over which Gould [2003] builds a moving average of bank-friendly conditions. Three years is a short
enough time span to reflect a country’s recent history, and at the same time long enough to guarantee
that a significant amount of country/year cells will have non-zero values.
101
ernment crises and purges, finally, reflect a completely different set of political
and institutional dynamics, which run from a government to its citizens, rather
than the other way around.
The objective nature of AverageUnrest forms an empirical basis for the common
knowledge assumption at the basis of the theoretical model discussed in Section
3.2. Country officials might be willing to lie to the IMF about the potential for
social unrest, but they cannot lie about the extent of what already happened and
was recorded by the press. This variable is observed by the Fund in the same way
as it is observed by the government.
As a methodological note, one common problem arises in the empirical litera-
ture on IMF lending: selection. The non-random selection of countries into IMF
programs may affect the relationship between social unrest and austerity. In
particular, a source of concern might be that governments self-select into IMF
agreements in a way that is correlated with both austerity and social unrest. For
example, a country could have entered two IMF agreements over a particular
time span. Perhaps in the first occasion the government tried to fix its balance
sheets in an attempt to avoid the IMF loan, while in the second occasion the
government went directly to the negotiation stage with the Fund. It is likely that
the pre-existing fiscal consolidation efforts reduced the need for fiscal adjustment
in the first occasion versus the second (all else held equal). If the pre-program
attempts to fiscal adjustment induced social unrest in the first episode, my model
would capture a negative relationship between the planned fiscal conditionality
and social unrest prior to the agreement. In order to exclude this possible source
of bias, I run some robustness tests by including actual fiscal adjustment (in the
year preceding the fiscal deficit condition) as an additional regressor. My results
are robust to this specification.
Moreover, I estimate a selection model based on the Heckman procedure to
explicitly control for selection. Implementing this procedure correctly proves chal-
lenging in this context, due to the unavailability of a credible instrument. Any
variable related to the access to an IMF loan is very likely to be directly affecting
the stringency of conditionality. This is because the political variables that have
been used in the existing literature to this purpose (often in the context of pro-
gram evaluation, such as the number of votes in line with the US in the UN
general assembly) are not obviously exogenous.71 If a country can use its polit-
ical influence to obtain more lending, it is also likely to use it to obtain a more
71. Barro, Lee [2005].
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lenient deal, all else held equal. In fact, my results are indicative of an impor-
tant influence of the Fund’s major stakeholders in determining the stringency of
conditionality, in line with the results of Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland [2009a,b].
In my selection equation, the exclusion restriction will be the presence of an
IMF deal in the previous year. This variable has a strong predictive power on
IMF program participation in any given year and therefore constitutes a rele-
vant instrument.72 On the other hand, its validity as an instrument relies on the
assumption that this variable affects the current degree of fiscal conditionality
only to the extent to which prior IMF agreements (or their absence) induced
the country to pursue prior fiscal consolidation. Therefore, conditional on pre-
existing fiscal consolidation, IMF agreements taking place in the previous year
should be unrelated to the degree of fiscal conditionality. My results hold to this
specification, with similar magnitudes and significance as the baseline.73
3.4 Results: fiscal conditionality and social unrest
This section discusses the results on quantitative fiscal targets and relative robust-
ness tests. I also analyse how several political institutions might mediate between
social unrest and fiscal conditionality.
3.4.1 Fiscal conditionality: macroeconomic determinants
The level of fiscal consolidations or expansion planned during an IMF program
depends on a set of macroeconomic variables, such as the pre-existing level of
fiscal imbalance of a country. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2 displays the relation-
ship between fiscal consolidation planned at the end of each program/year and a
vector of macroeconomic and program-level controls, using a fixed-effects and a
random-effects model, respectively.
In Column 1 the signs are generally as expected: the elasticity between the fiscal
surplus prior to the agreement and Consolidation is negative and strongly signif-
icant, implying that an improvement in the fiscal balance worth one percentage
point of GDP reduces fiscal consolidation targets by 0.11 percentage points of
72. Prior participation in IMF agreements has been used before as an instrument: see for example
Rickard and Anner [2014].
73. Dryscoll-Kraay [1998] standard errors are included whenever the dependent variable is continuous in
order to take into account potential cross-sectional dependence. The error structure in this procedure is
assumed to be correlated between the panels, autocorrelated up to two lags and robust to heteroskedas-
ticity. I also run some robustness tests to prove that controlling parametrically for cross sectional
dependence does not substantially change the results. Appendix A3.2 provides this set of estimations.
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GDP. This means that one standard deviation increase in the budget balance
reduces Consolidation by 16% of a standard deviation. The relationship between
the trade balance and fiscal consolidation is also negative and significant, and has
a similar magnitude: one standard deviation increase in the balance of payments
reduces fiscal conditions by 21% of a standard deviation. Countries with a better
balance of payments are required to carry out smaller budget cuts. One standard
deviation increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, on the other hand, leads to an
increase in the fiscal consolidation target worth 52% of a standard deviation. The
comparison of this magnitude with the one associated to budget balance (16%)
suggests that fiscal consolidation targets depend primarily upon long-term fiscal
sustainability concerns: a high debt/GDP ratio is more relevant in determining
fiscal consolidation targets than a high deficit/GDP ratio.
The IMF’s own growth forecast errors at the one-year horizon also display a posi-
tive relationship with fiscal consolidation targets (+0.14, significant at 5% level).
This result can be interpreted in light of Blanchard and Leigh’s [2013] findings.
Under rational expectations, the correlation between growth forecast errors and
planned fiscal adjustment should be zero. A positive coefficient is indicative of
an underestimation from the IMF of the short-term multipliers arising from fiscal
consolidation, which is consistent with Blanchard and Leigh’s [2013] results.
Finally, the conditions can be targeted at the primary balance surplus, rather
than the overall fiscal balance. Conditions on primary balance imply that the
fiscal target should be calculated at the net of the payment of interests on
outstanding public debt. As a major component of government expenditure is
excluded, these conditions are nominally stricter: all else held equal, a condi-
tion on primary balance appears 6.8 percentage points of GDP higher than a
condition on budget balance (significant at the 1% level).
Program-level variables do not seem to have much explanatory power on fiscal
conditionality. The number of consecutive years a country has been under IMF
arrangement has no significant effect on the dependent variable, nor does the
overall IMF lending-to-GDP ratio. Also, the IMF lends to some low and middle-
income member countries under concessional terms (interest rates on the loan are
virtually zero and the repayment terms are longer). However, controlling for this
factor does not seem to have a direct effect on fiscal consolidation targets. Column
2 displays the result of a random-effects model identical to the one in Column 1:
the sign and magnitude of the effects are not dissimilar between the two models.
However, the Hausman test rejects random-effects at the 1% confidence level,
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suggesting that the fixed-effects model is preferable. All the estimations from this
point onward will therefore include country fixed-effects.
3.4.2 Fiscal Conditionality and Social Unrest: Baseline
Table 3.3 introduces the social unrest measure, AverageUnrest : this is the moving
average of the episodes of unrest (riots, anti-government demonstrations, and
general strikes) which have occurred in the country during the three years prior
to a program/year. Column 1 shows that AverageUnrest is negatively associated
with Consolidation , and the magnitude of the effects is relevant: the elasticity
is -0.62, implying that one standard deviation increase in this regressor (two
episodes per year) reduces the dependent variable by 24% of a standard deviation
(significant at the 1% level).
Columns 2-6 run some robustness checks on this baseline result. In particular,
they control for possibile sources of omitted variable bias. Previous literature
on IMF conditionality has shown that several institutional and political factors,
other than social unrest, influence the number and scope of policy prescrip-
tions within IMF agreements. First of all, the number of protests might be
related to the quality of democratic institutions: public protests might be less
costly in democratic regimes than under autocratic governments. If transitioning
to democracy simultaneosly improves a country’s budget balance, AverageUn-
rest would be measuring a spurious relationship between fiscal deficit targets
and social unrest. In Column 2 I therefore include a control for the quality
of democratic institutions, Polity2 . This variable captures a regime’s author-
itarian spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to
+10 (consolidated democracy). While the level of democracy reduces the average
fiscal consolidation target (elasticity of -0.18, significant at the 5% level), the
coefficient associated with AverageUnrest is however largely unchanged, both
in terms of magnitude and significance.
The degree of democracy prevalent in political institutions is not the only factor
affecting fiscal conditionality and correlated with social unrest. The IMF might,
for example, be reluctant to push costly reforms in election years, as citizens
might punish the incumbent government in the polls. Starting negotiations with
a new government once a program has already been agreed with the previous
one is costly, and the Fund might try to avoid this scenario. At the same time,
the years in the run-up to a general election might also be associated with more
protests than usual. Column 3 tests whether timing of the elections matter for
fiscal conditionality, taking into account the level of democracy. While the coef-
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ficient on elections is negative (-0.25), it is not significant. Moreover, the effect
of AverageUnrest is left largely unchanged (-0.61, significant at the 5% level).
Column 4 analyses another potential source of omitted variable bias: insti-
tutional, rather than extra-parliamentary, opposition. Within-parliament opposi-
tion might be related to extra-parliamentary opposition, as a reflection of the
overall political fractionalization in society. However, the veto players internal
to the parliament might be the true reason the IMF’s deal is more lenient, as
some reforms promoted by the IMF agreement might need to be voted on by
the parliament. Therefore, when omitting a control for institutional fraction-
alization, the coefficient on AverageUnrest might be upwardly biased. However,
Column 4 shows that veto players in the legislature do not seem to be driving
the results. The number of veto players in a legislature is positively correlated
with the stringency of fiscal conditionality (+0.79, significant at the 5% level).
On the other hand, the effect of AverageUnrest is still negative and significant
(-0.5, significant at the 5% level).
Another confounding factor might be the IMF’s internal motives to be more or
less indulgent towards a country. The literature on IMF programs and condi-
tionality suggests that the Fund’s most important contributors (the US and G5
nations) have not only influenced the IMF’s decision to lend (Barro and Lee
[2005]) but also the intensity and scope of conditionality attached to programs
(Dreher Sturm and Vreeland [2009a,b]). The literature proxies for this geopolit-
ical influence of the West on International Financial Institutions’ operations using
the number of votes a country casts in line with the US at the United Nations
General Assembly (Barro and Lee [2005]), or with temporary membership of
the UN Security Council (Dreher Sturm and Vreeland [2009a]). The external
geopolitical pressure can reflect on the IMF’s staff decision making process, to the
point of making the Fund’s win set larger when dealing with countries favoured
by its powerful stakeholders (Dreher and Jensen [2007]).
To control for the IMF’s win set, Column 5 includes both the number of votes
in line with the US at the UN General Assembly as well as a dummy indicating
whether a country is a temporary member of the UN Security Council in a given
year. Consistently with Dreher Sturm and Vreeland [2009a,b], I find that political
closeness to the US reduces the stringency of conditionality: one standard devi-
ation increase in the votes in line with the US in any given year (0.12) reduces
Consolidation by 0.84 percentage points of GDP, or 15% of its standard deviation.
Temporary membership of the UN Security Council also reduces the need for
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fiscal consolidation. The coefficient associated with AverageUnrest is however
substantially unchanged from Column 1 and still strongly significant (1% level).74
The models displayed in Table 3.3 include the full set of macroeconomic controls
proposed in Table 3.2. This is in the attempt to control for the financial situation
of a given country/year, which might drive fiscal consolidation efforts. However,
the relationship between social unrest and fiscal conditionality might be driven by
special economic circumstances which might not be fully captured by this set of
macroeconomic controls. The need for fiscal consolidation might be more severe
if a country borrows from the IMF to face a sovereign debt crisis, rather than a
currency or banking crisis. At the same time, different types of financial crises
could also carry different probabilities of social unrest, as they might have more
or less direct effects on the citizens’ welfare. In order to control for this potential
source of omitted variable bias, I use the dataset compiled by Laeven and Valencia
[2013], which measures the existence and typology of financial crises occurring in
each country/year. Column 6 shows that while currency crises are associated with
more lenient fiscal conditionality (as probably the IMF’s intervention focuses on
other policy areas in this case), the coefficient on AverageUnrest remains negative
and strongly significant (-0.71, significant at the 1% level).
Overall, this section displays that the baseline results on the relationship between
IMF fiscal conditionality and a recipient country’s pre-existing history of social
unrest are robust to a wide set of potential confounding factors.
3.4.3 Robustness to selection
Having excluded the most obvious candidates for a possible omitted variable bias
in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 tests whether the relationship between social unrest and
planned fiscal consolidation is robust to potential selection issues. This concern
arises from the possibility of strategic behaviour on the side of the government
in the run-up to an IMF program. If, for example, governments undertake fiscal
adjustment when trying to stave off an IMF loan, they might generate social
unrest in the process. If the attempt to avoid the IMF program fails, how-
ever, and the government subsequently requires the Fund to provide the country
with lending assistance, my model would capture a negative relationship between
planned fiscal consolidation efforts and social unrest prior to the agreement.
74. Small differences in the cofficients are due to the loss of significant parts of the overall sample, when
including multiple controls, which are not available for all program/years. Appendix A3.2 attempts
to correct for this possible source of bias via interpolation of the additional control variables that are
continuous in nature (Polity2 and number of votes in line with the US at the UN General Assembly).
The results are left substantially unchanged.
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Table 3.4 therefore includes actual fiscal consolidation at year t-1
(∆Deficitt-1=Deficitt-1-Deficitt-2) as an additional control. Column 1 shows that
previous fiscal consolidation efforts have a strong negative effect on planned future
fiscal consolidation: one percentage point improvement in the deficit-to-GDP
ratio in previous years substantially reduces fiscal consolidation targets (coef-
ficient 0.89, significant at the 1% level). However, the inclusion of this control
does not considerably change the sign or magnitude of the cofficient associated
with AverageUnrest : the elasticity is -0.52, significant at the 5% level. The magni-
tude of this effect is a reduction in fiscal targets worth 20% of a standard deviation
for each standard deviation increase in AverageUnrest prior to the agreement:
this is only a small decline from the magnitude of 24% estimated in Table 3.3.
Column 2 displays the effect of AverageUnrest only for the years subsequent to
the first year of the program, to show whether the effect of social unrest differs
at different stages of an IMF arrangement. The effect of social unrest seems
to be irrelevant once the program has started: the IMF is not responsive to
social unrest taking place once the government has agreed to a multi-year lending
facility. However, Column 3 shows during the first year of a program, the effect
is negative and strongly significant (1% level): one standard deviation increase in
AverageUnrest prior to the beginning of a program reduces fiscal consolidation
targets by 48% of its standard deviation in the first program/year. This, from
a two-level game point of view, might suggest that the government reveals its
options at the beginning of an IMF arrangement: the size of its win set is disclosed
once and for all, and shifting domestic constraints might not be used against the
Fund as a bargaining tool ex-post. The magnitude of this effect might however
also suggest that a selection issue could be at play in the baseline results. In
particular, countries more prone to social unrest might systematically be in need
of less fiscal adjustment at the beginning of the agreement.
Column 4 is directly comparable to Column 1, as it includes all program years,
not just the initial year. Here, however, I exclude Western European countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal) from the estimation to control whether the effect is
driven by this subset of IMF borrowers, who are characterised by higher levels
of democratic accountability (as measured by the Polity2 scale) with respect
to the rest of the sample. Higher democratic accountability might imply more
possibilites for the population to protest against the political authority. On the
other hand, these countries might also be associated with a less severe need for
fiscal adjustment (compared to other countries undergoing IMF arrangements).
However, Column 4 shows that this is not the case: the coefficient on AverageUn-
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rest is substantially unchanged from Column 1: Western European democracies
are not driving the results.
However, these results do not rule out the possibility of a selection bias. Column
5 therefore presents the estimation of the Heckman selection model, in fur-
ther attempt to correct for selection into IMF programs. The selection equation
(Column 6) includes the same vector of controls as in the outcome equation,
and an exclusion restriction: this is a dummy indicating whether the country
was under an IMF program at year t-1 . While this variable has strong predic-
tive capacity for future inclusion into an IMF lending program (+1.13, significant
at the 1% level), it should have no direct or indirect effect on Consolidation,
once controlling for fiscal reform that had already taken place in the same country
prior to the current program/year. Column 5 shows that this further control
for selection leaves the magnitude and significance of the coefficient associated
with AverageUnrest substantially unchanged from Column 1. Practically, this
implies that two additional episodes of civil unrest in each of the three years
prior to any program/year reduce fiscal consolidation targets by 1.2 percentage
points of the deficit-to-GDP ratio (21% of a standard deviation).
3.4.4 Mediating factors: social unrest and domestic politics
The previous sections have provided evidence of the negative relationship between
fiscal consolidation under IMF arrangements and the level of extra-parliamentary
constraints faced by a government. In particular, if a population is generally
more prone to protests in the run-up to an IMF program review, its governments
receives less stringent fiscal consolidation conditions in the following program
review.
However, the strength of this constraint is unlikely to be the same for all countries,
because different governments face different incentives to respond to their citizens’
needs and demands. Leaders in fully democratic countries, for example, might be
more responsive to the threat of social unrest than more autocratic leaders. Also,
the electoral cycle might matter: being close to the elections might make politi-
cians reluctant to entertain the idea of costly reforms that could trigger protests.
Partisanship might as well play an important role. A party that witnesses its elec-
toral base being largely represented among the protesters is probably more likely
to be responsive to their needs. Finally, extra-parliamentary opposition might
interact with intra-legislature fragmentation: if governments are constrained by
the protests and also face a large number of veto players in the parliament, the
effect of social unrest on fiscal targets might be enhanced.
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Table 3.5 addresses how these political variables mediate between social unrest
and fiscal conditionality by exploiting a set of interaction terms with political
variables taken from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions. Column
1 shows that social unrest has a stronger effect on Consolidation the higher the
degree of democratic accountability of a country’s institutions. The coefficient on
the interaction term between AverageUnrest and the polity score is negative (-
0.25, significant at the 5% level), implying that the higher the level of democratic
accountability, the larger the effect of AverageUnrest on fiscal conditionality.
This can be read as evidence that autocratic governments might therefore be
unwilling or unable to use this particular type of domestic constraint as a bar-
gaining tool when negotiating with the Fund. On the other hand, the extent of
intra-parliamentary opposition seems to have no mediating effect between social
unrest and fiscal consolidation: in Column 2 the interaction term between the
number of veto players in a legislature and social unrest prior to the agreement
is not significant.
Column 3 shows that election timing matters: social unrest has a stronger nega-
tive effect on fiscal consolidation targets during electoral years (-0.38, significant
at the 10% level). This result, together with the evidence about the differential
role of social unrest along the Polity2 scale, suggests that the electoral cycle might
be an important key to an understanding of the system of incentives faced by a
government when bargaining over conditionality with the IMF. The higher the
level of democratic accountability, and the closer in time the elections are, the
more the need of a government to be responsive to its electoral base. Therefore,
the larger the potential for extra-parliamentary opposition to provide leverage
in the negotiation process, as the threat of involuntary defection becomes more
credible.
Finally, the results in Columns 4 and 5 show how political leanings of the gov-
ernment interact with the measure of social unrest. Column 4 shows that those
government classified as right-wing by the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions do not use social unrest as an instrument to obtain fewer condi-
tions. In fact, they might be using it to obtain stricter fiscal conditionality, as
the interaction term between social unrest and fiscal consolidation is actually
positive (+0.42, significant at the 10% level). The opposite is true for left-wing
governments: when these are faced with higher AverageUnrest , they negotiate
less stringent fiscal consolidation targets (-1.48 percentage points, significant at
the 10% level).
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These two results can be interpreted as further evidence that the citizen/voter is
pivotal in understanding how social unrest can affect fiscal conditions. Left-wing
governments are more likely to find institutional and political support among
members of the trade unions and social movements. Therefore, since their elec-
toral base is likely to be disproportionately represented in strikes and anti-govern-
ment demonstrations, the threat of involuntary defection can become severe for
these governments, unless they accomodate some of their voters’ demands. This
view is in line with Rickard and Anner’s [2014] results. On the other hand,
conservative governments do not typically have their electoral base in the trade
unions or social movements. As their electoral support finds its root in other
strata of society, the threat of involuntary defection due to social unrest becomes
less credible for these governments. Moreover, conservative politicians might even
be willing to use the occasion of an IMF agreement to push reforms that might
have been previously hardly attainable due to domestic opposition, as the pos-
itive sign on the interaction term in Column 4 seems to suggest.
3.5 Social Unrest and structural conditions
Citizens may care about the size of a budget cut, but they are also likely to care
about its distribution. If a government is constrained when implementing fiscal
adjustment because of the threat of social unrest, it should also have difficul-
ties implementing structural changes in labour markets, welfare state and public
employment, as these policy realms are among those that will impact citizens
more directly. Therefore, according to the two-level game theoretical framework,
the evidence of strong social movements should also reduce planned structural
conditionality in the economic policy domains.
3.5.1 Results
The dependent variable in Table 3.6 is the number of conditions in SocialPol-
icyReform in each program/year. Since the dependent variable is discrete and
presents overdispersion I use a negative binomial regression framework.75
Column 1 shows that the elasticity between AverageUnrest and the number of
conditions in SocialPolicyReform is negative (-0.12) and statistically significant
at the 5% level: one standard deviation increase in the measure of social unrest
reduces the number of these conditions by 0.25 (a quarter of a condition), or 11%
of a standard deviation.
75. The standard deviation of SocialPolicyReform is about 1.5 times larger than its mean (Table 3.1).
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Column 2 tests whether the result is robust to a classification of structural con-
ditions which takes into account their relevance, using the weighting system
proposed by Caraway Rickard and Anner [2012]. In this categorization, Prior
Actions receive a weight of 4, Structural and Quantitative Performance Criteria
a weight of 3, and Strucural Benchmarks of Indicative Targets a weight of 2.
Column 2 shows that introducing this additional classification of the type of
conditions does not change the direction or magnitude of the baseline result.
However, while the coefficient is similar to Column 1, the higher standard devi-
ation associated with this weighted dependent variable reduces the magnitude
of the results substantially: one standard deviation increase in AverageUnrest
is now associated with a decline in the weighted number of reforms worth 4% of its
standard deviation, about a fourth of the magnitude found using the unweighted
structural conditionality measure.
Columns 3 and 4 run a placebo test: the dependent variables are the number
of conditions associated with trade reform and financial sector reform in any
given program/year. These are also conditions often included in IMF programs
and they might face some form of domestic opposition. However, the type of
constraints associated with reforms of these policy areas are less likely to depend
upon protests and more likely to hinge on the influence of business associations,
for example, or other institutional constraints (Woo [2013]). Gould [2003, 2006]
shows that financial sector conditions, in particular, are shaped by the presence
and influence of commercial banks among the group of lenders working in part-
nership with the IMF. Column 3 shows that there is no significant relationship
between the number of trade conditions and social unrest prior to a program/year.
Column 4 shows that the number of financial sector reforms is actually moder-
ately increasing in the number of episodes of unrest prior to a program/year.
This is evidence that the decline in the number of conditions following episodes
of social unrest is not simply reflecting a generalized reduction in conditionality.
Rather, it specifically reflects a decline in the number of conditions related to
public expenditure.
Finally, Column 5 adds controls for whether the country is undergoing a banking,
currency, or sovereign debt crisis, as classified by Laeven and Valencia [2013].
Banking crises are associated with fewer social policy conditions (-1.5, significant
at the 1% level), while the other two types of crises do not have a significant
impact on the number of conditions. However, adding these controls does not
change the sign or magnitude of AverageUnrest substantially: the estimated elas-
ticity is -0.1, significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.7 displays the same results as in Table 3.6 using a zero inflated negative
binomial model, as a robustness test. This model should be able to take into
account excess zeros obtained by the data generating process.76 Column 1 shows
that the zero-inflated model has to be preferred to the standard negative binomial
MLE: the Z statistic of a significant difference between the two models is positive
(+1.76) and statistically significant at the 5% level. Column 1 also largely con-
firms that one standard deviation increase in the episodes of social unrest reduces
the number of conditions on social policy reform by 12% of a standard deviation
(significant at the 5% level). Columns 2-5 test the robustness of this result to the
inclusion of additional controls.
Column 2 adds controls for the macroeconomic determinants of fiscal consol-
idation, proposed in Table 3.2, plus a dummy variable indicating whether the
program also features a condition on fiscal deficit in the same year. The pres-
ence of a condition on fiscal deficit actually reduces the number of structural
conditions, suggesting that these two types of conditions are not complementary,
but rather alternative. Nevertheless, the coefficient associated to AverageUnrest
remains negative (-0.12) and statistically significant at the 10% level.
Column 3 adds controls for other domestic political constraints, explored in Table
3.2.77 The level of democratic accountability has no significant effect on the
number of SocialPolicyReform conditions. The presence of elections in the same
program/year does not affect the dependent variable in a significant fashion
either. However, more veto players in the legislature are associated with more
stringent structural conditionality, as it is the case with fiscal conditionality
(+0.28, significant at the 5% level).
Structural conditionality may also be driven by the type of economic crisis the
country is facing. A sovereign debt crisis, for example, might suggest more con-
ditions targeted at reducing the public expenditure bill. Column 4 therefore adds
controls for the type of crisis, as coded in Laven and Valencia’s [2013] dataset.
While the coefficient on banking crises is negative and strongly significant, the
other two types of crises do not have any statistically significant impact on the
dependent variable. Moreover, the coefficient on AverageUnrest is substantially
unchanged (-0.11) and remains significant at the 5% level.
76. Many programs do not include any conditions on SocialPolicyReform at all, possibly because the
type of crises these countries are facing do not reflect a fiscal imbalance.
77. I run separate models in this case because the ZINB procedure fails to converge when introducing
too many regressors.
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Finally, Column 5 tests for the influence of geopolitical influences which might
affect the IMF’s win-set. I include controls for the number of votes in line with
the US at the UN General Assembly and a dummy for whether the country is a
temporary member of the UN Security Council. The effect of voting at the UN,
while negative, is not statistically significant. On the other hand membership of
the Security Council increases the number of structural conditions. The coefficient
associated with AverageUnrest remains negative (-0.11) and significant at the 5%
level.
The findings in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest a negative relationship between social
policy conditions and AverageUnrest . This provides further evidence in support
of the domestic constraints hypothesis: if governments are more constrained by
strong social movements, they are asked to implement fewer structural conditions
in the realms that relate most closely to public sector reform.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter analyses how a country’s propensity for social unrest influences fiscal
policy choices in the context of IMF arrangements. To study the relationship
between extra-parliamentary opposition and fiscal conditionality, I construct an
original dataset on fiscal policy and government budget reforms included in all
IMF agreements between 2002 and 2012.
If citizens of a country are more prone to social unrest, the government might
postpone fiscal stabilisation and other social policy-related reforms in order to
avoid the welfare loss resulting from rioting (Ponticelli, Voth [2011]; Tabellini
Passarelli [2013]). If this is a credible threat, however, it might also influence the
negotiations between a country and the IMF, by providing the government with
a bargaining advantage towards the Fund. The theoretical basis is Putnam’s
[1988] seminal contribution on two-level games. This theory predicts that if a
party is constrained by domestic constituencies, and this constraint is common
knowledge between the negotiating parties, then the most constrained negotiator
obtains a better deal, because of the threat of involuntary defection. As a result,
conditionality in the realms of fiscal and social policy should be fewer, and less
stringent.
My findings strongly support this hypothesis: an increase in social unrest prior
to a program/year significantly reduces fiscal consolidation targets. Moreover,
governments also obtain fewer structural conditions related to welfare provision
and public employment. These results are robust to controlling for a vast array
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of variables deemed relevant by previous literature on IMF conditionality, and to
potential selection issues.
The analysis presented here might benefit from a measurement of the scope and
intrusiveness of structural conditions. Further work is also required in order to
understand the degree of compliance with fiscal conditions. The simple model
presented here predicts that compliance with fiscal conditionality should be quasi-
perfect , given that domestic constraints are taken into account as a result of first-
stage negotiations. As this is not likely to be the case, other variables may inter-
vene in making defection (whether voluntary or not) arise in equilibrium. Finally,
it would be interesting to study whether social unrest influences governments’
decisions to undertake fiscal consolidation outside the context of IMF programs.
This chapter shows that social movements are able to influence economic policy-
making, even in the context of IMF lending. This is an interesting result, since
it suggests that extra-parliamentary opposition might be an additional polit-
ical force shaping fiscal policy choices, alongside the formal institutions already
considered by the political economics literature. A study of the domestic polit-
ical constraints to the implementation of economic policy, moreover, might help
explain why a similar set of policies might produce differ effects in different con-
texts. Fiscal reforms typically have many social and distributional consequences,
and optimal fiscal policy design may substantially differ from the textbook
approach, once these social constraints are taken into account.
IMF programs might be considered a peculiar case to study the effects of political
constituencies on fiscal policy, but it is precisely in virtue of this peculiarity that
they constitute an informative example. If the threat of civil unrest is capable of
restricting options even under IMF arrangements, then it may also explain fiscal
policy choices in more conventional times.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: An increase in the domestic constraints shifts the set of possible agreements from [Sm1,
G*] to [Sm2, G*].
                                    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
















Figure 3.2. Countries undergoing IMF lending programs, 2002-2012 . Source: IMF MONA Database
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of fiscal consolidation measure as defined in Equation n.11. A positive number
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of structural conditionality measures. Number of conditions per program/year,



































Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics. Sources: IMF Monitoring of Fund Arrangements Database,
Cross National Time Series Data Archive, World Economic Outlook (2015).
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Program Characteristics 
#Consecutive Years In Program 486 3.33 2.61 0.00 13.00 
Concessional Lending 483 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Deficit Condition 486 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Access/GDP 470 5.59 18.18 0.00 138.74 
Conditionality  
Consolidation 231 1.11 5.61 -17.52 19.57 
Social Policy Reform, Yearly # 472 1.27 2.32 0.00 16.00 
Trade Reform, Yearly # 472 1.10 2.32 0.00 23.00 
Financial Sector Reform, Yearly # 472 0.59 1.52 0.00 10.00 
Controls: Social Unrest 
Average Unrest (three year moving average) 480 0.69 2.15 0.00 28.33 
General Strikes, Yearly # 485 0.09 0.58 0.00 4.00 
Riots Yearly # 485 0.25 0.80 0.00 5.00 
Anti-Government Demonstrations, Yearly # 485 0.48 1.51 0.00 8.00 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Average Forecast Error GDP Growth  (t+1) 481 0.43 4.48 -20.43 40.25 
Fiscal Deficit/GDP 459 -2.50 8.13 -23.48 125.45 
Balance of Payment/GDP  472 -7.42 8.79 -70.98 19.75 
Public Debt/GDP 429 71.92 80.64 9.55 931.64 

118
Table 3.2: Fiscal conditionality: macroeconomic and program-related controls





   
Forecast Error Growth (One year) 0.140** 0.108* 
 (0.057) (0.057) 
Deficit t-2 -0.112*** -0.102*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) 
BOP t-1 -0.138*** -0.138*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) 
Debt t-1 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Primary Balance 6.842*** 2.336** 
 (1.741) (1.021) 
Years in Program -0.175 -0.124 
 (0.185) (0.167) 
Concessional 2.179 0.008 
 (1.533) (1.003) 
Access/GDP -0.120 -0.028 
 (0.073) (0.021) 
Constant -4.656*** -3.336*** 
 (1.444) (1.128) 
   
Observations 202 202 
Within R-squared 0.325 0.277 
Number of Countries 
 










OLS regression. Sources: MONA database and World Economic Outlook (April 2015). 
The dependent variable is fiscal consolidation at time t (only country/year cells that received 
a condition on fiscal balance are included). Controls include: the forecast error of GDP 
growth (one year horizon); Government deficit/GDP at t-2; Balance of Payments/GDP and 
Central Government Debt/GDP at t-1; a dummy for whether the condition refers to 
government primary balance; number of consecutive years under an IMF program; a dummy 
for whether the IMF program is classified as concessional lending or not; Access (in SDR) as 
a proportion of current national GDP. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Fiscal consolidation and social unrest: interaction with institutional factors
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation 
      
Unrest*Polity -0.258**     
 (0.107)     
Polity -0.147     
 (0.088)     
Unrest*VetoPl.  0.015    
  (0.184)    
Veto Players  0.771**    
  (0.260)    
Unrest*Elections   -0.383*   
   (0.180)   
Elections   0.145   
   (0.178)   
Unrest*Conservative    0.425*  
    (0.196)  
Conservative Govt.    -2.356**  
    (0.918)  
Unrest*Left     -1.485* 
     (0.729) 
Left     1.555 
(0.885) 
 
Average Unrest 1.356 -0.560 -0.330 -0.797*** -0.329* 
 (0.782) (0.638) (0.211) (0.205) (0.172) 
 




















Constant 1.428 -2.761 0.047 -3.456** -4.270*** 
 (1.505) (2.198) (1.175) (1.455) (1.228) 
      
Observations 164 168 168 188 188 
Number of groups 52 54 54 59 59 
OLS regression. The dependent variable is planned fiscal consolidation in year t. This table 
runs a series of models where average unrest is interacted with a set of controls for domestic 
politics from the World Bank database of political institutions. Column (1) controls for the 
interaction between average unrest and polity score. Column (2) for veto players in a 
legislature, measured as the number of checks and balances. Col.(3) for the interaction 
between unrest and election years. Cols. (4) and (5) for the interaction between unrest and 
right and left wing governments, respectively. All Columns include the full set of controls 
included in Table 1 as well as country fixed effects. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.6: Structural conditionality: negative binomial regression
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











      
AverageUnrest -0.120** -0.128* -0.074 0.117* -0.103* 
 (0.051) (0.070) (0.122) (0.061) (0.057) 
AccessGDP 0.016 0.028 -0.015 -0.038 0.017 
 (0.025) (0.047) (0.035) (0.178) (0.025) 
Banking Crisis     -1.520*** 
     (0.339) 
Currency Crisis     0.307 
     (0.609) 
Sov. Debt Crisis     -1.076 
(1.223) 
 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.632*** 1.770*** 0.894** -1.611*** 0.379*** 
 (0.164) (0.240) (0.450) (0.188) (0.134) 
      
Observations 431 431 431 431 412 
Negative binomial regression. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the number of conditions in 
social policy reform recorded at year t. In Column (2) is the number of conditions weighted 
according to their nature, following the weighting procedure proposed by Caraway, Rickard and 
Anner (2012). In Cols. (3)-(4) is the number of conditions on international trade reform and financial 
sector reform, respectively.  Column (5) adds controls for the type of crisis, according to Laeven and 
Valencia’s (2012) classification. Country fixed effects (unconditional). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.7: Structural conditionality: xero-inflated negative binomial
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression. The dependent variable in cols. (1)-(5) is the count of 
conditions in social policy reform in a given country/year. Column (2) adds macroeconomic controls. 
Column (3) controls for the level of democratic accountability (polity scale), the number of veto 
players in a legislature and whether the program/year is also an election year. Column (4) controls for 
the type of crisis, as in Laeven and Valencia (2012). Column (5) controls for geopolitical influences 
(votes in line with the US at the UN General Assembly and whether the country is a temporary 
member of the UN Security Council). Unconditional country fixed-effects are included in all models. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
Average Unrest -0.131** -0.125* -0.113*** -0.118** -0.116** 
 (0.052) (0.065) (0.043) (0.057) (0.050) 
Access/GDP -0.004 -0.027* -0.044*** -0.004 0.001 
 (0.034) (0.016) (0.011) (0.031) (0.027) 
Debt t-1  -0.005    
  (0.003)    
BOP t-1  -0.009    
  (0.011)    
Deficit t-2  0.030    
  (0.024)    
Fiscal Consolidation  -0.664***    
  (0.243)    
Polity   0.015   
   (0.155)   
Veto Players   0.283**   
   (0.121)   
Election   -0.117   
   (0.101)   
Banking Crisis    -1.441***  
    (0.261)  
Currency Crisis    0.057  
    (0.536)  
Sov. Debt Crisis    -0.019  
    (0.384)  
Membership UNSC     0.904*** 
     (0.284) 

























Constant 0.867*** 1.582*** 0.674 1.292*** 0.907** 
 (0.160) (0.261) (1.404) (0.179) (0.407) 
Vuong Test  
 
1.76**     
Observations 431 375 373 412 364 
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Appendix A3.1: Cross sectional dependence
Cross sectional dependence is a common problem arising in panel datasets where
units are not randomly sampled. Countries, for example, are subject to regional
shocks and a macroeconomic crisis can expand rapidly across borders, generating
regional (or even global) common disturbances. Assuming the residuals are corre-
lated within groups, but uncorrelated across groups, might lead to underestimate
the standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay [1998]). Corrections for spatial depen-
dence in macro datasets are possible, but they generally rely on the assumption of
a large time dimension (T>N) , which is unrealistic in many applications (Hoeckle
[2007]). Controlling parametrically for cross-sectional dependence, on the other
hand, imposes a precise structure on the data and could be prone to misspecifi-
cation. Driscoll and Kraay’s [1998] procedure allows one to non-parametrically
correct for cross-sectional dependence, autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity,
while at the same time not requiring a large T/N ratio. Hoeckle [2007] performs
the Monte Carlo simulations on a sample where N=1000 and the maximum T=40
(T/N=0.04). The sample I use in this chapter includes 67 countries undergoing
fiscal conditionality, with a maximum number of years in which fiscal conditions
are recorded in any given country being eight (T/N=0.12). This technique is
overall more flexible than controlling parametrically for cross sectional depen-
dence. Nevertheless, Table A.3.2 shows that incuding year dummies with robust
standard errors does not substantially affect the results, compared to Table 3.3.
125
Table A3.2: Controlling parametrically for cross-sectional dependence
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation 
      
AverageUnrest -1.068** -0.977** -1.022** -0.675** -1.136** 
 (0.468) (0.434) (0.458) (0.328) (0.493) 
Forec.error (1Y) 0.170*** 0.075 0.069 0.175*** 0.145*** 
 (0.060) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
Deficit t-2 -0.099** -0.142*** -0.147*** 0.153*** -0.106** 
 (0.048) (0.035) (0.032) (0.047) (0.050) 
BOP t-1 -0.133* -0.115 -0.135* -0.082 -0.130* 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.076) (0.058) (0.072) 
Debt t-1 0.037*** 0.001 0.005 0.019* 0.037*** 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) 
Primary Balance 7.350*** 7.464*** 7.418*** 6.788*** 7.180*** 
 (1.782) (1.957) (1.946) (1.721) (1.729) 
Years in program -0.216 -0.399 -0.426 -0.420 -0.246 
 (0.260) (0.302) (0.302) (0.252) (0.276) 
Concessional 1.405 1.965 2.113 2.062 1.472 
 (2.131) (2.757) (2.745) (1.425) (2.109) 
Access/GDP -0.198** -0.223** -0.225** -0.285*** -0.182** 
 (0.076) (0.088) (0.089) (0.055) (0.083) 
Election   0.020   
   (0.363)   
Polity2  -0.115 -0.146   
  (0.186) (0.228)   
Membership UNSC    -6.228***  
    (1.791)  
Votes with US (UNGA)    -5.299  
    (5.877)  
Banking Crisis     -1.269 
     (1.926) 
Currency Crisis     -3.612 
     (2.163) 




















Constant -4.533** -0.156 -0.596 0.082 -3.773* 
 (2.121) (2.900) (3.207) (1.698) (2.221) 
      
Observations 188 164 160 151 183 
R-squared 0.378 0.430 0.462 0.417 0.413 
Number of Countries 59 52 51 56 57 
OLS regression. The dependent variable is planned fiscal consolidation at the end of year t. This 
Table reproposes the model in Table 2, but using a different simple robust standard errors, instead of 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. I control for cross-sectional dependence by adding year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A3.2: Interpolation of dependent variables
Table A3.1. Interpolation of political variables
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Consolidation Consolidation 
   
AverageUnrest -0.585*** -0.617*** 
 (0.148) (0.184) 
Forecast Err.Growth 0.112** 0.148*** 
 (0.035) (0.033) 
Deficit t-2 -0.120** -0.097* 
 (0.038) (0.048) 
BOP t-1 -0.131*** -0.145*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) 
Debt t-1 0.005 0.037*** 
 (0.015) (0.004) 
Primary Balance 5.047*** 5.247*** 
 (0.620) (0.377) 
Polity2 (Interpolation) -0.105  
 (0.089)  











Constant -1.541* -4.860*** 
 (0.775) (0.890) 
   
Observations 166 188 
Number of groups 53 59 
OLS regression.  The dependent variable is planned fiscal consolidation at the end of year t.  
Column (1) controls for the effect of the Polity scale once the missing cells for this variables have 
been replace by their country-level average throughout the years. Column (2) does the same with the 
number of votes in line with the US at the UN General Assembly. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in 
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